



HISTORICAL BULLETIN



HISTORICAL BULLETIN
The Research Journal of the Philippine Historical Association
Volume LI January–December 2017

KAPISANANG PANGKASAYSAYAN NG PILIPINAS
The Philippine Historical Association

BOARD OF TRUSTEES (2016–2018)

President DR. EMMANUEL F. CALAIRO *De La Salle University Dasmariñas*
Vice President DR. FERNANDO A. SANTIAGO, JR. *De La Salle University*
Secretary JONATHAN C. BALSAMO *Museo Valenzuela*
Treasurer DR. EVELYN A. SONGCO *University of Santo Tomas*
Public Relations Officer MICHAEL CHARLESTON B. CHUA *De La Salle University Manila*
Editor-In-Chief, *Historical Bulletin*: DR. MA. LUISA T. CAMAGAY *University of the Philippines Diliman*

BOARD MEMBERS

GLORIA E. MELENCIO *University of the Philippines Los Baños*
DR. ESTRELLITA T. MUHI *University of the East (Retired)*
DR. ARLENE D. CALARA *University of Santo Tomas*
JAMES S. GUIDANGEN *Kalinga-Apayao State College*
Representative to the Philippine Social Science Council DR. EVELYN A. MIRANDA
University of the Philippines Diliman (Retired)
**Representative to the National Commission for Culture and the Arts – National Committee on
Historical Research** DR. CELESTINA P. BONCAN *University of the Philippines Manila*

EDITORIAL BOARD MEMBERS

DR. REYNALDO C. ILETO *Nanyang Technological University of Singapore*
DR. ROMMEL A. CURAMING *Univeristy of Brunei, Darussalam*
DR. SATOSHI ARA *Fukushima, Japan*
DR. RAQUEL A. G. REYES *School of Oriental and Affrican Studies, Univeristy of London*
DR. FRANCIS A. GEALOGO *Ateneo de Manila University*

The Historical Bulletin is the official journal of the Philippine Historical Association.

Please address manuscripts, book reviews, research notes, comments and advertisements to THE EDITOR,
Historical Bulletin, c/o Philippine Social Science Council, Commonwealth Ave., Diliman, Quezon City or thru
www.pha.1995.blogspot.com.

The Historical Bulletin is a refereed journal; the editorial staff/reviewers reserve the right to publish or not
articles submitted for review.

Articles in the *Historical Bulletin* do not represent the views of the Philippine Historical Association.

Application to quote or reprint articles in the *Historical Bulletin* should be addressed to THE EDITOR.

Philippine Copyright © 2018 by the Philippine Historical Association.

ISSN 2244-2782

ZENAIDA N. EBALAN
JOURNAL DESIGN AND LAYOUT



THE PHILIPPINE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION

HISTORICAL BULLETIN
Volume LI
2017







HISTORICAL BULLETIN

Official Journal of the Philippine Historical Association

VOLUME LI

JANUARY–DECEMBER 2017

vii

Editor's Note

1

Ang Mito ng Gintong Orinola: Kakayahan at Kontrobersiya sa Pamamahala ni Elpidio Quirino
Michael Charleston "Xiao" Chua

22

Towards the Happiness and Security of the "Common Man": Agrarian Reform in the Time of President Ramon Magsaysay, 1954–1957
Fernando A. Santiago, Jr., Ph.D.

50

Ang Retorika ng Rehimeng Duterte at ang Kulturang Pilipino: Isang Kasong Pag-aaral sa Pagbabanggaan ng Burukrasya at Kultura
Raul Roland R. Sebastian, DPA
Mark Joseph P. Santos

93

The Origins and Rise of Philippine Political Corruption: On the Diversion of *Kaginhawahang Bayan* by the Elite during the Spanish and American Regimes and its Lasting Impact on Philippine Politics and Administration
Ma. Carmen V. Peñalosa, DPA

138

Regulating the Opium Contract System in the Late-Spanish Philippines: The 1896 Iloilo Inspection Reports
Ferdinand Philip F. Victoria

v







Editor's Note

Without the intention of assessing administrations of past presidents, the collection of papers published in the *Historical Bulletin* curiously became one. Three presidents of the Philippine Republic are the focus of three papers. They are Elpidio Quirino, Ramon Magsaysay and Rodrigo Duterte. Elpidio Quirino is the subject of Michael Charleston “Xiao” Chua’s article “Ang Mito ng Gintong Orinola: Kakayahan at Kontrobersiya sa Pamamahala ni Elpidio Quirino”; Ramon Magsaysay is the focus of Fernando A. Santiago Jr.’s “Towards the Happiness and Security of the Common Man: Agrarian Reform in the Time of President Ramon Magsaysay, (1954–1957); and finally Rodrigo Duterte is the topic of Dr. Raul Roland R. Sebastian and Professor Mark Joseph P. Santos’ “Ang Retorika ng Rehimeng Duterte at ang Kulturang Pilipino: Isang Kasong Pag-aaral sa Pagbabanggaan ng Burukrasya at Kultura.”

The two other papers are also very timely and current since they elaborate on political corruption and the opium contract system. The Duterte administration vows to end political corruption and had declared a war on drugs. The latter may not be related to the current campaign against drugs by the Duterte administration but it looks at another form of “drug” present during the Spanish administration whose exclusive use was for the Chinese in the Philippines. (Reason: Opium was illegal also for mestizos to consume.)

The three articles on previous presidents are assessments of their administration by taking a look at their persona and their accomplishments. Far more than that, the articles interestingly take a look at the cultural underpinnings which shaped them and their administration. Chua argues for instance that Quirino may be studied using the concept of *dunganon* which Alice Magos defines as a person who embodies one or all of the following qualities: wise, confident, righteous, eloquent, charismatic and of exceptional strength. Magos adds that the *datus* and the *babaylans* of pre-colonial Philippines were *dunganons*. Quirino according to Chua was a *dunganon* and taking off from this concept would contextualize the achievements of Quirino such as being “Father of Philippine Foreign Service,” a promoter of social social justice and industrialization, a peace





maker through his negotiations with Huk leaders, and one who espoused regional solidarity among the countries of Southeast Asia. One learns from Chua's article that issue of having bought a "golden orinola or chamberpot" for his personal use was one concocted by the American authorities who found Quirino flexing his independence for the country's interest instead of serving American interest in the country.

Taken from this light, Chua concludes that it is about time to put an end in describing Quirino's administration as a lackluster administration.

Land is a prized possession for Filipinos. This was what Ramon Magsaysay promised the "common man": to own a piece of cultivable land. In his inaugural address, Magsaysay declared: "Land for the landless shall be more than a just a catch phrase. We will translate it into actuality. We shall clear and open for settlement our vast and fertile public lands which, under the coaxing or willing hearts and industrious hands, are waiting to yield substance to millions of our countrymen." The objective of Fernando A. Santiago Jr.'s paper is to look at how the Magsaysay administration addressed agrarian reform in the country. In the three years of Magsaysay as president, the Agricultural Tenancy Act which provided guidelines on tenancy relations and the Land Reform Act of 1955 were passed. Santiago added that with the two laws "a two pronged approach to land reform" was effected: reform in the tenancy relations and the break-up of landed estates. Santiago concluded that Magsaysay Agrarian Reform empowered the Filipino peasant. Through the Agricultural Tenancy Act, peasants were empowered to assert their rights shown by the increased number of cases filed by tenants against the landlords. Santiago added that though the Land Reform Act of 1955 may have not pushed enough land reform, it became the basis of future legislations on land reform such as the 1963 Agricultural Land Reform Code of Diosdado Macapagal.

Barely reaching the middle of the six-year Rodrigo Duterte Administration, the paper of Dr. Raul Roland R. Sebastian and Professor Mark Joseph P. Santos makes an assessment of the rhetoric of the Duterte Administration. The paper asserts that the popularity of the Duterte administration to the Filipino masses is grounded on the Filipino culture. The paper posits that the idea of an authoritarian ruler is not alien to the Filipino culture citing examples of "strong man" such as Lee Kwan





Yew of Singapore, Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia and Kim Jong Un of North Korea. Presenting Duterte as the father figure to the Filipino people makes comprehensible according to Sebastian and Santos the need to discipline his “children” through the use of strict disciplinary measures. This justifies the Duterte’s war on drugs as well as firing people in government for committing graft and corruption. The use of foul language, the lack of formality, the macho image and his sexist stance according to Sebastian and Santos endears him to the masses instead of alienates them because this is what the masses understand. The paper further explains that this rhetoric of Duterte’s bureaucracy runs counter to a western-inspired bureaucracy set in place after the EDSA People Power Revolution. The paper ends with an interesting question: Does the rejection by Duterte of western-inspired bureaucracy and his acceptance of a bureaucracy grounded on Filipino culture enough to give legitimation to his administration?

The current campaign of the Duterte administration against corruption has much to learn from the paper of Carmen V. Penalosa entitled “The Origins and Rise of Philippine Political Corruption: On the Diversion of “Kaginhawahang Bayan By the Elite during the Spanish and Philippine Politics and Administration.” The paper documents the emergence of political corruption in the Philippines by identifying two sources: the colonial systems of both Spain and the United States and the native elite who were co-opted into the two systems. Penalosa looks into the cultural dynamics of a *pinuno* (leader) and his *sakop* (wards) which was premised on *kaginhawaang bayan* (community wellbeing and welfare). She adds that the *kaginhawaang bayan* as well as the *pinuno-sakop* relations was compromised under the two colonial regimes of Spain and the United States. The *pinuno-sakop* relations was transformed into a patron-client relationship during the Spanish period and into a patronage and spoils politics during the American period. According to Penalosa, gone was the desire for *kaginhawaang bayan* only to be replaced by *pansariling kapakinabangan* (self-aggrandizement) and *ginagawang hanapbuhay ang trabaho* or the “Filipino metaphor for political corruption.”

Ferdinand Philip Victoria’s paper entitled “Regulating the Opium Contract System in the Late Spanish Philippines” discusses the opium





contract system focusing on Iloilo. Using the 1896 Iloilo Inspection Reports, Victoria asserts that the *Inspection Reports* revealed many violations of the contract regarding the establishment of opium dens. One was the absence of a clear signage of the opium establishment, the toleration of private opium establishments and the discrepancies between the list of fumaderos (opium dens) provided by the contractor and the premises visited by the inspectors. Victoria concluded that Spanish colonial authorities turned a blind eye on the violations of the contract as this enterprise brought in money to the colonial coffers. Moreover Victoria showed how power between the colonial government and contractors was contested and renegotiated for the benefit of both. All of this was happening at the close of Spanish rule in the Philippines.

All of the articles are interesting and relevant as they resonate to what is currently happening to the Philippines: the recently concluded 125th birth anniversary of Elpidio Quirino, the comparison being made between Ramon Magsaysay and Rodrigo Duterte as charismatic leaders, the campaign against corruption by the Duterte Administration and lastly the campaign against drugs.

For the above mentioned reasons, this particular issue of the Historical Bulletin makes an interesting read.

MA. LUISA T. CAMAGAY





Ang Mito Ng Gintong Orinola: Kakayahan at Kontrobersiya sa Pamamahala ni Elpidio Quirino

MICHAEL CHARLESTON “XIAO” CHUA
De La Salle University

Abstract

Sa Kamaynilaan, may Quirino Highway at Quirino Avenue. Sa Norte Luzon, mayroong Quirino Province. Sa buong bansa, may iba’t ibang Quirino *schools*. Ngunit sa pag-aaral ng kasaysayan ng bansa, dinadaan-daan lamang si Pangulong Elpidio Quirino.

Ang pagdiriwang ng ika-125 taong kaarawan ng unang pangulong Ilocano, ang orihinal na Apo Lakay, nitong nagdaang November 16, 2015 ay isang pagkakataon sa ating nasyon na muling balikan ang maraming pamana ng kanyang administrasyon.

Ngunit, simula nang matalo siya sa halalan ng 1953 kay Ramon Magsaysay, ang naalala ng marami ay ang mga kontrobersiya ng korupsiyon sa kanyang administrasyon.

Batay sa iba’t ibang mga lathalain ukol sa pamumuno ni Quirino, at sa mismong mga talumpati at alaala ni Quirino, titingnan ng papel na ito ang iba’t ibang salik na nakaapekto sa imahe ni Quirino sa kabila ng masasabing “competent leadership” sa lente ng mga dalumat ng “Kasaysayang Buhay,” “Dunganon nga Tawo” at ang datu bilang “Tagapagpamudmod ng Ginhawa.”

Tatapusin ang papel ng ilang paglilista ng mga mahahalagang mga naisakatuparang ng Administrasyong Quirino, mga bagay at mga konsepto na atin na ngayong isinasawalang-bahala. Lilinawin ang paglalarawan sa administrasyon ni Quirino bilang “uneventful.”

Sa huli, ang papel ay magpapanukala ng isang pagtingin sa ating mga nakaraang mga pinuno na kinuha ang halimbawa mula sa mga Amerikanong *presidential biographers*—na upang maging ganap at tunay





na matuto sa kasaysayan ay kailangang talakayin ang mga negatibo at positibong aspekto ng pamumuno ng isang lider.

Panimula

Sa Kamaynilaan, may Quirino Highway at Quirino Avenue. Sa Norte ng Luzon, mayroong Quirino Province. Sa buong bansa, may iba't ibang Quirino *schools*. Ngunit sa pag-aaral ng kasaysayan ng bansa, dinadaan-daan lamang si Pangulong Elpidio Quirino.

Ang pagdiriwang ng ika-125 taong kaarawan ng unang pangulong Ilocano, ang orihinal na Apo Lakay, nitong nagdaang November 16, 2015 ay isang pagkakataon upang muling balikan ang maraming pamana ng kanyang administrasyon.

Ngunit, simula nang matalo siya sa halalan ng 1953 kay Ramon Magsaysay, ang naalala ng marami ay ang mga alegasyon ng korupsiyon sa kanyang administrasyon. Kapartido niya ang siyang nagwika ng sikat na katagang, “What are we in power for?” Mayroon ding alegasyon na ginamit ng kanyang kapatid na si Antonio ang kanyang tanggapan para sa kapakinabangan ng kanyang mga negosyo. Liban sa pagiging elitista at mahilig mag-*party*, bumili siya diumano para sa sarili ng isang Php 5,000.00 kama sa Palasyo, at na mayroon siyang pagmamay-aring isang gintong orinola.

Batay sa iba't ibang mga lathalain ukol sa pamumuno ni Quirino at sa mismong kanyang sariling talambuhay, titingnan ng papel na ito ang iba't ibang salik na nakaapekto sa imahe ni Quirino sa kabila ng masasabing “competent leadership” nito, isang pangulong sinikap, ngunit nabigo na pigilin ang korupsiyon ng mga nasa pamahalaan, sa kabila rin ng pruweba na siya mismo ay hindi nandambong.

Ipakikita rin ng papel ang isang mundong kaiba mula sa ating kinabubuhayan ngayon—isang mundong ang kaliit-liitang bintang ng *graft* ay napapalalaki ng midya at ng *Counter Intelligence Agency* (CIA) ng Estados Unidos. Nabahiran ang imahe ni Quirino lalo na nang magupo ito ng karamdaman sa gitna ng Halalang 1953 upang maibadha ang isang pinunong populista na may mensahe ng pagbabago.

Tatapusin ang papel ng ilang paglilista ng mga mahahalagang mga naisakatuparang ng Administrasyong Quirino, mga bagay at mga konsepto





na atin na ngayong isinasawalang-bahala. Lilinawin ang paglalarawan sa administrasyon ni Quirino bilang “uneventful”—o walang anumang mahalagang nangyari.

Sa huli, ang papel ay magpapanukala ng isang pagtingin sa ating mga nakaraang mga pinuno na hiniram ang halimbawa mula sa mga Amerikanong *presidential biographers*—na upang maging ganap at tunay na matuto sa kasaysayan ay kailangang talakayin ang mga negatibo at positibong aspekto ng pamumuno ng isang lider.

Ang Konsepto ng Kasaysayang Buhay at “Gamhanan nga Tawo”

Sa panahon ngayon, ang preokupasyon ng maraming akademiko ay sa pag-aaral ng Kasaysayang Panlipunan o “History from Below,” iyon bang ang tuon ay ang kasaysayan ng mga ordinaryong mamamayan sa pangkalahatan kaysa sa mga indibidwal na mga talambuhay, lalo na ang talambuhay ng mga lider. Subalit, hindi pa rin maipagkakaila na na may halaga pa rin ang pag-aaral ng biograpiya/talambuhay dahil magandang unawain kung paano ang isang tao ay produkto ng panahon at kung paano niya hinuhubog ang panahon ayon sa kanyang kilos.

Bagama’t madalas ang tuon ng *Bagong Kasaysayan* ay ang kasaysayang panlipunan, may saysay pa rin ang pag-aaral ng biograpiya. Sa kanyang introduksyon sa kanyang kapanahong akda ukol sa dating pangulong Joseph Ejercito Estrada, ipinaliwanag ni Dr. Zeus A. Salazar ang konsepto ng Kasaysayang Buhay:

Salaysay na may saysay para sa isang grupo ng tao ang kasaysayan. Ang talambuhay naman ay salaysay na may saysay para isang tao—at para sa kanyang kapwa o kapanalig na rin—bilang bahagi ng lipunan at kalinangan, higit sa lahat ng panahon, na kanyang kinabibilangan. Matindi ang pagkakaugnay ng mga tao at ng kasaysayang kanilang nililikha—lalo na yaong nakahawak ng kapangyarihan bunsod ng pagiging pinuno. . . . ay may katuturan hindi lamang sa kanyang sarili, kaanank at kapanalig kundi lalo’t higit, sa kanyang kapanahon at kababayan—gayundin, bilang simbolo ng isang sukdulang yugto nito, sa buong Kasaysayan ng Kapilipinuhan (Salazar 2005, xiii–xiv).





Hindi iisa ang kasaysayan. Ang biograpiya ay bahagi ng tatlong uri ng kasaysayan ayon kay Dr. Jaime B. Veneracion:

. . . masasabing ang kasaysayang pang-isahan lamang ay tinatawag na **talambuhay**, ang pangkomunidad ay **kasaysayang lokal**, ang pangmaramihan o pambansa ay **kasaysayang nasyonal**. Bukod dito, bawat institusyon sa komunidad at sa bansa ay nakabubuo rin ng sariling kasaysayan. Layunin ng mga historyador na bigyan ng pangkabuuang perspektibo ang lahat ng ito sa pamamagitan ng isang balangkas ng mga pangyayari (Veneracion 1997, 6, hindi akin ang giit).

Kasaysayan Pang-isahan naman ang tawag dito ni Prop. Atoy M. Navarro:

. . . bagamat tinitingnan bilang sentral ang mga indibidwal o personahe, mahalaga pa ring tingnan ang mga ito nang hindi hiwalay sa kabuuang kabihasan. Mahalaga ang pagpapaloob ng pangkasaysayang talambuhay sa kabuuang kalagayan at kalakaran ng iba't ibang aspeto—istruktura, institusyon o sektor pangkabihasan (Navarro 2000, 5).

Samakatuwid, kailangang basahin ang ating mga pinuno batay sa mga konseptong kultural na nagmula sa Pilipinas bilang bahagi ng kamalayan. Sa aking tesis masterado na *Ang Maynila ni Imelda: Isang Kapanahong Kasaysayan ng Pagbabagong-Anyo ng Metropolitan Manila (1965–1986)* (Chua 2010), isa sa aking mga ginamit upang basahin ang Unang Ginang ay ang Bisayang konsepto ng *dungan*, na dinalumat ni Dr. Alicia Magos sa kanyang etnograpiya ng isang pamayanan ng Kinaray-a sa Antique. Sa aking pagbasa, makikita ang katumbas na konsepto sa iba't ibang pamayanan sa Pilipinas, lalong-lalo na sa Ilocos sa mga paglalarawan sa mga *Apo* tulad ni *Apo Lakay Quirino* at *Apo Lakay Marcos*. Para kay Magos, ang *dungan* ay:

A life force, an energy, as well as an ethereal entity, a spirit with a will of its own that resides in the human body and provides the essence of life. Apart from denoting an alter ego and soul stuff, the dungan as presently understood refers to such personal attributes as willpower, knowledge and intelligence, and even the ability to dominate and persuade others (Magos 1992, 47–50).





Para kay Magos, *dunganon* ang isang tao kung mayroon siya ng isa o lahat ng mga katangiang ito: 1. Matinding katalinuhan, malawak na kaalaman at matalas na kaisipan; 2. May malakas na paninindingan at kumpyansa sa sarili; 3. Lumilikha ng yaman at may maningning na reputasyon; 4. Matatas magsalita at may karisma; at 5. May kakaibang lakas.

Ang lahat ay may *dungan*, ngunit may ilan na may malakas ang *dungan*. Sa sinaunang bayan, ang karaniwang *dunganon* ay ang mga datu at babaylan (Magos 1992).

Sa ganitong paglalarawan, makikita na si Quirino ay *dunganon nga tawo* nga siya na tulad ng sinaunang mga datu na may responsibilidad sa bayan na magpamudmod ng ginhawa. Subalit, ang mga kontrobersiyang pulitikal sa kanyang panahon at gayundin ang kanyang pagkakasakit ang siyang nagpahina sa kanyang *dungan* kaya naman sa huli ay nanghina rin ang kumpiyansa ng tao sa kanya.

Pagpapalakas ng Dungan: *From Guro to Pangulo*

Si Elpidio Quirino ay isinilang sa kulungan ng Vigan noong November 16, 1890. Isinilang siya doon hindi dahil kriminal ang kanyang mga magulang ngunit dahil ang kanyang ama na si Don Mariano ay *warden* ng karsel na iyon.

Nag-aaral pa lamang siya ng mataas na paaralan nang noong 1906, sa edad na 16, ay kinuha na si Pidiong bilang guro ng elementarya nang mangailangan ang barrio ng Caparia-an, Agoo, La Union. Limang buwan siyang naging guro doon (Lopez 1990, 8).

Mula sa kaniyang ipon, lumipat si Quirino sa Maynila at nagpatuloy bilang *working student* sa Manila High School hanggang nakatapos siya ng abogasiya sa Universidad ng Pilipinas noong 1915. Si Quirino mismo ay hindi mayaman subalit napangasawa niya ay mula sa isa sa pinakamayamang angkan sa Vigan, si Alicia Sy-quia. Nang madiskubre siya ni Senate President Manuel Quezon, nagsimula na ang kanyang pag-angat sa pulitika at nagtamo ng *dungan*: naging mambabatas, senador, miyembro ng Independence Mission at delegado ng Constitutional Convention. Humawak din siya ng mga posisyon sa gabinete. Siya rin ang unang dekanong Adamson University College of Law (Lopez 1990, 9-35).





Ikalawang Digmaang Pandaigdig: Ang Pagsubok na Magpapatibay kay Quirino

Ang pagsapit ng Ikalawang Digmaang Pandaigdig sa Pilipinas ay malaking dagok sa buhay ni Apo Pidiong. Sa pagsuporta niya at ng kanyang kapatid na si Antonio sa mga gerilya, sila ay inaresto at 15 araw na kinulong sa Fort Santiago ng mga Hapones (Robles 1990, 48).

Sa nalalapit na pagdating ng mga Amerikano, tinanggihan niya ang mungkahi na tumungo na siya at ang kanyang pamilya sa Baguio. Tinamaan ng bomba ang kanilang duplex na tinitirhan sa Maynila at dahil dito ay naatake sa puso ang ina ni Alicia at kinailangan nilang lumipat sa katabing bahay (Robles 1990, 48–49).

Noong February 12, 1945, habang sinusubukang lumipat ng lugar ang pamilya Quirino dahil sa dinaranas na pagkagutom, pinagbabaril sila ng mga kawal ng *Japanese Navy*. Nasawi ang anak niyang si Norma at ang asawang si Alicia na kalong-kalong ang anak na si Fe Angela, na siniguradong patay sa pamamagitan ng bayoneta. Natamaan ng shrapnel si Armando habang binabawi ang mga katawan ng kapamilya.

Sa mga sandaling iyon, si Elpidio ay nagbabalot pa lamang ng mga damit at hindi pa nakalalabas. Nang makita ang katawan ng mga mahal sa buhay tila tumigil ang kanyang mundo. Nang wala na ang mga Hapones, bumalik siya sa kanilang tahanan at nakitang buhay pa ang kanyang mga anak na si Vicky at si Tommy na nakatakbo mula sa eksena, bagama't ang babae ay sugatan sa binti.

Si Quirino, na isa sa naging pinakamataas na tao sa bansa, ay nagpabalik-balik na tumawid sa Ilog Pasig buhat-buhat ang mga nasawing kapamilya, siyam lahat kabilang ang iba pang mga kamag-anak, upang bigyan ng maayos na libing. Wala na ang kanyang asawa at tatlo sa kanyang limang anak (Robles 1990, 49).

Pagkaraan ng giyera, nagpatuloy ang panunungkulan ni Quirino sa pamahalaan. Bilang Bise Presidente ni Manuel Roxas, si Quirino ay hinirang na Kalihim ng Ugnayan Panlabas.

Ama ng *Philippine Foreign Service*

Sa muling pagtatag ng pamahalaan matapos ang digmaan, hinirang ni Pangulong Manuel Roxas na unang Kalihim ng Ugnayang Panlabas ng





Ikatlong Republika si Elpidio kasabay ng pagiging Pangalawang Pangulo noong 1946. Ayon kay Dr. Ricardo José, historyador ng Kasaysayang Diplomatiko mula sa UP Departamento ng Kasaysayan, gamit ang karanasan sa pagsama-sama kay Quezon bilang kanyang kalihim sa mga Independence Missions sa Estados Unidos at *exposed* sa pakikipag-usap sa mga matataas na opisyal na mga dayuhan, itinatag ni Quirino ang Department of Foreign Affairs “from scratch.”

Maliban sa mga Pilipinong nagsanay sa Estados Unidos ng diplomasya na tinawag na mga “State Department Boys,” kulang ang bilang ng mga maaaring magtrabaho sa Departamento ng Ugnayang Panlabas. Kailangan ng hindi pangkaraniwang kasanayan sa pakikipagnegosasyon sa mga taong magtatrabaho dito. Kaya naman, si Quirino mismo ang pumili ng pinakamagagaling at pinakamatatalino na pumasok sa departamento, tulad ng sinabi ni Dr. José, “*But since the department was still being built, its first members were appointed directly, based on Secretary Quirino’s recommendation.*” (Jose 2015)

Marami sa mga pinili niya ay ang mga peryodista, mga makata at mga intelektuwal ssa kadahilanan na ang mga ito ay maalam ngunit maingat magsalita at maayos pumili ng mga gagamiting salita. Ito ang panahon na napakataas ng tingin ng mga tao sa mga nasa propesyon ng pagsusulat.

Hindi naglaon, kanyang ipapatupad ang mga eksamen para sa mga magiging diplomat (Jose 2015).

Nakapagbukas din tayo ng diplomatikong relasyon sa 27 bansa. Isang kahanga-hangang tagumpay sa isang maliit at bagong bansa pa lamang.

Sa kanyang pakikipagnegosasyon sa mga Amerikano, sinikap niyang itaguyod ang interes ng mga Pilipino. Bagama’t mahirap. Nasabi nga ng isang Amerikanong *diplomat* ukol sa kanya, “*The trouble with Quirino is that he is taking Philippine Independence too seriously.*” (Lopez 1990, 170) Nagawa niyang bawasan ang mananatiling base militar sa Pilipinas mula 70 hanggang 23 na lamang (Quirino 1990, 227).

Nang siya’y nagging pangulo, nagawa niyang kumbinsihin ang mga Amerikano na gawing *iron clad* ang kanilang pagtatanggol sa Pilipinas kung sakaling manganib ang bansa sa pamamagitan ng paghingi ng Mutual Defense Treaty, na hanggang ngayon ay batayan ng ating pakikipagkaibigan sa Estados Unidos (Lopez 1990, 98).





Isang indikasyon na tumitingin na sa ibang lugar liban sa Amerika si Quirino ay ang pagpapahalaga niya sa Asya. Noong May 26–30, 1950, pinulong ni Quirino ang Southeast Asia Union Conference sa Lungsod ng Baguio, kilala sa tawag na Baguio Conference. Nagbunga ang pulong ng mga hakbang tungo sa pagtutulungan ng mga bansang Pakistan, Thailand, India, Ceylon, Australia, Indonesia at Pilipinas sa mga usapin ng kultura at ekonomiya (Quirino 1955, 224–227; Lopez 1990, 99).

Iminungkahi ni Quirino ang isang samahan ng mga bansa na tatawaging Pacific Union upang pagkaisahin ang mga bansa sa Asya-Pasipiko na magtulungan sa isa't isa. Kaso hindi tinangkilik ng Amerika at India ang mungkahi dahil sa iba-iba ang isinusulong na ideolohiya ng mga bansang bubuon nito. Panahon iyon ng Cold War at ilag ang US sa mga komunistang bansa tulad ng People's Republic of China (Quirino 1990, 270; Lopez 1990, 100–101).

Masyado pang maaga sa panahon ang ideya ni Quirino.

Pagdating ng panahon, Amerika na mismo ang magsasakatupag ng ideya ni Quirino sa pamamagitan ng pagtatatag ng South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) sa pag-igting ng Cold War. Ipagpapatuloy rin ang pakikipagtulangang ekonomiko at kultural ng mga bansa sa mga samahang itatatag pagdating ng panahon—Malaysia-Philippines-Indonesia (MAPHILINDO), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) at ang Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation o (APEC) na nagpulong sa Maynila noong Nobyembre 2015, nataon na linggo ng ika-125 taong kaarawan ni Quirino.

Ayon sa Pangulo ng UN General Assembly na si Carlos P. Romulo, "*He was responsible for creating the Department of Foreign Affairs and launching it on the international map. When he became President, Quirino defended the foreign service from the intrusion of politicians, and refused to appoint any ambassador who did not deserve it, in spite of political pressures.*" (Gleek 1993, 144)

Ayon kay Dean Gloria Santos ng Philippine Historical Association, "*Quirino is regarded as the Father of Foreign Service for as the first secretary of foreign affairs, he was responsible for the establishment, development, and growth of the foreign service.*" (Santos 1999, 193)





Ang Limang Libong Pisong Kama

Ngunit ang administrasyon ni Quirino ay nabalot ng mga alegasyon ng korupsiyon na nagpahina sa *dungan* nito at tuluyang ikinabagsak sa Halalan ng 1953.

Bago pa ang halalan ng 1949, nagsampa ang ilang mambabatas ng kasong *impeachment* kay Quirino. Kung anu-ano ang ibinintang sa Pangulo at sa kapatid nitong si Judge Antonio Quirino. Kabilang na ang diumano ay Php 5,000.00 kama na binili ni Quirino para higaan sa Palasyo (Quirino 1990, 195; Robles 1990, 121). Tila tumugma sa elitistang imahe ni Quirino na kahit mahirap, ay laging nais na magmukhang presentable, naka-amerikana, mahilig magsaya kaya raw gustong mamuhay ng marangya.

Ngunit bumili siya ng kama dahil dinala ni Unang Ginang Trining Roxas ang kama sa palasyo dahil wala na siyang matutulugan at matuluyan. Matapos rin ang digmaan, kailangang ayusin ang palasyo at lagyan ng muebles upang tumugma sa dignidad ng Palasyo bilang tahanan ng Pangulo ng isang bansa (Quirino 1990, 195–196; Robles 1990, 121).

At nang tingnang mabuti, nagkamali lamang ang *accountant* na naglagay ng presyo sa kama, mas maganda pa at mas marangya ang kama nilang mag-asawa sa Syquia Mansion sa Vigan! Kahit ang mga peryodistang pinakitaan ng kama ay naniwalang baka Php 300 lamang ito (Quirino 1990, 196).

Kahit mga kalaban ni Quirino hindi naniwala sa mga alegasyon sapagkat natalo sa kamara ang *impeachment resolution* sa bilang na 58–9 (Quirino, 197; Robles 1990, 122).

Isang sulat ang natagpuan ng tila yamot na kapatid ni Quirino na si Judge Tony sa kanyang kapatid na pangulo ng Pilipinas na may petsang April 5, 1949 na nagsaad ng ganito:

“Paradoxical as it may seem, my relationship with you—instead of being an asset—has redounded to my disadvantage. I realize how impossible it is for filthy minds to grasp the assertion that being the President’s brother has not benefitted me at all. On the contrary, it has interfered in my pursuits which, even before you became President, already had the makings of a successful





enterprise—even if I have to say so myself—thanks to my business associates and connections, and certainly not to my relationship with you.” (A. Quirino 1949, 2)

Si Judge Tony Quirino ang magtatatag ng Alto Broadcasting System, ang unang maglalagay ng telebisyon sa Pilipinas, na magiging ABS-CBN.

“Ang Gintong Orinola”

Kapag itinuturo siya sa mga klase ng kasaysayan, liban sa pagbanggit sa korupsiyon diumano ng kanyang administrasyon, isinasama siya sa napakalawak na dikusyon ng neo-kolonialismo matapos ang digmaan—ang mga pangulo na lubos na naimpluwensyahan ng mga Amerikano. Sa katunayan, mas masalimuot ang katotohanan.

Bagama’t kailangan niyang maging makipagkaibigan sa mga Amerikano dahil panahon iyon ng Cold War, binalanse niya ito at sa maraming pagkakataon ay ginawang prayoridad ang mga komitment sa United Nations at pinrotektahan ang interes ng Pilipino (Lopez 1990, 170). Kaya naman, dahil dito, hindi lamang ang mga kalaban niya ang sumira sa kanya, tumulong na rin ang Central Intelligence Agency o CIA upang siraan siya, na kanyang ikinatalo sa halalang 1953 (Lopez 1990, 138–141).

Ipinangalandakan ng mga kritiko niya ang isang iskandalo na ibinunyag ni Senador Lorenzo Tañada, na mayroon daw siyang Gintong Orinola. Ang orinola o *chamber pot* ay inilalagay sa tabi ng kama para ihian (Robles 1990, 119–125).

Muli, tila tumugma ito sa imahe ni Quirino na kahit nanggaling sa hirap, laging nais magmukhang presentable kaya napagkakamalang elitista.

Epektibo ang paninira, tumutugma ang ginto sa simbolo ng karangyaan at korupsiyon na inuupuan lamang ni Quirino sa umaga. Subalit ayon sa kanyang anak at Unang Ginang na si Victoria Quirino na tumunghay sa kanyang ama, kahit maysakit, ayaw gumamit ng ama niya ng orinola at medyo nayayamot ang mga nars sapagkat nagpapapilit na dalhin siya sa banyo (Gonzales-Meyer 2015).

Maging ang mga manunulat at mga peryodista noong panahon na iyon ang nagsasabi na haka-haka lamang ito. Ayon kay Francisco Sionil José ang paratang na ito ay mas simboliko kaysa literal (Sanchez 2015)





Ngunit kung titingnan ang mga pag-aaral ukol kay Quirino, totoo nga na nahirapan siya na tanggalin ang korupsiyon. May mga namana siyang mga iskandalo, tulad ng ilegal na pagbebenta ng mga *war surplus* upang pagkakitaan ng ilang mga opisyal ng pamahalaan matapos ang digmaan (Quirino 1990, 25–48). Mismong mga kapartido niya ang naging kanyang sakit ng ulo. Pinaimbestigahan niya mismo ang Pangulo ng Senado na si Jose Avelino dahil dito. Ngunit sa isang pulong sa bahay kubo sa tabi ng Palasyo, sinabi diumano ni Avelino kay Quirino, “*Why did you have to order an investigation Honorable Mr. President? If you cannot permit abuses, you must at least tolerate them. Para que estamos en poder? What are we in power for?*” (Quirino 1990, 73) Nasuspindi si Avelino bilang Pangulo ng Senado, nagtatag ng isang paksyon ng partido na tumakbo laban mismo kay Quirino sa pagkapangulo noong 1949 (Quirino 1990).

Kritikal ang pagtasa ng Amerikanong historyador na si Louis E. Gleeck, Jr. kay Quirino:

No Philippine president was so viciously trashed by the media, Philippine and foreign, as Pres. Elpidio Quirino. In the process, the quite remarkable progress in economic development and foreign affairs achieved by the president during his term of office has been badly neglected. On the other hand, there is no defense possible of his toleration of growing corruption and violence perpetrated against political opponents by his associates and subordinates (Gleeck 1993, 80).

Ang pinakasikat na kaso ng karahasan na ginawa ng mga tauhan ng isang kapartido ng Pangulo ay ang brutal na pagpatay ng mga tauhan ni Gobernador Rafael Lacson ng Negros Occidental sa isang dating gerilya na si Moises Padilla na tumakbo laban sa isang bata ng gobernador sa bayan ng Magallon. Ngunit, agad namang kinasuhan si Lacson sampu ng kanyang mga tauhan at nahatulang maysala.

Bagama’t masasabing nahirapan si Quirino na pigilin ang mga anomalya sa pamahalaan, masasabing siya mismo ay hindi makikitaan ng indikasyon ng pandarambong dahil buong buhay niya iisa lamang ang kanyang biniling ari-arian: ang kanyang huling tahanan sa Novaliches, kaya naroon ang Quirino Highway (Lopez 1990, 168). Ang iba ay ari-arian





na ng kanyang asawang mayaman na nasawi noong digmaan kasama ng halos kanyang buong pamilya. Ang kanyang pamilya rin ay nagpatuloy na mamuhay ng marangal matapos siyang mamatay noong 1956.

Sa kanyang katandaan, naitala na mismong si Senador Tañada, isa sa pinakamatinding kritiko ni Pangulong Quirino ang nagsabi, "*When I meet my political friends, I often tell them that I am ashamed for having attacked President Quirino . . . when millions were wasted by President Marcos.*" (C. Quirino 1987, 194)

Noon, ang diumano'y limang libong piso lamang na kama at ang mitolohikal na orinola ay naging malaking usapin noong panahon ni Quirino. Kaiba sa ngayon, ang mga isyu ng korupsiyon ay bilyon ang pinag-uusapan subalit patuloy pa rin nahahalal ng taumbayan. Tila may persepsyon na ang ilan sa atin na ang korupsiyon ay natural na kalakaran na lamang sa pamahalaan at tanggap na nila ito.

Pagpapamudmod ng Ginhawa: Industriyalisasyon at *Social Justice*

Sa kabila ng mga kontrobersiya, maraming mga magagandang inisyatibo ang Administrasyon ni Elpidio Quirino upang mapabuti ang buhay ng mga mamamayan.

Si Quirino ang kauna-unahang pangulo na naghawi ng daan tungo sa industrialisasyon ng bansa. Ngunit hindi lamang ito sa mga salita at mga talumpati, kongkreto niya itong ipinakita sa pagtatatag ng mga *hydroelectric plants* tulad ng Ambuklao Dam sa Luzon at Maria Cristina Fall hydroelectric at fertilizer plants sa Mindanao. Nagpatayo ng irigasyon sa mga Ilog Agno at Pampanga at nagpamahagi ng lupa sa Isabela, Cotabato, Bukidnon at Lanao. Siya din ang lumagda ng batas na nagtatatag ng Central Bank of the Philippines, ang pangunahing institusyon ng pananalapi sa Pilipinas (Lopez 1990, 169–170; Robles 1990, 214–215).

Gayundin hindi niya kinalimutan ang kanyang pinagmulan. Malapit-lapit sa bituka ng mga tao ang pagsulong niya ng *Minimum Wage Law*, ang pag-amyenda sa *Women's Compensation Act* at ang *8-hour Law*. Sa kanya rin inisyatibo ang paglalaan ng pabahay para sa mga ordinaryong empleado ng pamahalaan. Makikita ito sa pamamagitan ng Quirino District na binubuo ng Projects 2, 3 at 4. (Lopez 1990, 170; Robles 1990, 215).





Usapang Pangkapayapaan

Alam ni Quirino na maipapatupad lamang ng mas malawakan ang kanyang mga proyekto kung maisusulong ang usaping pangkapayapaan.

Matapos ang digmaan, muling namundok ang mga gerilyerong Huk sa pamumuno ni Luis Taruc nang patalsikin siya sa kongreso. Para sa mga Amerikano, mga rebeldeng komunista ang mga Huk na kailangang sugpuin. Kaya sinunod ni Pangulong Roxas ang mas matigas na lapit na ito. (Robles 1990, 65). Subalit nang pumalit ang kanyang Pangalawang Pangulo na si Quirino, kanyang ipinahayag na ang kasalukuyang polisiya noon sa mga Huk ay kailangang irekonsidera. Para sa kanya ang mga Huk ay may mga lehitimong mga karaingan na kailangang tugunan (Quirino 1990, 10; Robles 1990, 65).

Upang ipakita ang sinseridad na makinig sa lehitimong karaingan ng mga Huk, tumungo si Quirino sa ilang mga bayan sa Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac at Pampanga na tinatawag na Huklandia noong April 29, 1948 nang walang masyadong bantay upang patunayan na lokal lamang na rebelyon at hindi pambansa ang Rebelyong Huk. Dito niya nakita na may mga alkalde sa mga lugar na ito ay hindi pumapasok sa munisipyo sa takot sa Huk. Matapos ang pagbisita, natuwa ang lahat na umuwi ng ligtas ang Pangulo. Kontrolado niya ang sitwasyon at sinsero siya sa pakikipag-usap sa mga rebelde (Quirino 1990, 12–14; Robles 1990, 66–67).

Tinanggap ni Taruc ang alok ni Quirino at sa isang sulat kay Quirino ay sinabing karapatan ng pinaka-abang mamamayan na makausap ang kanyang Pangulo. Mismong kapatid ni Elpidio na si Antonio ang nakipag-usap kay Taruc (Quirino 1990, 10, 14; Lopez 1990, 113).

Pumayag na bumaba si Taruc sa kabundukan upang makipag-usap. Pinatuloy siya sa mismong tahanan ni Quirino, sa kabila ng dami ng mga otel na mayroon na noon (Quirino 1990, 17; Robles 1990, 70–72). Dito makikita na nais makipag-usap ni Quirino sa mga rebelde bilang kapamilya niya.

Noong June 21, 1948, bumaba si Taruc mula sa kabundukan at pumasok sa tanggapan ng Pangulo ng Pilipinas sa Palasyo ng Malacañan. Binasa ni Quirino ang proklamasyong Amnestiya sa mga Huk kung magbababa nang armas (Quirino 1990, 16–17; Robles 1990, 72–73).





Minsan ding nag-organisa si Taruc ng pulong para kay Quirino sa Bulacan, at nagbunyi ang lahat (Quirino 1990, 20; Lopez 1990, 115).

Ngunit nagkaroon ng hindi pagkakaintindihan. Nais ni Taruc na kumalas na sa mga Amerikano ang pamahalaan bagay na hindi madaling gawin. Hindi agad napatupad ang ilang naipangako ni Judge Tony Quirino sapagkat patuloy na nagkaroon ng pagsalakay sa mga rebelde at hindi naipamudmud ang mga lupaing hinihingi. Kakaunting Huk naman ang nagbaba ng armas at di naglaon, bumalik si Taruc sa kabundukan (Quirino 1990, 20-24; Lopez 1990, 116). Noong 1949, pinatay ng mga Huk sa isang ambush ang kabiyak ng kanyang *mentor* na si Manuel Quezon, si Doña Aurora Aragon Quezon noong 1949.

Sa kabila nito, ilan sa mga kahilingan ng mga Huk ang ipinatupad pa rin niya: ang *social amelioration program*, na pagdating ng panahon ay magiging Social Security System; ang pagpapautang para sa kagamitan at pangangailangan sa pagtanim ng mga magsasaka; at ang pagpapautang para sa pagpapatayo ng pabahay, na sa pagdating ng panahon ay magpapatuloy sa pamamagitan ng PAGIBIG Fund (Lopez 1990, 115).

Pamana sa Pag-alala ng Kasaysayan

Bata pa lamang si Pidiong ay kinakitaan na siya ng interes sa kasaysayan. Sa kanyang paglalakad ng limang kilometro araw-araw mula sa Agoo tungo sa Caparia-an ng maging isang binatilyong guro sa *public school*, naisip niyang ang ginagawa niya ay kasintulad rin ng karanasan ni Abraham Lincoln. Binasa niya ang unang talambuhay ni José Rizal na inakda ni Wenceslao Emilio Retana na *Vida y Escritos de Jose Rizal* kaya naman naging idolo niya ang ating National Hero (Lopez 1990, 8; C. Quirino 1987, 23-24).

Nang maging Pangulo ng Pilipinas, dahil nawasak ng digmaan ang iba't ibang rekord ng pamahalaan sa mga bayan at lalawigan sa buong Pilipinas, inatasan niya ang mga guro sa pampublikong paaralan na ipunin at isulat ang kasaysayan ng bawat lokalidad sa Pilipinas, bawat barrio, bayan at lalawigan. Ang mga rekord na ito ay kolektibong nakilala bilang *Historical Data Papers* at maaakses sa Pambansang Aklatan ng Pilipinas. Isang malaking tulong sa mga lokal na historyador ang koleksyong ito.





Gayundin sa pamamagitan ng Republic Act No. 597, kanyang itinanghal ang Fort Santiago bilang pambansang dambana na makikilala bilang “Shrine of Freedom” sa alaala ni Rizal at ng isang pulutong ng mga pambansang bayani at martir “*who had been confined and lost their lives within said premises*” noong March 6, 1951 (Congress of the Philippines 1951).

Siya rin ang nagsimula na pagpapinta ng iba’t ibang mga larawan ng mga naging Pangulo ng Pilipinas upang sila ay maalala ng may dangal. Isang tradisyon na ipinagpapatuloy hanggang sa kasalukuyan. Ito ang mga larawan ng mga pangulo na ating makikita sa mga *postcards at posters* na ginagamit natin sa paaralan.

At sa pamamagitan ng Executive Order no. 145, iniutos niya ang muling pagtatayo ng bahay ni Rizal. Ito ay pinangunahan ni Arkitekto Juan Nakpil, magiging Pambansang Alagad ng Sining, at tinustusan ng kontribisyon ng iba’t ibang batang estudyante ng Pilipinas. Natapos ang gusali noong 1950.

Kung mapapansin, marami sa mga pamanang pangkasaysayan na ito ni Quirino ay mga bagay na mahalaga pa rin sa atin ngayon.

Malasakit: Komitment sa United Nations, Kapayapaan at Pakikipagkapwa-tao

Noong kalihim pa lamang siya ng Ugnayang Panlabas, binalangkas na ni Quirino ang magiging “Four Pillars of Philippine Foreign Policy”: (1) *Close cooperation with the United Nations*, (2) *Close relations with the United States*, (3) *Friendly relations with neighboring countries* at (4) *Devotion to world peace*.

Mapapansin, hindi ang United States ang kanyang prayoridad kundi ang United Nations. Ang prayoridad sa United Nations ay nilayon ang pagsuporta sa dekolonisasyon ng ibang mga bansa, paggalang sa karapatang pantao at pagpapanatili ng kapayapaan at kaayusan sa daigdig. Ipinamalas ito ni Quirino sa tatlong pangunahing aksyon: ang pagtanggap sa mga pagtanggap sa mga *White Russians*, pagsali natin sa Korean War at pagpapatawad at pagpapauwi sa mga bihag na Hapones sa Pilipinas.

Ang mga *White Russians* ay ang mga residente ng Rusya na tagasuporta ng Czar at mga anti-komunista na tumakas noong panahon ng Bolshevik





Revolution noong 1917 patungo sa Tsina. Ngunit nanganib ang buhay nila dahil sa pagwawagi ng mga Komunista sa Tsina. Lumikas sila ngunit walang bansa sa daigdig ang gusting tumanggap sa kanila. Hindi ito nakapagtataka, dahil kakatapos pa lamang ng digmaan at ang mga bansa ay problematiko pa rin sa kani-kanilang mga suliranin. Ang bilang ng *White Russians* na naghahanap ng bansang kukopkop sa kanila. (Kwan 2015).

Sa kabila nito, si Quirino lamang ang tanging pinuno sa mundo na dagling kumupkop sa kanila at pinatira sila sa Tubabao Island, Guiuan, Eastern Samar sa loob ng tatlong taon. Sa kanyang pagbisita doon, ipinagiba niya ang mga pader upang ipadama sa mga ito na malaya sila sa bayang ito (Kwan 2015).

Nang manganib ang demokratikong pamahalaan ng Timog Korea nang salakayin ito ng North Korea sa tulong ng mga Tsino noong 1950, tumugon muli si Quirino sa kahilingan ng United Nations na magpadala ng isang batalyon na tutulong na pigilin ito. Nagingning ang galing ng Pilipino sa pakikipagdigma sa Digmaan sa Korea, ang pinakaunang pakikidigma ng mga Pilipino sa dayuhang bansa para sa kapayapaan.

Sinabi sa kanila ni Quirino, “. . . *You who are to go now will be the first to carry the flag of your own sovereign nation abroad in the war for freedom . . .* (E. Quirino 1950). *Poor as we are, this country is making a great sacrifice in sending you there but every Peso invested in you is a sound investment for the perpetuation of our liberty and freedom.*” (Azada 2008, 11)

Noong 1953, nilapitan si Quirino ng kanyang manugang na si Luis “Chito” Gonzales, kakakasal pa lamang niya sa anak ni Quirino, ang Unang Ginang Vicky Quirino, at sinabi niya sa pangulo, “Papa, I want to go to war.” Digmaan ang halos umubos sa kanyang pamilya nang walang awang patayin ng mga Hapones ang kanyang asawa at tatlong anak. Buntis ang Unang Ginang at maaaring manganib ang buhay ng asawa ng kanyang anak dahil muli sa isa na namang digmaan. Ngunit, ang tugon ni Quirino, “If you go to war, then my son has to go with you!” Kaya naman, si Lt. Tommy Quirino ay nagsilbi sa Korean War bilang tagapagugnay ng komunikasyon habang si Lt. Chito Gonzales ay nagsilbi bilang *reconnaissance pilot* doon. Ayon sa mga larawan sa mismong personal album ng kanilang mga larawan sa Digmaan sa Korea, nabigyan pa si Lt. Chito Gonzales ng Military Air





Medal ng Estados Unidos at ng Korean Pilot Wing Medal ni Pangulong Syngman Rhee dahil sa kanyang katapangan. (Velazco 2015)

Ibinigay din ni Chito sa kanyang mga kasamahan ang suweldo niya sa dalawang buwan niyang paninilbihan (Espiritu 1954).

Ayon kay Quirino sa mga kasapi ng 14th Battalion Combat Team, "*I sent ahead of you, my only son and my son-in-law to offer their blood in the defense of democracy. Thus, my pride will be that with my own flesh and blood, I shall have participated in your coming struggle and victory for the honor and prestige of our country.*" (Pobre 2012, 299)

Ngayon, ang Timog Korea ay isa nang maunlad na bansa. Hindi sana naisakatuparan ito kung hindi lumaban ang 16 na bansa, at kasama rito ang Pilipinas.

At sa kabila ng pag-ubos ng mga Hapones sa halos kanyang buong pamilya noong digmaan, noong July 4, 1953, habang nagpapagamot sa *John Hopkins Hospital*, nagbigay siya ng *Executive Clemency* sa 437 mga *Japanese War Criminals* na ilang taon na ring nakapiit sa bansa (Robles 1990, 223).

Hindi ito maintindihan ng marami subalit ayon sa kanya, maaari pa nating maging kaibigan ang mga Hapones para sa interes ng bansa. Nais niyang maghilom na ang sugat na iniwan ng digmaan. At dahil marami pa rin sa mga Pilipino ang galit sa mga Hapones, isa rin ito sa naging dahilan ng kanyang pagkatalo sa Halalan ng 1953.

Imbes na paghihiganti, pang-unawa ang kanyang isinukli sa mga taong gumawa sa kanyang pamilya ng masama. Masasabing isa siyang maginoo at disenteng tao.

Hatol ng Kasaysayan

Nakakalungkot isipin na ang naaalala ng marami sa kanya sa matagal na panahon ay ang hindi niya napigilang korupsiyon sa bansa sa kabila ng kanyang mga pagsisikap. Sa kaisipan ng marami, ang nanatili sa kanilang alaala ay ang pagbagsak ng *dungan* ni Quirino lalo na nang sa Halalan ng 1953. Naikumpara ang maysakit na si Quirino sa batang-bata at dinamikong si Ramon Magsaysay ang kanyang kalaban sa Halalan ng 1953. Ayon sa Amerikanong historyador na si Louis E. Gleeck Jr. naging madaling target si Quirino ng iskandalo,



"In [Carlos P.] Romulo's own words, the president was a reserved man . . . ever conscious of the dignity of his office." This is the truth, but it is not the whole truth. Quirino was pompous and vain, thin-skinned, and overestimated his own qualities. Because of these weaknesses, he offered a temptingly vulnerable target (Gleeck 1993, 144–45).

Ngunit ngayon, binabalikan na ng mga historyador ang kanyang pamana at nakikita na sa paglipas ng panahon at sa paghahambing sa mga sumunod pang mga pangulo, hindi na masama, bagkus magniningning pa ang kanyang rekord. Dahil ayon nga sa respetadong dating UP President na si Salvador P. Lopez sa kanyang talambuhay kay Quirino na *The Judgment of History*, "*With the passage of time, Elpidio Quirino stands taller still in the Pantheon of Philippine Presidents . . . He deserves to be enshrined in the hearts of the Filipino people not only as First Diplomat and eminent . . . President of the Republic of the Philippines, but in the sober judgment of many, as the greatest and the best.*" (Lopez 1990, 171)

Mapalad si Quirino at hindi nagtatag ng dinastiya ang mga sumunod sa kanya, sapagkat kung hindi, mas mahirap na makita ng marami kung anuman ang kanyang mga pagkukulang at tagumpay sapagkat dahil sa pulitika ng mga naiwan nagiging emosyunal ang mga opinyon at laging nagagamit sa iba't ibang interes. Kaya naman sa kabila ng paglipas ng panahon, napakahirap pa ring hatulan ng kasaysayan ang mga katulad nina Ferdinand Marcos, Imelda Marcos, Ninoy Aquino, Cory Aquino, maging si Emilio Aguinaldo, dahil nananatiling nasa pulitika ang kanilang mga pamilya at nagagamit ang alinmang impormasyon ukol sa kanila upang isulong o pigilan ang interes ng kanilang mga pamilya.

Hindi tulad sa Estados Unidos na ang mga katulad ni Richard Nixon, sa kabila ng napakasamang pagtingin sa kanya ng marami dahil sa mga eskandalo ng kanyang panahon, dahil walang miyembro ng pamilyang Nixon ang nagnais maging pangulo ay napahalagahan ang kanyang mga tagumpay halimbawa sa Ugnayang Panlabas at iba pa. Ito ang kailangan nating matutunan. Sikaping tanggalin ang emosyon sa pagtaya ng mga kalakasan at kahinaan ng isang lider upang mas matuto sa mga ito.

Masasabi ring tagumpay ng positibong pagmemensahe ang naging tuon ng pagbuhay sa alaala ni Quirino noong 2015 sa panahon ng ika-



125 anibersaryo ng kapanganakan ni Quirino. Isinariwa ng President Elpidio Quirino Foundation ang pagganti sa mga taong nakatunggali at nagpabagsak kay Quirino, at sa halip itnuon nila ang selebrasasyon sa mga mismong pamana ng pangulo.

Sa huli, masasabing isinabuhay ni Pangulong Quirino ang kanyang mga salitang ito: “*So conduct yourself that both in public and in private life you can always look straight into any man’s eyes and tell him to ‘Go to hell.’*” (E. Quirino 1951) Ipinakita sa maraming aksyon ni Apo Pidiong ang pagpapahalaga sa mga ideyal na binitiwang niya sa kanyang talumpating pampasinaya, ang pinakamaikli sa kasaysayan ng bansa, matapos na mamatay ang Pangulong Roxas, “*Tolerance, Goodwill and Love.*” (E. Quirino 1948, 151)

Mga Sanggunian

Azada, Victorino T. tagapag-ipon. 2008. *The war in Korea: Heroism and gallantry of the first Filipino combat troops in a foreign country.* Lungsod Quezon: Peftok Veterans Federation, Inc.

Chua, Michael Charleston B. 2010. *Ang Maynila ni Imelda: Isang kapanahong kasaysayan ng pagbabagong-anyo ng Metropolitan Manila (1965–1986).* Tesis Masterado sa M.A. Kasaysayan, UP Diliman.

Congress of the Philippines. 1951. Republic act no. 597—An act to declare Fort Santiago a national shrine and to provide for the preservation of historical monuments in the walled city of Manila. 6 March. [http://www.chanrobles.com/republicacts/republicactno597.html#.](http://www.chanrobles.com/republicacts/republicactno597.html#.WhTAOkqWbcc) WhTAOkqWbcc.

Espinosa-Robles, Raissa. 1990. *To fight without end: The story of a misunderstood president.* Makati: Ayala Foundation.

Espiritu, M. Sgt. Guillermo M. 1954. Liham pasasalamat para kay Lt. Luis M. Gonzales, 16 Pebrero.

Gleeck, Lewis Jr., E. 1993. *The third Philippine republic, 1946–1972.* Lungsod Quezon: New Day Publishers.

Gonzales-Meyer, Ruby Quirino. 2015. Panayam kay Ruby Quirino Gonzeles-Meyer ni Michael Charleston “Xiao” Chua, Rizal Tower, Rockwell, 7 October.





- Jose, Ricardo Trota. 2015. Elpidio Quirino's role in the development of Philippine foreign policy. Lektura sa Departamento ng Ugnayang Panlabas, October 27.
- Kwan, Kinna Mae, mananaliksik. 2015. *Tubabao odyssey: Refuge in the Philippines*. Dokumentaryo ng Pambansang Komisyon Pangkasaysayan ng Pilipinas at ng President Elpidio Quirino Foundation.
- Lopez, Salvador P. 1990. *Elpidio Quirino: The judgment of history*. Maynila: President Elpidio Quirino Foundation.
- Navarro, Atoy M. 2000. "Ang bagong kasaysayan sa Wikang Pilipino: Kalikasan, kaparaanan, pagsasakasaysayan," *Bagong kasaysayan: Mga pag-aaral sa sasaysayan ng Pilipinas* Lathalain Blg. 11. Lungsod Quezon: Palimbagan ng Lahi.
- Pobre, Cesar P. 2012. *Filipinos in the Korean war*. Lungsod Quezon: Kagawaran ng Tanggulang Pambansa.
- Sanchez, Hera, executive producer. 2015. *Guro to pangulo: Ang buhay ni Elpidio Quirino*. Dokumentaryo ng ABS-CBN DocuCentral, President Elpidio Quirino Foundation at ng Pambansang Komisyon Pangkasaysayan ng Pilipinas, ipinalabas 15 November.
- Santos, Gloria M. 1999. The presidents of the postwar republic, 1946–1965. Sa *Philippine presidents 100 years*, pinamatnugutan ni Rosario Mendoza Cortes, 180–209. Lungsod Quezon: New Day Publishers.
- Quirino, Antonio. 1949. Letter to President Elpidio Quirino, 5 April 1949 (Letter in the possession of the President Elpidio Quirino Foundation).
- Quirino, Carlos. 1987. *Apo Lakay: The biography of President Elpidio Quirino of the Philippines*. Makati: Total Book World.
- Quirino, Elpidio. 1948. Inaugural remarks of Elpidio Quirino (After the demise of Manuel Roxas). Sa . . . *So Help us God: The presidents of the Philippines and their inaugural addresses*, pinamatnugutan nina J. Eduardo Malaya at Jonathan E. Malaya, 151. Lungsod ng Pasig: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 2004.
- Quirino, Elpidio. 1950. Speech of his excellency Elpidio Quirino, President of the Philippines at the public rally for the Tenth Battalion Combat





Team, 2 September. *Official Gazette*. <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1950/09/02/speech-of-president-quirino-at-the-public-rally-for-the-tenth-battalion-combat-team-september-2-1950/>.

Quirino, Elpidio. 1951. Extemporaneous speech of his excellency Elpidio Quirino, president of the Philippines, upon being awarded a gold medal and diploma of merit "for rising from barrio teacher to second president of the Republic of the Philippines and for continuing an abiding interest in education," by the awards committee of the golden jubilee of the Philippine educational system, 16 December. *Official Gazette*, <http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1951/12/16/extemporaneous-speech-of-president-quirino-upon-being-awarded-a-gold-medal-and-diploma-of-merit-by-the-awards-committee-of-the-golden-jubilee-of-the-philippine-educational-system/>.

Quirino, Elpidio. 1955. *The Quirino way: Collection of speeches and addresses of Elpidio Quirino*. Maynila: Juan Collas.

Quirino, Elpidio. 1990. *The memoirs of Elpidio Quirino*. Maynila: Pambansang Suriang Pangkasaysayan.

Salazar, Zeus A. 2005. *Pangulong Erap: Biograpiyang sosyopolitikal at pangkalinangan ni Joseph Ejercito Estrada, Tomo 1 Pinunong bayan: Tungo sa hamon ng EDSA II*. San Juan, Metro Manila: RPG Foundation, Inc.

Velazco, Malcolm A., manunulat at direktor. 2015. *March of the valiant: Philippine expeditionary force to Korea*. Dokumentaryo ng Pambansang Komisyong Pangkasaysayan ng Pilipinas at ng President Elpidio Quirino Foundation.

Veneracion, Jaime B. 1997. *Agos ng dugong kayumanggi: Isang kasaysayan ng sambayanang Pilipino*, Binagong Edisyon. Lungsod Quezon: Abiva Publishing House, Inc.





Towards the Happiness and Security of the “Common Man”: Agrarian Reform in the Time of President Ramon Magsaysay, 1954–1957

FERNANDO A. SANTIAGO, JR., PH.D.
De La Salle University



Heretofore, social justice has raised fervent but frustrated hopes in the hearts of our less fortunate citizens. We must not permit social justice to be an empty phrase in our Constitution. We must bring it to life—for all.

In consonance with this purpose, my administration shall take positive, energetic measures to improve the living conditions of our fellow citizens in the barrios and neglected rural areas and of laborers in our urban and industrial centers.

The land tenure system of our country shall be reexamined, to purge it of injustice and oppression.

“Land for the landless” shall be more than just a catch-phrase. We will translate it into actuality. We will clear and open for settlement our vast and fertile public lands which, under the coaxing of willing hearts and industrious hands, are waiting to yield substance to millions of our countrymen.

Democracy becomes meaningless if it fails to satisfy the primary needs of the common man, if it cannot give him freedom from fear and on which a strong republic can be built. His happiness and security are the only foundations on which a strong republic can be built. His happiness and security shall be foremost among the goals of my administration.¹

With these words, President Ramon Magsaysay declared his commitment to improve the life of the “common man.” He then





embarked on a program for rural improvement. The program entailed the extension and intensification of government services in the countryside. It also required the transformation of the whole economic and social structure of Philippine rural life. Because it involved changing the existing pattern of agricultural credit, land tenure and landlord-tenant relations, such initiative was referred to as agrarian reform.²

While Magsaysay was said to have accomplished more in three years than “all the administrations in the past thirty years,” much of his effort seems to have been forgotten.³ In fact, it is President Diosdado Macapagal who is remembered as “the Father of Philippine Agrarian Reform.” A title he earned for abolishing share tenancy and for consolidating of all existing land reform laws into the *Agricultural Land Reform Code*.⁴ A look at the code would however show that many of its provisions are based on laws enacted during the presidency of Magsaysay. Thus, if credit is to be given where it is due, Magsaysay’s efforts in agrarian reform must be acknowledged. Such is the objective of the present study.

The present study shall look into the way the Magsaysay Administration addressed the needs of the peasant through agrarian reform. In doing so, the researcher hopes to generate interest in the history of agrarian reform in the Philippines. The researcher also hopes that the study will serve as a reference to the nation’s policy makers in their continuing efforts toward improving life in the countryside.

The only extensive work on this subject matter is the article, “Philippine Agrarian Reform under Magsaysay” by David Wurfel. It was published in two segments in the *Far Eastern Survey* in 1958.⁵ Printed shortly after Magsaysay’s tragic death, the study may be viewed as a tribute to the fallen president. It is also a thorough and comprehensive discussion of Magsaysay’s policy on rural improvement. While it details the features of Magsaysay’s agrarian reform, including a background on the legislation of the laws, the study is situated in the time itself and does not benefit from historical hindsight. Also, considering the publication of the article less than a year after Magsaysay’s death, it does not include the critique of scholars who assessed various aspects of the program. Finally, the historical contextualization is insufficient for the author does not explain the circumstances that led to the pressing need for agrarian reform. Such voids, the present study hopes to fill.





Background

The *Philippine Agricultural Statistics* provides some facts and figures on the Philippines during the mid-twentieth century. It shows that in 1948, of the 29,741,290 hectares of land in the Philippines, 5,726,583.64 hectares were farmland, of which only 3,711,902.23 hectares were cultivated. Of the total of 1,638,624 farms, 783,938 were devoted to the planting of rice, the nation's food staple. This covered an area of 1,648,963.83 hectares or almost 45% of all cultivated land.⁶ Among all regions of the Philippines, Central Luzon had the highest number of farms devoted to rice. In fact, of the 236,602 farms there, 202,054 or 85% was specifically for cultivating the food staple. For this reason, Central Luzon was considered the rice granary of the Philippines.⁷

With regard those cultivating the farms in Central Luzon, only 59,524 were full owners, 34,981 were part owners, 105,458 were share tenants (emphasis mine), 2,013 were share-cash tenants, 2,486 were cash tenants, and 31,967 were other tenants.⁸ The vast majority of farmers in the country's rice granary thus did not own the land they tilled.

There was also a drastic rise in tenancy during the first half of the 20th century. James Putzel observed that tenancy "increased from 16 per cent in 1903 to 35 per cent of the farming population just before World War II. Central Luzon, the center of rice production, saw an even higher tenancy rate, particularly in Pampanga, Nueva Ecija and Bulacan. In Nueva Ecija tenancy went from 38 per cent in 1903 to 54 per cent just prior to World War II, and to 60 per cent by 1948."⁹

Such observation is supported by the comparison of the national distribution of farmland by tenure of farm operators in 1939 and 1948, where a decline in part-ownership of farms and an increase in tenancy from 35.1% to 37.4% was noted.¹⁰ While the 1948 census showed that 37.4 percent of the farms were operated by tenants, another report showed that in 1952 the proportion of tenancy in the areas surveyed reached 46% of all farms.¹¹ Inequity in landownership was thus growing.

At the time, Central Luzon was the primary hotbed of peasant unrest. The unrest was said to have "occurred over a very specific and continuing issue—that of land tenure."¹² In the *Economic and Social Survey of Rural Households in Central Luzon* of 1954, it was shown that the peasants'





discontent was due to the complex social relations with respect to the ownership and use of land resources.¹³ Benedict J. Kerkvliet observed that unrest and rebellion “correlated strongly with the high percentage of tenant farmers in Central Luzon provinces.”¹⁴ Such unrest has also been viewed as rooted in the inherent evils of the *kasamá* system.¹⁵

It was early in the twentieth century when the peasants began organizing themselves to assert their rights against landlords. This could be seen in the rise of peasant unions such as the *Confederacion de Aparceros y Obreros Agricolas de Filipinas* (Philippine Confederation of Tenants and Agricultural Workers) later renamed *Kalipunang Pambansa ng mga Magbubukid sa Pilipinas* (National Peasants’ Union of the Philippines), *Katipunan ng mga Anak Pawis ng Pilipinas* (Congress of Philippine Workingmen), *Aguman Ding Maldang Talapagobra* (Workers’ and Peasants’ Union), and *Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas* (Communist Party of the Philippines).¹⁶ Although these organizations were influenced by Marxist ideology, the rise of political consciousness is also attributed to the freedoms introduced during the American colonial era.¹⁷

By the 1920s and 1930s, deep class feelings against landlords was already evident, but it was during the Second World War when the peasants gained the strength to actually challenge the status quo. This came with the rise of the socialist-communist anti-Japanese guerilla unit, “*Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon*” (People’s Anti-Japanese Army) also known as *Hukbalahap*. With the people’s support, the unit proved effective against the invading army and later “took some of the credit for ending the Japanese occupation.”¹⁸ However, it was disliked by the landlords and political elites because of their overlap with the pre-war peasant movement, as well as their criticisms and attacks on the landlords during the war.¹⁹

In 1946, the Democratic Alliance, an umbrella group for all mass organizations and sympathetic individuals was formed.²⁰ At this point, the *Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas* had already “absorbed practically all the former *Huk* guerillas who were landless farmers” and they too became part of the organization.²¹ With the solid support of the peasants, 6 Democratic Alliance congressional candidates were elected in the same year. They were however unseated from Congress on ground of alleged





electoral fraud and terrorism during the elections. The actual reason was their opposition to the amendment of the Constitution to allow parity rights, a condition required by the Bell Trade Act. Their removal set the stage for such amendment.²²

The removal of the peasants' representatives was perceived as an act of oppression which led to rebellion that lasted for more than half a decade. The former anti-Japanese guerilla army transformed into a resistance movement against the State. It was renamed *Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan* (People's Liberation Army), more popularly known as the *Huks*.

The Philippine Constabulary waged massive military campaigns to crush the movement and to stop the spread of communism in the Philippines but the rebel group even managed to gain strength because of the support of the peasants. Landlords tried to undermine the *Huks* by supporting the government's iron fist policy against the communists.²³ The peasants on the other hand saw the anti-communist crusade as part of a grand scheme between the landlords and the State to perpetuate the dominance of the propertied class.

An aggravating factor was the many abuses committed by members of the Philippine Constabulary on the peasants which gave the impression that the State was the oppressor and the *Huks*, the defender of the people. By 1950, the "unified and widespread Huk movement posed a real danger to the government."²⁴ Solving the agrarian problem was therefore imperative to prevent the success of the peasant rebellion.

In 1950, at the request of President Elpidio Quirino, President Harry Truman appointed a United States Economic Survey Mission to consider the economic and financial problems of the Philippines and to recommend measures that will enable the country to become and to remain self-supporting.²⁵ The mission observed the strained relationship between landlord and tenant, low productivity and unfair conditions in the countryside. The necessity of land reform was also recognized. In what was called the Bell Report, it was stated that,

The Philippine farmer is between two grindstones. On top is the landlord, who often exacts an unjust share in spite of ineffective legal restrictions to the contrary. Beneath is the deplorably low





productivity of the land he works. The farmer cannot see any avenue of escape. He has no credit except at usurer's rates. There is no counsel to whom he can turn with confidence. He is resistant to change for fear of losing the meager livelihood he and his family possess. The incentive to greater production dies aborning when what he regards as an unjust share of the harvest of his work goes to the landlord.²⁶

The following year, Robert S. Hardie was commissioned by the United States Mutual Security Agency to study the tenancy situation in the Philippines. Hardie was a proponent of the liberal approach to agrarian reform which placed land redistribution at the center of the strategy for rural change.²⁷ The Hardie Report summarized the problems of the barrio economy as follows,

1. The smallness of farms acts to limit potential gross income. As a national average, the tillable land area per farm is three hectares. Farms containing less than two hectares of tillable land, constituting more than one-half the total farms, occupy less than one-fifth the tillable land area.
2. Tenant frequency is high, averaging about 35 per cent for the nation as a whole and soaring to nearly 68 per cent in those areas where unrest is greatest.
3. Farm rentals are oppressive. Most tenants pay 50 per cent of the gross product (after planting and harvesting costs) as rent.
4. Net family income derived from farm operations are woefully inadequate for a decent standard of living. Farm income from outside sources is insignificant.
5. Interest paid by tenants on borrowed money is greatly onerous. Rates of 200 per cent and even higher are common. The majority of small farmers borrow regularly from year to year.
6. A lack of adequate and economic storage, marketing and buying facilities forces farmers to sell in a low price market and buy in a high.
7. Guarantees against ruinous prices are nonexistent.





8. The development of institutions conducive to the growth and strengthening of democratic tendencies has long been neglected in the rural areas.
9. Other factors bearing on rural economic instability include minimum wages, taxation and inheritance.²⁸

Hardie then recommended the following,

1. Reduce holdings of large landowners by transferring farm ownership to tenants and farm laborers.
2. Establish more equitable sharing practices between landlord and tenants.
3. Survey and classify land for agricultural uses.
4. Resettle population voluntarily on unoccupied lands.
5. Classify land titles and facilitate their transfer to new settlers and other new owners of land.
6. Provide more adequate credit facilities to farmers and other business enterprisers.²⁹

The proposal was condemned by the landlords in Congress.³⁰ The Speaker of the House even branded Hardie a “communist.”³¹ But despite the opposition to redistributive land reform, no one could deny its necessity and thus Horacio de la Costa noted, “It was in fact, a matter not only of justice but of necessity for the Republic to assure the laboring class fair treatment within the framework of its democratic institutions. The Communist Party of the Philippines had embarked on a determined, and increasingly successful, campaign to make the landless and debt-ridden peasantry of the plantations its springboard for a military take-over of the government.”³²

It was at this juncture that Ramon Magsaysay entered the scene and altered the course the nation was headed. When he was appointed Secretary of National Defense in 1950, an unprecedented campaign to gain the peasants’ trust in government was launched. Abuses by the Philippine Constabulary were curtailed and socio-civic activities involving soldiers were conducted in the rural areas.³³ The Economic Development





Corps (EDCOR), was created “to rehabilitate Huk soldiers by making economically independent and politically loyal citizens out of them.”³⁴ These measures were carried out to win the hearts of the peasants.

Magsaysay also invested in superior firearms and military intelligence. Soldiers were trained in guerilla warfare followed by the intensification of military offensive campaigns against the rebels. According to a Jesus Lava, Secretary General of the *Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas*, these efforts “had an impact not only on the movement’s mass support but on the armed [Huk] soldiers as well. Many left because repression was ending, and they were not ideologically committed enough to stay in the movement, especially as things grew worse for the Huks.”³⁵ In the words of Manuel F. Martinez, “early in 1950, the Huks had projected victory in two years. Instead, by late 1952, within those two years, RM reversed the tide of revolution.”³⁶

When Magsaysay won the presidency in 1953, he advocated agrarian reform as a consolidation of his gains as Secretary of National Defense. It was called a continuation of “the government’s twin policy of ‘all-out force and all out friendship’ in dealing with the rebellion.”³⁷ Land reform was therefore pursued to prevent the resurgence of insurgency.

At his inaugural address, President Ramon Magsaysay promised to turn social justice into a reality. He said that his administration “shall take positive, energetic measures to improve the living conditions of our fellow citizens in the barrios and neglected rural areas and of laborers in our urban and industrial centers.” He said that the land tenure system will be re-examined and purged of injustice and oppression. Finally, he stated that “land for the landless” was going to be translated into actuality.³⁸ In what the Manila Chronicle dubbed as the “Presidents’ Promissory Note,” Magsaysay dedicated himself to transforming the life of the common man.³⁹

Magsaysay’s Agrarian Reform Program

To carry out reform, Magsaysay’s program required the enactment of laws and establishment of new agencies. The two basic laws of the program were the Agricultural Tenancy Act which governed tenancy relations and the Land Reform Act of 1955 which provided for the redistribution of land to the tiller. These laws made possible a two pronged approach to





land reform- tenancy reform and the break-up and sub-division of landed estates.⁴⁰

Aside from the above mentioned laws, the implementation of the program required the establishment of new agencies. Among them were the Agricultural Tenancy Commission and the Court of Agrarian Relations. The Agricultural Tenancy Commission (ATC) was tasked to implement the Agricultural Tenancy Act. The Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) on the other hand was mandated to adjudicate disputes arising from the reform efforts. For support services the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) was tapped with the task to provide an adequate production credit system for small farmers. Lastly, the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) was also tapped to resettle tenants who would be displaced.⁴¹

The Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954

Republic Act No. 1199: An Act to Govern the Relations between Landholders and Tenants of Agricultural Lands (Leasehold and Share Tenancy), also known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act was enacted on August 30, 1954.⁴² Its purpose was, “to establish agricultural tenancy relations between landholders and tenants upon the principle of social justice; afford adequate protection to the rights of both tenants and landholders; to insure an equitable distribution of the produce and income derived from the land; to provide tenant-farmers with incentives to greater and more efficient agricultural production; to bolster their economic position and to encourage their participation in the development of peaceful, vigorous and democratic rural communities.”⁴³

It sought to break the “inertia of inaction” in tenancy and to pave the way for the tenants to own a piece of land to cultivate. The Act was also meant to assure an equitable tenant-landlord relationship to promote the progressive development of agriculture.⁴⁴

The technical experts who drafted the bill believed that many share tenants were unprepared for the responsibilities of land ownership for everything they did on the farm was subject to the control and direction of the landlords. As a result, the tenant farmers did not develop the managerial skills needed to succeed in landownership.⁴⁵ Thus, a process





called the “agrarian ladder” was envisioned with the goal of preparing share-tenants for independent ownership.⁴⁶

The agrarian ladder involved the farmer’s gradual transition from share-tenant to leaseholder then from leaseholder to owner.⁴⁷ Share tenancy involved the agreement between a landowner to furnish his land and a tenant to cultivate it. They agreed on the items of production each would contribute such as supplies, farm implements and farm animals. The harvest would then be divided between them according to their respective contributions. Leasehold on the other hand involved the cultivation of a piece of agricultural land owned by another in consideration of a fixed price, in cash or kind. In this system the tenant did not receive a share of the harvest but instead paid the landlord a fixed lease rental while keeping the rest of the harvest himself. It therefore provided an incentive for the tenant to improve his production, for any gain in production belonged solely to him.⁴⁸ It was believed that with the support of the government, the leaseholder would learn from experience the responsibilities of land ownership and farm management. It was also assumed that it would break the share tenant’s dependence on the landlord.⁴⁹

Leasehold was a new concept in Philippine tenancy legislation at the time. It was considered a step up the agrarian ladder for it would give the tenant more independence and a larger share of the harvest.⁵⁰

Despite its noble intentions, the bill went through difficulty before it was finally approved by Congress. In fact, what was eventually enacted was a watered-down version of the original bill. According to Riedinger, the reason was that a great number of Congressmen belonged to the landed political elite who resisted reform.⁵¹

In the final version, the law gave the tenant the right to shift to the leasehold system. The shift to leasehold was an option and not a requirement in consideration of the fact that some landlords and share tenants were actually satisfied with the share tenancy system.⁵² Aside from having the option to shift to leasehold, the law also gave the peasant the right to adopt the crop-share arrangement, should he decide to maintain the share-tenancy relationship. According to Senator Juan Sumulong, Congress was guided by “the principle of the right of civil determination





of the peasants." According to Senator Raul Manglapus, the share tenants were assured the exercise of the freedom of choice.⁵³

The law also had other salient features. It guaranteed security of tenure, conferred on tenants more managerial rights, set the maximum limitation on land rentals, and made possible for the tenant to receive a greater portion of the harvest by giving him the right to contribute more to the items of production.⁵⁴ It also "codified and clarified the vague and scattered tenancy laws, detailed the rights and obligations of landlord and tenant, and reduced the interest rates and the creditor's liens on the tenant."⁵⁵

Despite being a watered down version of the bill, the Agricultural Tenancy Act nonetheless empowered the peasants with rights that they could assert judicially without fear of ejection. For the first time the security of tenure of the peasant was guaranteed because the Act contained penal provisions if landlords eject tenants without any legal procedure.⁵⁶ American writer Joe R. Motheral called this law "the most comprehensive landlord-tenant regulatory measure in the world," a Magna Carta for Philippine tenants.⁵⁷ The express statement in the law, to establish agricultural tenancy relations "upon the principle of social justice" was even commended by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations for it was uncommon for tenancy laws to do so.⁵⁸

However, even though the law was enacted, Congress did not pass its companion law that would have created the Court of Agrarian Relations which would settle tenancy disputes arising from the Act. To make things worse, Congress failed to appropriate funds for its implementation.⁵⁹ Therefore, it appeared that the law would be paralyzed by the inaction of the Philippine legislature.

Agricultural Tenancy Commission (ATC)

To address the problem, Magsaysay ordered the creation of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission through Administrative Order No. 67.⁶⁰ He allotted the budget for its establishment from his contingency fund. Later, it received additional support from U.S. counterpart funds.⁶¹

As the implementing agency of Republic Act No. 1199, the Agricultural Tenancy Commission (ATC) was tasked with a three-point objective. First,





to conduct the educational programs to acquaint landholders and tenants of their rights and obligations. Second, to conduct surveys and research work to determine the extent of compliance and adaptability of the law to different crops in different areas. And third, to give assistance to tenants and landlords to amicably settle their disputes.⁶² The Commission was thus divided into information, technical and mediation divisions.⁶³

Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR)

Almost a year passed before the companion law of the “Agricultural Tenancy Act” was finally enacted. On June 14, 1955, the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) was established.⁶⁴ Its main function was to adjudicate all tenancy disputes. Landlord-share tenant disputes that were not settled by the Agricultural Tenancy Commission were referred to the court.

The Land Reform Act of 1955

On September 9, 1955, Republic Act No. 1400: An Act Defining a Land Tenure Policy, Providing for an Instrumentality to Carry Out the Policy, and Appropriating Funds for its Implementation, also known as the Land Reform Act of 1955 became the basic law for the redistribution of land to the tiller. Although a continuation of previous land acquisition and redistribution programs, it differed from the earlier efforts in that it expanded the scope of lands that may be acquired by the government for redistribution. It also created the Land Tenure Administration (LTA) which was tasked to implement the law.⁶⁵

Government acquisition of lands for redistribution was justified by the inherent power of the state to eminent domain. The 1935 constitution expanded this power by making a special provision for the acquisition of private lands for redistribution to individuals at cost, no longer limiting the justification for the taking of land for mere public use. However, the constitutional power was interpreted in several cases by the Supreme Court as applying only to the big landed estates for it appeared to have been the intention of its framers.⁶⁶ This policy was reiterated in R.A. 1400 when it provided for expropriation at the initiative of the government, of lands that were three hundred hectares or more if owned by individuals and six hundred hectares or more if owned by corporations.⁶⁷





The new law also expanded acquisition to lands where justified agrarian unrest existed regardless of area. Therefore unlike the earlier land redistribution law, even properties that were less than three hundred hectares could be covered by compulsory acquisition provided that agrarian unrest was present. In such cases, the landowners were compelled to give up their land once they were paid just compensation.⁶⁸

In situations where share tenants wanted to become owners, but where the three hundred hectare minimum could not be met and agrarian unrest was not present, the recourse given by the law was negotiated purchase. The majority of share tenants in an estate may petition the Land Tenure Administration to negotiate the purchase of any privately owned land. After acquisition, the land would be subdivided and sold to the tenants in annual installments.⁶⁹

Before acquisition, it was the task of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission to determine the preparedness of the farmers for land ownership.⁷⁰ The law also required that the tenants first form a cooperative to be affiliated with a government financing cooperative agency to assure that the credit needs of the tenants for consumption and production purposes were met.⁷¹ The problem with adequate production credit was addressed by tapping the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA).

Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA)

Money lending was a major source of revenue for some landlords. In certain cases, revenue earned in lending almost equaled the rental share. Some believe that the function of this kind of credit was to keep tenants in debt and “perennially subject to the dominant class of landowners.”⁷² To avoid exploitation and to provide an adequate production credit system for small farmers, the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Administration (ACCFA) was formed.

The establishment of the ACCFA was actually a result of the prodding by the Mutual Security Agency. It was established by the Administration of President Elpidio Quirino in 1952 but was not given sufficient funding. Magsaysay revitalized the ACCFA in 1955.⁷³ A system of liberal credit specifically designed to meet the needs of the small farmer was thus





established.⁷⁴ Aside from this, the ACCFA also facilitated the organization of farmers' cooperatives as required by the "Land Reform Act of 1955."

National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Administration (NARRA)

In Magsaysay's first year as president, he asked Congress to replace the disorganized Land Settlement and Development Corporation (LASEDECO) with the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA).⁷⁵ This agency was created primarily to resettle share tenants, mostly from the heavily tenanted areas of Central Luzon to sparsely settled regions, chiefly in Mindanao and Palawan.⁷⁶

The agency was tasked to relocate share tenants who would be displaced by the division of estates into family-size farms for there were instances when the land area was insufficient to accommodate all the share tenants. Its function was not limited to resettlement for aside from providing farm lots, work animals and farm implements to facilitate cultivation, the NARRA also extended credit assistance in kind and advanced food rations. It also helped organize community activities.⁷⁷

Accomplishments of the Program

In his last state-of-the-nation-address, President Magsaysay said:

Through tenancy and land reform measures, we have improved the living conditions of our tenants and farmers. More than that, these new measures have opened up the path to land ownership. But ownership alone will not ensure to the small farmer the full enjoyment of his land. For this, it is necessary that he should operate his farm efficiently. We have, therefore redoubled our efforts in assisting him to become an efficient farmer.

Since 1954, we have vigorously campaigned against the exploitation of tenants by their landlords. We are succeeding. We have helped the tenants secure a greater share of the fruits of their labors. Last year, the Court of Agrarian Relations was established. Within the brief period of its existence, this Court has shown its effectiveness in the settlement of tenancy disputes.⁷⁸





Magsaysay was clearly proud of the accomplishments of his program and while it did not totally transform rural society, steps toward uplifting the lives of the masses had already taken place.

In the past, peasants were practically helpless against exploitative landlords. This changed with the passage of the Agricultural Tenancy Act which defined their rights. With the help of the Agricultural Tenancy Commission, peasants could assert their rights in court instead of participating in insurgency. According to Jose Abueva,

The ATC intervened in tenantlandlord disputes to redress inequalities in bargaining power and inequities in crop distribution By June 1955, the ATC had conducted 214 public forums in 21 provinces, mediated between 98,513 tenants and 1,005 landowners, rendered more than a thousand legal opinions, and settled amicably 270 out of 596 cases referred to it, which involved 43,958 tenants and 830 landowners. The ATC mediated 1,030-tenancy dispute (sic) in FY 1956, and 2,808 in FY 1957. The ATC claimed that, as a result of its work tenants had increased their share and production, and their sense of security and morale had improved.⁷⁹

In its first year, the Court of Agrarian Relations handled 2,589 cases. It was more than all the cases filed with the tenancy division of the Court of Industrial Relations in the previous three years. A more significant accomplishment was that it disposed of all the cases and some three hundred pending ones as well. "Through vigorous action in the field aided by less formal procedures, waiver of docket fees, and the policy of resolving doubts in favor of the tenant as embodied in the Land Reform Act of 1955, almost overnight the CAR gained the tenants' confidence."⁸⁰

In a speech delivered in 1963, Senator Raul S. Manglapus provided the following figures to show the performance of the Agrarian Court. He said that in 1955, 2,306 filed, 2,306 disposed; in 1956, 2,592 filed, 2,592 disposed; in 1957 2,603 filed, 2,598 disposed, 5 pending; in 1958, 3,870 filed, 3,809 disposed, 61 pending; in 1959, 3,863 filed, 3,787 disposed, 76 pending; in 1960, 4,392 filed, 4,219 disposed, 173 pending; in 1961, 5,187 filed, 4,460 disposed, 727 pending; in 1962, 5,019 filed, 3,254 disposed,





1,765 pending; in 1963, 3,837 filed, 1,806 disposed, 2,031 pending; or a total of 33,669 filed 28,231 disposed and 4,838 pending.⁸¹

With regard the Land Tenure Administration, the implementing agency of the Land Reform Act of 1955, Abueva said that “within a year the LTA had investigated 60 of 251 petitions for expropriation. By June 1957, ten estates had been acquired by the LTA and other agencies, and turned over to LTA management. The LTA executed with landless tenants 733 deeds of sale, involving 80 farms and 757 home lots.”⁸²

The NARRA which was responsible for resettling displaced share tenants moved 10,651 families, 5,914 of which had come from areas of high tenancy, by 1956. The following year, it resettled 21,587 families into 16 settlement projects. The administration also “provided the settlers with farm implements, work animals, livestock and poultry, seeds, water supply, schools, and subsistence aid. It surveyed and subdivided land and issued patents. It even helped to organize community associations that undertook self- help projects.” Incidental to this was the expediting of the issuance of land titles. The President “encouraged the U.S. supported modernization of patent processing in the Bureau of Lands” which sped up its work tremendously. Land patents issued jumped from about 9,000 in 1953 to over 46,000 in 1955.”⁸³

A consolidated view of all the above will show the unified efforts exerted by the Magsaysay administration to improve the life of the common man. Never before had the Philippine government embarked in reform of such a wide scale.

An Evaluation of the Program

While Magsaysay seemed sincere in his desire to uplift the “common man,” his advocacy for agrarian reform was also an anti-communist strategy.⁸⁴ In this regard, the program succeeded for as observed by Hugh L. Cook, a former American adviser of Magsaysay’s technical group,

A blunt evaluation of the program’s importance is that President Magsaysay used it to undercut the basic appeal of the Communist infiltrated Hukbalahap rebellion in the heavily tenanted areas, and thus made possible the survival of the





republic. The people wanted a piece of land as a value in itself, or security of tenure on the land, and wanted a greater share of the fruits of their labor. They wanted the government on their side in disputes with landlords. The land reform program has moved them not rapidly but noticeably toward achievement of these values.⁸⁵

As a sincere effort to make life better for the peasants, Wurfel observed,

Though it cannot yet be proven statistically, it appears that the Magsaysay administration may have halted the trend toward greater concentration of land ownership. Stricter enforcement of the Public Land Act and expanded land settlement programs increased the number of owner- cultivators on new lands; cheap agricultural credit prevented small owners in settled areas from losing their land because of debt; and increased shares for tenants through enforcement of the Agricultural Tenancy Act discouraged large investors from buying more agricultural land as income property. But to reverse the trend is more difficult.⁸⁶

While it had its share of praises, the program was also subject to criticism. For Renato Constantino the “Land Reform Act of 1955” was “hardly revolutionary” because the landlord dominated Congress, not content with raising the expropriation-exempt land holdings to 300 hectares, inserted a number of legal loopholes in the Act. Among those he identified was the provision that the 300 hectares should be contiguous, which exempted many estates. Another was the provision that expropriation could be undertaken only when the majority of the tenants petitioned for purchase. Constantino believed that considering the power of the landlords over the debt-ridden tenants, they “could easily cow all but the most militant peasants into silent submission.” The landlords could also easily block such petitions in light of their political influence.⁸⁷

It seems that Constantino misinterpreted the law for as mentioned earlier, the 300 hectares of contiguous land was required only if the government would initiate expropriation, as was done prior to Magsaysay’s





program. But in cases where there was justified agrarian unrest, government was empowered to expropriate land regardless of area. A petition from the tenants was not even required in this case.⁸⁸ The other situation where a majority of the farmers could petition for the purchase of an estate, referred to land where acquisition was to be made by negotiated purchase.⁸⁹ The law gave the tenants the right to ask the government to put the land they tilled under the coverage of land reform. However, mere desire for ownership did not mean being prepared for the responsibilities. More than just transferring land to the tenants, the purpose of Magsaysay's program was to improve their living condition. Therefore, unless it was clear that the peasants were prepared for ownership, even a petition did not guarantee negotiation for purchase.⁹⁰

Another criticism is that compared to those of Taiwan and Japan, the Philippine program was very conservative. It was much less thoroughgoing in land redistribution compared to the programs of the two countries where "reforms abolished absentee ownership and set a low ceiling on land that could be retained by landlords." Wolf Ladejinsky, said that the reforms in the two countries "involved a drastic redistribution of property, income, political power and social status at the expense of the landlords." And although the landlords were not entirely dispossessed, "their monopoly of wealth was significantly diminished. They also rechanneled their capital into other avenues of enterprise."⁹¹

While conditions in the Philippines, Taiwan and Japan were similar, there were several factors that prevented the Philippines from adopting the same radical reform measures. One is that many share tenants were unprepared for the responsibilities of land ownership. Aside from lack of preparation, they were also not ready to finance the cost of agricultural production. Aggressive land redistribution was thus risky for it could negatively impact agricultural productivity unless the government furnished capital and provided management support.⁹² Another reason is that the Philippine Constitution safeguarded the right to property.⁹³ Government could thus not take, divide and distribute estates without payment of just compensation.⁹⁴ Lastly, the landlord dominated Congress was apathetic to the need for change in the countryside.





A mimeograph article entitled “The Land Reform Program of President Diosdado Macapagal: Description, Analysis and Justification,” described President Magsaysay’s Land Reform Act as having been “hampered by many defects which eventually rendered its implementation ineffective. These defects were,

1. The Act does not contain inducements, wither negatively through taxation, or positively by offering attractive compensation, to the landowners to, sell his land voluntarily to the Administration;
2. There is no provision for the fixed pricing of the land to be acquired by the government;
3. The maximum retention rights permissible are still too high i.e. for an individual, 300 hectares, and for a corporation, 600 hectares of contiguous land;
4. The acquisition of tenanted agricultural land has to be petitioned by a majority of its tenants;
5. There is no adequate financing for the land acquired by the Land Tenure Administration; and
6. There is likewise no financial assistance for the repurchase of the land by the tenants.⁹⁵

Antonio J. Ledesma S.J. thus noted that “up to the decade of the 60’s, the agrarian problem remained unsolved and had even been aggravated by the expansion of the population.”⁹⁶

Conclusion

The primary effect of Magsaysay’s Agrarian Reform was the empowerment of the Philippine peasantry. With the confidence and security gained through the “Agricultural Tenancy Act,” they asserted their rights with less hesitation and fear as seen in the dramatic increase in the number of cases filed by tenants against landlords. On the other hand, though some consider the “Land Reform Act of 1955” to have been insufficient, it was nonetheless a “strategic beachhead for agrarian reformers” which paved the way for the passage of President Diosdado Macapagal’s stronger “Agricultural Land Reform Code” in 1963.⁹⁷





While the program was made with fairness in mind, the situation involved a sharp difference in wealth, power and prestige between the landlords and peasants. Therefore any law intended to make the distribution of wealth more equitable had to be at the expense of those favored by the existing inequitable conditions. This was the price to pay for a more secure and stable society and toward this end, no matter how transitory, the program was a success.

Notes

1. Inaugural Address of Ramon Magsaysay, President of the Philippines, December 30, 1953, *Official Gazette* 49 No. 12 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, Dec. 1953), 5332-5333.
2. David Wurfel, "Philippine Agrarian Reform under Magsaysay," *Far Eastern Survey*, 27 No. 1 (Jan. 1958), 7.
3. Ibid.
4. Republic Act No. 3844, August 8, 1963, *Official Gazette* 60 No. 18 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, May 1964), 2478-2527.
5. Wurfel, Jan. 1958, 7-15/David Wurfel, "Philippine Agrarian Reform under Magsaysay II," *Far Eastern Survey*, 27 No. 2 (Feb. 1958), 23-30.
6. *Philippine Agricultural Statistics 2* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1956), 3-16.
7. Ibid, 13.
8. *Philippine Agricultural Statistics 2*, 39.
9. James Putzel, *A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1992), 55.
10. *Philippine Agricultural Statistics 1*, 6.
11. Generoso F. Rivera and Robert T. McMillan, *The Rural Philippines* (Manila: Mutual Security Agency, 1952), 217.
12. Donald E. Douglas, "An Historical Survey of the Land Tenure Situation in the Philippines," *Solidarity* 5 No. 7 (July, 1970), 65.
13. Generoso F. Rivera and Robert T. McMillan, *An Economic and Social Survey of Rural Households in Central Luzon* (Manila: A Cooperative Project of the Philippine Council for United States Aid and the United States of America Operations Mission to the Philippines, 1954), vi.






14. Benedict J. Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1979), 23–24.
15. Fernando A. Santiago, Jr., *Changing Times and Agrarian Unrest in the Philippines: A Social History of Landlordism in Nueva Ecija during the Pre-War Era, 1909–1941* (Ph.D. diss.: University of the Philippines, Diliman, 2013), 145.
16. Teodoro A. Agoncillo, *History of the Filipino People* (Quezon City: Garotech Publishing, 1990), 445–446/ Jim Richardson, *Komunista: The Genesis of the Philippine Communist Party, 1902–1935* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2011), 114–115.
17. Agoncillo, 445.
18. Kerkvliet, 109. “The Peasant War in the Philippines: A Study of the Causes of Social Unrest in the Philippines,” *Social Sciences and Humanities Review* (Manila, Philippines, 1946), 375–436.
19. *Ibid*, 116.
20. Dr. Jesus B. Lava, *Memoirs of a Communist* (Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 2002), 90.
21. Alfredo B. Saulo, *Communism in the Philippines, An Introduction–Enlarged Edition* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994), 36.
22. Agoncillo, 437–438/ Kerkvliet, 138–151.
23. Kerkvliet, 189–191.
24. Agoncillo, 457.
25. *Report to the President of the United States by the Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines* (Washington, D.C., October 9, 1950), 7.
26. *Ibid*, 43/ Jose V. Abueva, *Focus on the Barrio* (Quezon City: Phoenix Press, Inc., 1959), 19.
27. Putzel, 85.
28. Robert S. Hardie, *Philippine Land Tenure Reform: Analysis and Recommendations* (Manila: Special Technical and Economic Mission, U.S. Mutual Security Agency, 1953), 10–16/ Abueva, 1959, 17.
29. *Ibid*.
30. Lewis E. Gleeck, Jr., *The Third Philippine Republic, 1946–1972* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1993), 112/ Putzel, 91.





31. Ibid/ Stephen Roskamm Shalom, *The United States and the Philippines, A Study of Neocolonialism* (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1986), 85.
32. Horacio de la Costa S.J., *Readings in Philippine History* (Manila: Bookmark, Inc., 1992), 258.
33. Putzel, 88.
34. Wurfel, Jan. 1958, 9.
35. Kerkvliet, 238.
36. Manuel F. Martinez (ed. By Nelson A. Navarro), *Magsaysay the People's President* (Makati City: RMJ Development Corporation, 2005), 175.
37. Jose V. Abueva, *Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography* (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1971), 437.
38. Inaugural Address of Ramon Magsaysay, President of the Philippines, December 30, 1953, 5332/ Abueva, 1959, 48.
39. Abueva, 1971, 280.
40. Fernando A. Santiago, "Farm Tenancy Reform and the Agricultural Tenancy Commission," *Rural Progress, GREENBOOK 1956* (Manila: The Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 1956), 45/ Wurfel, Jan. 1958, 11/ Wurfel, Feb. 1958, 23.
41. Wurfel, Jan. 1958, 8-15.
42. Republic Act No. 1199, August 30, 1954, *Official Gazette* 50, No. 10 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, Oct. 1954), 4655-4671.
43. Ibid, 4655.
44. Fernando A. Santiago, "Agricultural Tenancy Commission (ATC)," *Agricultural Credit in the Far East: Proceedings of the First Agricultural Credit Workshop* (Manila-Baguio, 1956), 83.
45. Fernando A. Santiago, "Enlarging Farm Size Through Development Program," *Farm Management: Documents Presented at the Fifth FAO Development Center on Farm Management for Asia and the Far East* (Manila: Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and University of the Philippines, 1961), 239.
46. Wurfel, Jan. 1958, 11.



- 
47. Fernando A. Santiago, Jr., *An Interview with Retired Justice Fernando A. Santiago Regarding the Land Reform Program of President Ramon Magsaysay and its Impact on Central Luzon* (2002), 2–3.
48. *Ibid.*, 3.
49. Republic Act No. 1199, 4655–4671.
50. Wurfel, Jan. 1958, 11.
51. Jeffrey M. Riedinger, *Agrarian Reform in the Philippines: Democratic Transitions and Redistributive Reform* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995), 88.
52. *Report to the President of the United States by the Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines*, 43.
53. Raul S. Manglapus, *Land of Bondage, Land of the Free: Social Revolution in the Philippines* (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1967), 13.
54. Santiago, “Farm Tenancy Reform and the Agricultural Tenancy Commission,” 1956, 45.
55. Abueva, 435.
56. Dorothy Dillon, *Land Reform* (Manila: Thomas Jefferson Cultural Center in Manila, 1968), 43–44.
57. Joe R. Motheral, “Land Tenure in the Philippines,” *Journal of Farm Economics*, 38, No. 2 (Oxford University Press, May, 1956), 471/ Walter Froehlich (ed.), *Land Tenure, Industrialization and Social Stability: Experiences and Prospects in Asia* (Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1961), 175.
58. Emmanuel S. Abensour, Pedro Moral-Lopez and Erich H. Jacoby, *Principles of Tenancy Legislation: A Comparative Study* (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1957), 2.
59. Abueva, 1971, 372; 426.
60. Administrative Order No. 67, Office of the President, September 30, 1954.
61. Wurfel, Jan. 1958, 13.
62. Santiago, “Farm Tenancy Reform and the Agricultural Tenancy Commission,” 1956, 45.
63. Wurfel, Jan. 1958, 13. For more detail, see Santiago, Jr., 2002.



64. Republic Act No. 1267, June 14, 1955, *Official Gazette* 51 No. 7 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, July 1955), 3335–3340.
65. Republic Act No. 1400, September 9, 1955, *Official Gazette* 51 No. 10 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, September 1954), 4960–4966.
66. Article XII, Section 4, The 1935 Constitution.
67. R.A. 1400, 4961.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid. 4962–4963.
70. Santiago, Jr., 2002, 5.
71. Santiago, Agricultural Tenancy Commission (ATC), 1956, 88.
72. Froehlich, 1961, 170.
73. Carlos Quirino, *Magsaysay of the Philippines* (Makati: Carmelo & Bauerman, Inc., 1958), 171.
74. Osmundo Mondonedo, “Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA),” *Agricultural Credit in the Far East, Proceedings of the First Agricultural Credit Workshop* (Manila-Baguio, 1956), 66.
75. Republic Act No. 1160, June 18, 1954, 50 No. 9 *Official Gazette* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, Sept. 1954), 4070–4076/ Abueva, 1971, 370.
76. Froehlich, 1961, 170.
77. Republic Act No. 1160, 4071–4072.
78. Ramon Magsaysay, Fourth State of the Nation Address, January 28, 1957, *Official Gazette* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1957)/ Gleeck, 164.
79. Abueva, 1971, 372. Republic Act 821.
80. Abueva, 1971, 373–374.
81. Manglapus 1967, 17.
82. Abueva, 1971, 373.
83. Ibid, 370–371.
84. Putzel, 88–91.
85. Froehlich 1961, 179.
86. Wurfel, Feb. 1958, 30.





87. Renato Constantino and Letizia R. Constantino. *The Philippines: A Continuing Past* (Quezon City: The Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978), 264.
88. Republic Act No. 1400, 4961.
89. Ibid, 4962–4963.
90. Santiago, Jr., 2002, 5.
91. Putzel 1992, 74.
92. Froehlich 1961, 177.
93. Article III, Section 2, The 1935 Constitution.
94. Froehlich 1961, 177.
95. The Land Reform Program of President Diosdado Macapagal: Description, Analysis and Justification n.d.
96. Antonio J. Ledesma, "Land Reform in the Philippines in Light of Recent Catholic Social Thought." 1968, 214.
97. Abueva, 1971, 372–373.

Works Cited

- Abensour, Emmanuel S., Pedro Moral-Lopez and Erich H. Jacoby, *Principles of Tenancy Legislation: A Comparative Study*. Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1957.
- Abueva, Jose V. *Ramon Magsaysay: A Political Biography*. Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1971.
- Abueva, Jose V. *Focus on the Barrio*. Quezon City: Phoenix Press, Inc., 1959.
- Agoncillo, Teodoro A. *History of the Filipino People*. Quezon City: Garotech Publishing, 1990.
- Constantino, Renato and Letizia R. Constantino. *The Philippines: A Continuing Past*. Quezon City: The Foundation for Nationalist Studies, 1978.
- de la Costa S.J., Horacio. *Readings in Philippine History*. Manila: Bookmark, Inc., 1992.
- Dillon, Dorothy. *Land Reform*. Manila: Thomas Jefferson Cultural Center in Manila, 1968.





- Douglas, Donald E. "An Historical Survey of the Land Tenure Situation in the Philippines," *Solidarity* 5 No. 7 (July, 1970).
- Froehlich, Walter (ed.). *Land Tenure, Industrialization and Social Stability: Experiences and Prospects in Asia*. Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1961.
- GleECK, Lewis E. Jr. *The Third Philippine Republic, 1946–1972*. Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1993.
- Kerkvliet, Benedict J. *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines*. Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1979.
- Lava, Dr. Jesus B. *Memoirs of a Communist*. Pasig City: Anvil Publishing, Inc., 2002.
- Ledesma, Antonio J. "Land Reform in the Philippines in Light of Recent Catholic Social Thought." MA Thesis, University of the Philippines. 1968.
- Martinez, Manuel F. (ed. By Nelson A. Navarro), *Magsaysay the People's President*. Makati City: RMJ Development Corporation, 2005.
- Motheral, Joe R. "Land Tenure in the Philippines," *Journal of Farm Economics* 38 No. 2. Oxford University Press, May 1956.
- Putzel, James. *A Captive Land: The Politics of Agrarian Reform in the Philippines*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1992.
- Quirino, Carlos. *Magsaysay of the Philippines*. Makati: Carmelo & Bauerman, Inc., 1958.
- Riedinger, Jeffrey M. *Agrarian. Reform in the Philippines: Democratic Transitions and Redistributive Reform*. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1995.
- Richardson, Jim. *Komunista: The Genesis of the Philippine Communist Party, 1902–1935*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 2011.
- Rivera, Generoso F. and Robert T. McMillan. *An Economic and Social Survey of Rural Households in Central Luzon. Manila: A Cooperative Project of the Philippine Council for United States Aid and the United States of America Operations Mission to the Philippines, 1954*.
- Rivera, Generoso F. and Robert T. McMillan. *The Rural Philippines*. Manila: Mutual Security Agency, 1952.





Saulo, Alfredo B. *Communism in the Philippines, An Introduction–Enlarged Edition*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994.

Shalom, Stephen Roskamm. *The United States and the Philippines, A Study of Neocolonialism*. Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1986.

Santiago, Fernando A. “Enlarging Farm Size Through Development Program,” *Farm Management: Documents Presented at the Fifth FAO Development Center on Farm Management for Asia and the Far East*. Manila: Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and University of the Philippines, 1961.

———. “Farm Tenancy Reform and the Agricultural Tenancy Commission,” *Rural Progress, GREENBOOK 1956*. Manila: The Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 1956.

———. “Agricultural Tenancy Commission (ATC),” *Agricultural Credit in the Far East: Proceedings of the First Agricultural Credit Workshop*. Manila-Baguio, 1956.

Santiago, Fernando A. Jr., *Changing Times and Agrarian Unrest in the Philippines: A Social History of Landlordism in Nueva Ecija during the Pre-War Era, 1909–1941*. Ph.D. diss.: University of the Philippines, Diliman, 2013.

———. *An Interview with Retired Justice Fernando A. Santiago Regarding the Land Reform Program of President Ramon Magsaysay and its Impact on Central Luzon*. 2002.

“The Peasant War in the Philippines: A Study of the Causes of Social Unrest in the Philippines,” *Social Sciences and Humanities Review* (Manila, Philippines: 1946).

Wurfel, David. “Philippine Agrarian Reform under Magsaysay,” *Far Eastern Survey*, 27 No. 1 (Jan. 1958): 7–15.

———. “Philippine Agrarian Reform under Magsaysay II,” *Far Eastern Survey*, 27 No. 2 (Feb. 1958): 23–30.

Laws

Article III, Section 2, The 1935 Constitution.

Article XII, Section 4, The 1935 Constitution.





Administrative Order No. 67, Office of the President, September 30, 1954.

Fourth State of the Nation Address, January 28, 1957, *Official Gazette*.

Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1957.

Republic Act No. 821.

Republic Act No. 1400, September 9, 1955, *Official Gazette* 51 No. 10.

Manila: Bureau of Printing, September 1954, 4960–4966.

Republic Act No. 3844, August 8, 1963, *Official Gazette* 60 No. 18 (Manila:

Bureau of Printing, May 1964), 2478–2527.

Republic Act No. 1267, June 14, 1955, *Official Gazette* 51 No. 7 (Manila:

Bureau of Printing, July 1955), 3335–3340.

Republic Act No. 1199, August 30, 1954, *Official Gazette* 50, No. 10 (Manila:

Bureau of Printing, Oct. 1954), 4655–4671.

Republic Act No. 1160, June 18, 1954, 50 No. 9 *Official Gazette* (Manila:

Bureau of Printing, Sept. 1954), 4070–4076.

Inaugural Address of Ramon Magsaysay, President of the Philippines,

December 30, 1953, *Official Gazette* 49 No. 12 (Manila: Bureau of Printing, Dec. 1953), 5332–5333.

Reports

Hardie, Robert S., *Philippine Land Tenure Reform: Analysis and Recommendations*. Manila: Special Technical and Economic Mission, U.S. Mutual Security Agency, 1953.

Report to the President of the United States by the Economic Survey Mission to the Philippines. (Washington, D.C., October 9, 1950).

Inaugural Address of Ramon Magsaysay, President of the Philippines, December 30, 1953, 5332/ Abueva, 1959, 48.

Philippine Agricultural Statistics 1. Manila: Bureau of Printing, Jan. 1956.

Philippine Agricultural Statistics 2. Manila: Bureau of Printing, Feb. 1956.

The Land Reform Program of President Diosdado Macapagal: Description, Analysis and Justification n.d.





Ang Retorika ng Rehimeng Duterte at ang Kulturang Pilipino: Isang Kasong Pag-aaral sa Pagbabanggaan ng Burukrasya at Kultura

RAUL ROLAND R. SEBASTIAN, DPA
MARK JOSEPH P. SANTOS
Polytechnic University of the Philippines



Abstrak

Layon ng papel na ito na gamitin bilang isang kasong pag-aaral ang relasyon ng rehimeng Duterte sa kulturang Pilipino, na nakapaloob sa balangkas ng pagbabanggaan ng burukrasya at kultura. Sentral na tesis ng papel ang proposisyon na isa sa mga mahalagang salik na nakapagluklok kay Duterte sa pwesto at patuloy na nakapagpapanatili ng malaking base-suportang nagmumula sa masa ay ang pagsakay at pakikisangkot niya sa katutubong kulturang Pilipino, habang ito ay gumigitgit sa banyagang burukrasyang angkat mula sa labas. Gamit ang pulitikal na peryodisasyon ni Julio Teehankee, tatangkain ng papel na ipakita kung paano unti-unting nilansag ni Duterte ang gumuguhong naratibo ng Rehimeng Edsa, sampu ng diin nito sa mga konseptong umiinog sa liberal na demokrasyang buhat sa Kanluran, sa pamamagitan ng retorikal na pag-utilisa sa umiiral na salpukan ng banyagang burukrasya at kulturang bayan.

Nahahati ang papel sa dalawa. Ang unang bahagi ay maglalalatag ng maikling pagbaybay sa ilang pangunahing tema ng kulturang pampulitika sa bansa, na korelatibo (maaaring sanhi o bunga, kung hindi man pareho) ng pagbabanggaan ng burukrasya at kultura. Ilan sa mga ito ay ang papel ng pamilya sa pulitika, halaga ng utang na loob, diin sa kolektibong kapakanan higit sa indibiduwal na karapatan, at sistemang padrino. Ang ikalawang parte ng pananaliksik ay babagtas mismo sa





pagbabanggaan ng burukrasya at kultura sa konteksto ng administrasyong Duterte. Susubukang siyasatin sa ikalawang bahagi ang tatlong lantad na tema sa loob rehimeng Duterte: 1. Melodramang Kampanya, 2. Kontra-Amerikanong Tindig, Suliranin sa Mindanao, at ang Kritika sa Imperyalismong Maynila, at 3. Kampanya Kontra Droga, Awtoratikong Imahe, at Puna sa Liberal na Demokrasya ng Kanluran. Samakatuwid, ang una'y magsisilbing makrokosmong lapit sa paksa na magsasakonteksto sa daloy ng ikalawang bahagi, na siya namang maghahain ng maykrokosmong pagtingin sa naturang pagbabanggaan. Bubuuin ang una ng isang sarbey sa mga sekondaryang literatura kapwa ng Pilipino at banyagang mga iskolar na ukol sa pagbabanggaan ng burukrasya at kultura. Para naman sa ikalawang bahagi, liban sa mga sekondaryang mga literatura, ang pag-aaral ay sasandig sa mga diyaryo at mga balitang artikulo sa pormang elektroniko, partikular na sa mga ulat ukol sa pangulo, bilang primaryang batis.

I. Maikling Pagbaybay sa Ilang Temang Korelatibo ng Pagbabanggaan ng Burukrasya at Kultura sa Konteksto ng Kulturang Pampulitika ng Pilipinas

Ang ikalawang digmaang pandaigdig ay nagdulot sa bansa ng malawakang pagkawala at pagkasira ng buhay at ari-arian. Ang ganitong kalunos-lunos na kalagayan ang naging pasanin ng batang Republika ng bansa. Matapos ang digmaan, ang burukrasya ay kakikitaan ng mababang moral, mga hindi kwalipikado at walang kasanayang pinuno, at talamak na korapsyon. Sa ganitong sitwasyon ang burukrasya ay naging bukas na biktima sa mga panggigipit at pang-aabuso hindi lamang ng mga banyaga kundi maging ng ilang maimpluwensiyang pamilya sa bansa.

Ayon kay Alfred McCoy sa kanyang *Anarchy of Families* ang kakulangan sa pananalapi at makinaryang pulitikal para kontrolin ang buong bansa ay nagbunga ng pagkakaroon ng mahinang estado at pag-angat naman ng mga maimpluwensiyang pamilya na naging mga lokal na elit.¹ Ang mga lokal na elit na ito ang tunay na makapangyarihan sapagkat sila ang may direktang kontrol sa lalawigan. Sa ganitong aspeto, ang mga lider nasyonal ay naging sunud-sunuran sa mga lokal na elit sapagkat kinakailangan ng





lider nasyonal ang solidong boto at suporta ng mga maimpluwensiyang pamilya para maupo sa pwesto. Sa ganitong kadahilanan, ang estado ay pumapasok sa tinatawag na *rent seeking* sa mga elit. Sa ganitong, relasyon ang estado ay nagbibigay ng pabor sa ekonomiya o sa pulitika, sa mga maimpluwensiyang pamilya bilang pasasalamat sa suportang ibinigay ng mga elit sa mga lider nasyonal. Ang pagbibigay pabor ng mga lider nasyonal sa mga lokal na elit ay bumabagsak naman sa personal na relasyon sa pagitan ng mga lider nasyonal na tumatayong kliyente at ang mga lokal na elit na tumatayong patron at gayundin ang mga mamamayan sa lalawigan na umaasa sa pagsuporta o pagtangkilik ng mga lokal na elit. Sa ganitong lebel, ang lokal na elit ay tumatayong tagapag-ugnay ng mga tao sa kapangyarihang pulitikal at pangkabuhayan. Ang ganitong mga gawi ay maliwanag na nagdudulot ng malaking panganib sa pulitika at ekonomiya ng bansa. Ang pagbibigay pabor sa ilang mga mayayamang pamilya ay naging hadlang para matupad ang tunay na malayang kalakalan na walang kinikilingan. Ang pananatili rin ng isang pamilya sa loob ng napakahabang panahon ay maliwanag na banta sa tunay na demokrasya at maaaring pagmulan ng mga pang-aabuso.

Ang pamamayani ng ilang maimpluwensiyang pamilya sa pulitika ng bansa ay isa ng matagal na tradisyon. Ang pamilya sa lipunang Pilipino ay may pulitikal na konotasyon. Ang pamilya ay gingamit bilang isang kwalisyong pulitikal at sa pamamagitan ng pag-ugat sa parehong magulang at pagpasok sa mga *ritual kinship* tulad ng kasal at binyag, ang koneksyon ng pamilya ay lumalawak. Ang bawat miyembro ng pamilya ay inaasahang sumuporta at maging tapat sa pamilya, at dahil dito maliwanag na isa itong malakas na institusyong maaring magdala sa isang miyembro sa isang pulitikal na tanggapan.² Ang pagpapahalaga sa pangalan ng pamilya ay nagbibigay inspirasyon din sa mga miyembro na ipagpatuloy ang nasimulan ng kanilang mga magulang.

Sa pag-aaral namang ginawa ni Michael Cullinane tungkol sa mga Durano ng Danao ay ipinakita kung paano naging bihasa ang mga Durano sa pag-exploit ng relasyong patron at kliyente. Ipinakita kung paano ginamit ng pamilyang Durano ang pagpapalit ng katapatan para sa nepotismo sapagkat si Kristo daw mismo ay maraming mga kamag-anak sa kanyang mga apostoles.³ Ang paniniwalang ito ni Don Ramon ay maliwanag na naka-angkla sa prinsipyo ng pamilya sa pulitikang Pilipino





na kung saan ang katapatan ng bawat miyembro ay isang matibay na batas na sinusunod ng bawat kasapi. Ang kakulangan ng isang matibay na ideolohiyang pulitikal ng mga lider nasyonal at mga lider lokal ay isang malinaw na dahilan kung bakit ang pulitika sa bansa ay hindi umunlad at dahil dito ay patuloy na nagagamit ang botanteng Pinoy para sa kapakanan ng iilang lider.

Dahil sa kakulangan ng ideolohiyang pulitikal ay lumalabas na ang pulitika sa bansa laluna sa mga lalawigan ay hindi nagtatapos sa eleksyon bagkus ito ay patuloy na ginagawa sa buong taon. Ang posisyong pulitikal ay itinuturing ding personal. Ang pagkapanalo sa isang posisyong pulitikal ay itinuturing na isang magandang oportunidad para sa sarili at sa pamilya.⁴ Dahil dito ang mga maimpluwensiyang pamilya ay laging kasali sa mga eleksyon upang patuloy na makontrol ang mga interes ng pamilya sa kabuhayan at sa pulitika. Maituturing din na ang ilan sa mga kaugalian at ritwal sa bansa tulad ng binyag at kasal ay isang istrategyang pulitikal para palakasin ang koneksyon ng pamilya sa pulitika. Patunay dito ang pag-aaral na ginawa ni Cullinane sa mga Durano ng Danao sa Cebu na kung saan si Don Ramon, na itinuturing na patriarka ng mga Durano ay inaanak ni Salvador Gonzales na isang mayamang haciendero sa Cebu; ang kanyang panganay na kapatid na si Elisea ay asawa ni Paolo Almendras na isang mayamang haciendero at isang makapangyarihang lider pulitikal; at si Don Ramon mismo ay ikinasal sa isang Beatris Duterte na miyembro ng isa sa pinakamaimpluwensiyang pamilya sa Cebu.⁵ Malinaw sa pag-aaral na ang relasyong personal ay pinatag ang katayuang pulitikal ng pamilyang Durano sa loob ng napakahabang panahon.

Sa pag-aaral naman na isinagawa ni Remigio Appalo tungkol sa pulitika ng Occidental Mindoro ay nakapagdisenyo siya ng isang modelo na magpapakita ng pulitika sa bansa. Ang modelong ito ay tinatawag niyang *Organic Hierarchy Paradigm* na kung saan ang mga katawagang ibinigay sa pulitika at pamilya ay mga organiko, halimbawa, kapatid kabagis; apo sa tuhod; pangulo ng bayan (Mayor) na mula sa salitang ulo; kinatawan (*representative*; ang salita mismo ay nanggaling sa salitang katawan); kanang kamay para sa mga mababang lider at galamay para sa mga tagasuporta. Ang ganitong klase ng pulitika ay umiikot sa tinatawag na *Patronage Politics*. Ang mga lider ay tumatayong ama ng bayan at bilang ama ay kinakailangan tugunan niya ang mga pangangailangang





personal ng kanyang mga tagasunod tulad ng pagrerekomenda sa trabaho, pagpapagamot, pagpapalibing, pagsuporta sa pag-aaral at marami pang iba. May mga pagkakataong tinatawag ang mga lider para ayusin ang mga personal na alitan ng kanyang mga tagasunod. Bilang ama ay inaasahan niya ang pagtangkilik ng kanyang mga taga-sunod at kung sino ang hindi maging tapat ay pinarurusahan sa pamamagitan ng pag-ipit ng pondo. Sa katunayan, sa ganitong pigura ng lengguwahe itinampok ni Marcos ang kanyang sarili noong panahon ng Martial Law. Ipinakita niya ang kanyang imahe bilang ama na nagdidisiplina ng mga Pilipino bilang kanyang mga anak tungo sa isang maunlad na “Bagong Lipunan.” Kung susuriin, ang dehado nang husto ay ang mga mamamayan sapagkat ang karamihan sa mga naupo at nanalo ay hindi mga kwalipikado, bagkus ay mga naluklok lamang dahil sa kanilang apelyido. Dahil dito, kanilang katapatan ay wala sa bayan kundi nasa kanilang pamilya. Ang ganitong klaseng kalakaran ang naging sagabal sa pagkakaroon ng isang matiningong pulitika sa bansa.

Matagal nang palaisipan sa mga mag-aaral ng agham panlipunan kung paano nangyari na ang Pilipinas ang may isa sa mga pinaka atrasadong pulitika at ekonomiya sa kabila ng katotohanang kung ikukumpara sa mga nakapaligid na bansa. Tayo ang pinaka-unang nagkaroon ng mga modernong pulitikal na institusyon buhat sa Amerika. Sa kontrobersyal na artikulo ni James Fallows na *A Damaged Culture* ay sinubukan niyang magbigay ng kasagutan sa tila бага balintunang penomenong ito. Ani niya, ito ay dulot ng problematikong kultura ng mga Pilipino, mas ispesipiko pa, ang kakulangan natin ng nasyonalismo o pagmamahal sa bayan.⁶ Sa aming pakiwari, ano man ang merito ng kanyang analisis, ito ay hindi sumasalamin sa buong larawan ng masalimuot na isyu. Higit pa sa problema sa nasyonalismo (kung ito nga ang tunay na suliranin) ay ang hindi katugmaan ng mga modernong pulitikal na institusyong mayroon tayo, na inangkat lamang mula sa Kanluran, sa kulturang Pilipino. Ang hindi katugmaang ito ang maituturong sanhi ng pagbabanggaan ng burukrasya at kultura. Kababawan kung tatanggapin ang proposisyong maililipat ang isang pulitikal na institusyon mula sa isang banyagang bansa tungo sa sariling bayan nang hindi kinokonsidera ang kultura ng pinagbuhatan at patutunguhan nito. Marapat na maunawaan na ang mga pulitikal na institusyon ay lumilitaw bunga ng historikal na karanasan ng isang grupo ng mga tao, at kung gayon ay sumasalamin sa kanilang sariling kultura.





Naipaliwanag ito nang may lalim ng sosyolohistang si Randolf David sa kanyang aklat na *Understanding Society, Culture, and Politics*. Makabuluhang sipiin dito ang kabuuan ng kanyang komento,

“Whereas, in most of Europe, institutions grew out of the instincts of its people, the Filipino journey toward modernity began as an offshoot of our colonial experience, particularly under the Americans. We started out as perhaps the most institutionally modern among the so-called new nations of Asia, but somewhere in the transition we got stuck. We have, since independence, tried vainly to reconcile the imperatives of the modern institutions left behind by our colonial masters with the pre-modern culture of a feudalistic and hierarchical society, only to realize that there are no easy shortcuts to modernity . . . Our formal institutions in the Philippines are modern institutional systems that were grafted by American colonialism onto a pre-modern Philippine society and culture. These institutions clearly did not grow out of our own experience. They were rather brought in by our colonial masters. The point is simply that merely transplanting modern institutions onto another society does not automatically make that society modern. It does not create the conditions necessary to make these institutions work.”⁷

Maraming kultural na aspeto ng Estados Unidos na kaiba nang sa Pilipinas, at ito ang sanhi ng hindi kaangkupan ng ilang institusyong pulitikal na inangat natin sa Kanluran. Pangunahin na rito ang diin ng mga Amerikano sa indibiduwalismo o pagpapahalaga sa karapatan ng bawat indibiduwal, na litaw sa kanilang *Declaration of Independence*. Samantala, sa hanay ng mga Pilipino ay mataas ang pagpapahalaga sa komunidad. Ito ay tampok halimbawa sa konsepto ng bayanihan. Ang temang ito ang ginamit ni Marcos na litanya upang gawing lihitimo ang kanyang awtoritaryan na pamumuno sa pagbuo ng “Bagong Lipunan.” Ani niya, ang konsepto ng indibiduwal na karapatan at liberal na demokrasya ng Kanluran ay nabuo sa konteksto ng kanilang karanasang historikal, at ito ay hindi lapat sa kalagayan noon ng bansa. Dagdag pa ni Marcos, sa kultura ng Pilipinas gayundin ng ibang bansa sa Silangan ay mas matimbang ang kapakanan ng buong komunidad kaysa karapatan ng indibiduwal. Sa





kanyang sariling mga salita sa aklat niyang *The Philippine Experience: A Perspective on Human Rights and the Rule of the Law*:

“Despite the economic and social changes of the last five or six centuries which shaped the values and institutions of Western liberal democracy, none of them was directly experienced by the Philippines . . . The Philippines, in a word, did not have Western experience. But she was a child of ‘democratic colonialism’ . . . Western liberals never cease, of course, to be puzzled why their institutions could not take root in the developing societies, as well as they had in their own clime. And they tend to regard the problem as merely an excuse for authoritarian rule in the less developed countries. They fail to understand how variations in historical experiences and in material and social conditions inexorably create different problems for establishing effective government . . . It is clear that the social and economic realities of the Philippine setting have not been hospitable to the unqualified operation of Western liberal democracy.”⁸

Maging sa hanay ng mga Islamikong komunidad ay nagkaroon din ng katanungang may kinalaman sa pagbabanggaan ng burukrasya at kultura: kung ang demokratikong sistema ba mula sa Kanluran ay angkop sa kanila. Ito ang isyung diniskurso ni Carmen Abubakar sa kanyang sanaysay na *Is Islam Compatible with Democracy?* Inilahad niya rito kung paanong mayroong opinyon sa hanay ng ilang mga awtoritaryang Muslim na lipunan na nagpapalagay na ang demokrasya ay hindi lapat sa mga Islamikong komunidad, at nakikita pa minsan ang pagpapalaganap ng demokrasya bilang imposisyon ng Kanluraning hegemonya. Isang ilustratibong halimbawa na lamang nito ay ang pagsamantala ng Estados Unidos sa kadahilangang awtoritaryan ang mga Islamikong komunidad ng Kanlurang Asya o Gitnang Silangan upang gamiting lehitimasyon sa kanilang panghihimasok sa mga panloob na krisis ng mga ito.⁹

Katulad ng nabanggit na, ang pagpapahalaga sa pamilya ay isa sa mga marka ng kulturang Pilipino. Isa rin ito sa mga aspeto ng kultura na pinaka madalas bumangga sa burukrasyang angkat mula sa Kanluran, na tipikal sa pagiging impersonal at indibiduwalistiko. Sa pahapyaw na pagtalakay ni





Arlene Torres-D'Mello sa isyung ito, inilahad niya na ang pangbabanggan ng kultura at burukrasya ay nagdudulot ng kalituhan sa mga Pilipino, kung paano bibigyang balanse ang pagpapahalaga sa pamilya sa isang banda at ang pagsunod sa istriktong mga alituntunin ng burukrasya:

“Kinship loyalty is a very important feature of Filipino culture. Therefore, there is an ‘of course’ expectation that mutual assistance is extended to members of the family regardless of how distant the relationship may be. However, they also expect that people in public service should exercise a certain degree of professionalism at work. Drawing the line between where kinship loyalty ends and professionalism begins is often a bone of contention. On the one hand, both giver and receiver of kinship loyalty are criticized for practising nepotism and/or cryonyism. On the other hand, public servants who exercise a businesslike approach, as learned from the Americans, are complained about as ‘insensitive and bureaucratic,’ meaning rigid, or exercising too much ‘red tape.’”¹⁰

Ang Pilipinong konsepto ng utang-na-loob ay mayroon ding malaking ambag sa kultura-burukrasyang pagsasalpukan. Ayon muli kay D'Mello sa iba pa niyang akda, simula pa man nang pagpasok ng kolonyalismo sa bansa, ang konsepto ng utang-na-loob ay naisalin na at nagsilbing instrumento para sa pagpapalakas at pagpapanatili ng sistemang *patronage*.¹¹ Hanggang sa kasalukuyan ay iniinda natin ang mga implikasyon nito sagpagkat dito umiinog ang ilan sa mga pinaka malalaking suliranin ng pulitika sa bansa. Isang halimbawa ay ang isyu ng *political dynasty*. Ang itinuturong dahilan kung bakit patuloy na binoboto ng mga mamamayan ang mga lokal na elit na miyembro ng mga dambuhalang pamilya sa isang probinsya ay ang pagkakagapos nila sa mga pabor na ibinibigay ng mga pulitiko tulad ng mga iskolarsyip sa mga anak, tulong medikal, at pinansyal na suporta para sa kabuhayan. Pinalala ito sa mga nagdaang panahon sa pamamagitan ng paggamit sa kapangyarihang mula sa *pork barrel*, na isa ring porma ng *patronage politics*. Dahil napaka halaga sa lipunang Pilipino ng pagtanaw ng utang-na-loob (sa katunayan, bukod sa “walang hiya” at “walang pakikisama,” ang katagang “walang utang-na-loob” na ang isa sa pinaka





masakit na mga salitang maaaring marinig ng isang Pilipino), naitatali ang mga mamamayan sa katapatan sa mga lokal na elit. Nakaugnay din dito ang tradisyon ng nepotismo. Dahil sa utang-na-loob na namamayani sa loob at hanay mismo ng mga miyembro ng isang *political dynasty*, ang katapatan ay naitutuon hindi sa mga mamamayan bagkus ay sa mga kapamilya. Ang dugo ay nagiging mas matimbang kaysa sa batas. Ang *political dynasty* na bunga ng *patronage politics* ay nagdudulot ng isa pang konektadong suliranin: ang kawalan ng oportunidad na makilahok ng mga panibagong pangalan sa pulitika, mga indibiduwal na may sapat sanang kwalipikasyon upang baguhin ang kasalukuyang sistema. Dahil sa pagkaluklok ng mga naghaharing pamilya, nalilimitahan ang mga apelyidong pagpipilian ng mga botante sa balota. Ang mga pinagsama-samang salik na ito ang humahadlang sa transpormasyon sa loob ng burukrasya at nagpapanatili sa kahirapan ng masa. Sa kabilang banda, ang kahirapan naman ng masa ay ang ginagamit na instrumento ng mga makakapangyarihan (i.e. mga may abilidad na makapangyari sa loob ng sistema) upang panatilihin ang *status quo*. Ang *3P's cycle* na ito (*patronage politics—political dynasty—poverty*) ay hindi maglalaho, liban na lamang kung susubukang solusyunan ang mga suliraning bunga ng pagbabanggaan ng burukrasya at kultura sa lipunang Pilipino.

II. Ang Pagbabanggaan ng Burukrasya at Kultura sa Konteksto ng Pamahalaang Duterte

Sa isang malikhaing paghihiraya ng sosyolohistang si Randolf David, inihalintulad ang nakaraang 2016 pampanguluhang halalan sa metapora ng lansangang-bayan.¹² Mayorya sa mga kalahok ay tila mga pampasadang mga sasakyang napakahabang panahon nang bumabagtas sa mga lumang kalsada. Mayroong dalawang senador, ikalawang pangulo, at miyembro ng gabinete; lahat ay tuwirang mga elit ng Maynila. Ngunit sa hindi inaasahang pagkakataon ay may isang hindi pamilyar na sasakyang biglaang rumagasa at naungusan silang lahat. Sa isang iglap ay nailuklok sa pinakamataas na opisina ng estado ang isang alkalde mula sa timog, ang kauna-unahang pangulong nagbuhat sa Mindanao. Marami ang nagulantang sa kinahinatnan ng halalan; lalo pa't ang nagwagi ay animo'y hindi kumikilala sa mga kumbensyunal na mga tradisyong pulitikal. Hindi nagsusuot ng barong, nagwiwika ng Bisaya sa mga panayam, nagmura sa





Santo Papa at nakaraang pangulo ng Estados Unidos, nagpangalan ng mga korap na heneral ng AFP habang napapanood sa pambansang telebisyon, at naghamon sa hepe ng United Nations. Sa isang sulyap ay tila nakapagtataka ang pagkapanalo ng ikalabing anim na pangulo ng Pilipinas. Ngunit iba ang opinion ni Julio Teehankee. Ayon sa kanya, ang penomenon ay marapat lamang asahan. Sumulpot si Duterte sa panahong papabagsak na ang liberal na demokrasya at pulitikal na naratibo ng tinawag ng may-akda na Rehimeng Edsa. Bago magtungo sa pinaka paksain ng papel, kailangan munang maipaliwanag ang pulitikal na peryodisasyon ni Teehankee, dahil ito ang pangunahing balangkas na gagamitin ng mga mananaliksik upang mabigyang linaw ang talaban sa pagitan ng pagbabanggaan ng burukrasya at kultura isang banda at ng rehimeng Duterte sa kabilang banda.

Gamit ang konsepto ng “political time” ni Mark Thompson, nagbigay ng panahunang pampulitika si Teehankee na nagperyodisa sa termino ng mga pangulo.¹³ Sa isang simplistikong pagpapaliwanag, dinidikta ng konsepto na sa bawat ispesipikong panahon ay mayroong pormal na mga istrukturang pampulitika na humuhubog sa mga polisiya at aksyon ng bawat pangulo, at samakatuwid ay nagdedetermina maging ng kahihinatnan ng kanilang rehime. Ayon kay Teehankee, mahahati sa tatlong bahagi ang pulitikal na panahon mula kay Marcos hanggang kay Duterte. Ang administrasyong Marcos ay matataguriang panahon ng “Authoritarian Regime,” kung saan ang hawak ng diktador ang tatlong sektor ng gobyerno. Ang ikalawang panahon, na sumasaklaw mula sa administrasyon ni Cory Aquino hanggang kay Noynoy Aquino, ay matatawag na “EDSA Regime.” Sa kuro ng mga mananaliksik, ang opisyal na naratibo sa loob ng tatlong dekada ay maaaring maibubuod sa sumusunod na mga punto: 1. Ang batang Republika ay may papasibol na ekonomiya matapos na makamit ang kalayaan at nagtatamasa ng isang mainam na demokrasya, 2. Dumating ang diktador na si Marcos, hinubaran ng demokrasya ang bansa at kasama ang mga kroni’y kinamkam ang kaban ng bayan, 3. Tumindig ang tagapagligtas na si Aquino, kasama ang AFP at simbahang Katoliko Romano, at napatalsik ang diktador, sa gayo’y muling naibalik ang demokrasya sa bayan.

May pagka-karikatura man ang presentasyong nabanggit ay may pagkakahawig pa rin sa kung paano pangkaraniwang itinatatampok ang mga pangyayaring umiinog sa Rebolusyong EDSA ng 1986. Ang takbo ng kwento ay tila бага may paralelismo sa “tripartite” na pagkakahati ng kasaysayan





sa “Liwanag-Dilim-Muling Liwanag” alinsunod sa pagdalumat ni Zeus Salazar sa historiograpiya ng Propaganda.¹⁴ Tinitingnan ang panahon bago ang diktaduryang Marcos bilang liwanag, panahon habang namumuno si Marcos bilang dilim, at pagpapatalsik sa kanya ni Aquino bilang muling liwanag. Ang kinikilalang mga tagapagsulong ng “EDSA Regime” ay ang mga elit ng Maynila, ang simbahang Katoliko Romano, at ang Sandatahang Lakas ng Pilipinas o AFP. Tampok sa partikular na “political time” na ito ang ideolohiya ng liberal na demokrasya, na pangunahing impluwensya ng Estados Unidos sa Pilipinas. Sa sentro ng liberal na demokrasya ay ang diin sa mga sumusunod: pag-unlad, karapatang pantao, pagkakapantay-pantay, pang-angat sa posisyon batay sa merito, impersonal na mekanismo ng batas, at propesyunalismo. Maraming ipinangakong kaghinaan ang “EDSA Regime” sa mga Pilipino sa nakalipas na tatlong dekada.

Sa pagtataya ni Francis Fukuyama noong 1992 sa kanyang *End of History and the Last Man*,¹⁵ ipinagpalagay niyang absoluto na ang pagkapanalo ng liberal na demokrasya laban sa pangunahing kalaban nito na komunismo, kasunod ng pagbagsak ng USSR at ng Pader ng Berlin sa huling bahagi ng dalawampung dantaon. Ayon sa may-akda, ang liberal na demokrasya na ang kahuli-hulihang yugto sa ebolusyong ideolohikal ng tao, yamang nagapi na nito ang lahat ng kakumpitensyang ideolohiyang pampulitika. Ngunit sa nakaraang mga taon ay natunghayan ng kasaysayan ang unti-unting pag-atake sa mga retorika ng liberal na demokrasya, lalo na sa mga bahagi ng tinatawag nilang Ikatlong Mundo. Sa pagtatapos ng termino ni Noynoy ay tuluyan nang nasira ang imahe ng liberal na demokrasya (dulot ng hindi natupad na mga pangako), na siyang pundasyon ng “EDSA Regime.” Ayon kay Teehankee, ang pagpasok ni Duterte sa eksena ng pulitikang nasyunal ang naging hudyat sa pagsisimula ng pangatlong panahong pampulitika: ang “Post-EDSA Regime.”

Ang pagpasok ni Duterte sa eksena ng pulitikang pambansa ay isang naiibang yugto sa kasaysayan ng Pilipinas. Sa pakiwari ng mga mananaliksik, ngayon lang nagkaroon ng malawakan, sistematiko at relatibong matagumpay na pag-atake sa ala-ala ng EDSA. Tinangka na dati ito ng isa ring “populist” na pangulo na si Erap, ngunit bumulagta nang bumangga sa pinagsama-samang puwersa ng simbahan, militar, at mga oligarko ng Maynila. Ngunit sa pagkakataong ito, ang pagbangga ni Duterte ay matatayang medyo matagumpay, ang “historical amnesia”





(i.e. pagkalimot sa naratibo ng EDSA) na proyekto ay unti-unting nagwawagi. Ang mga Marcos ay nagiging bayani, habang ang mga Aquino ay nagiging kontrabida. Tila may pagkakahawig pa nga sa “Rebolusyong mula sa Sentro” ni Marcos, pinipitpit ang mga oligarko sa kanan habang binabanatan ang Partido sa kaliwa. Tila ngayon lang din nahati ang bayan sa animo’y pantay na bilang ng magkabilang panig. Charter Change, Federalism, Free Tuition Fee, Martial Law, Death Penalty, Human Rights, Philippine-Chinese Relations, War on Drugs, Jeepney Modernization, at Marcos sa LNMB. Kapanalig man o oposisyon vis-à-vis sa administrasyong Duterte, hindi maitatangi ninuman na radikal ang rehimeng ito, paano man bigyang kahulugan ang salitang “radikal.” Sa mas ikabubuti man o lalong ikasasama, mahirap pabulaanan na napakaraming nagbago sa loob lamang ng dalawang taon. Sa katunayan, mahirap na ngang makilala na ito pala ay ang parehong bansa na pinatakbo dati ni Noynoy dalawang taon palang ang nakalilipas. At marami pa ang patuloy na babaguhin kung maging matagumpay man ang proyektong awtokratiko ng pangulong lumalansag sa naratibo ng EDSA. Tiyak ngang nasa panahon na tayo ng “Post-EDSA Regime.”

Ang bahaging ito ang nais siyasatin ng mga mananaliksik. Sa isang lebel, maaaring ipagpalagay na ang ikalawang bahagi ng kasalukuyang papel ay naglalayong pumatong at magpalawig sa tesis ni Teehankee. Ipinapanukala ng mga mananaliksik na ang penomeno ng pagkawasak ng “EDSA Regime” at pagpasok ng “Post-EDSA Regime,” una sa lahat, ay sintomas lamang ng isang mas malawak pang isyu. Ang tinutukoy namin ay ang paggigitgan ng burukrasyang impluwensyado ng Kanluraning mga puwersa, partikular na ng Estados Unidos, sa isang banda at ng kulturang taal sa kabihasnang bayan. Tulad ng natalakay na sa unang bahagi ng papel, bawat burukrasya at mga istrukturang pampolitika ay mayroong pinag-uugatan na partikular na kultura ng isang lipunan, na hinubog ng kanilang espesyal na karanasang historikal. Kaya naman, kapag inangat ito patungo sa isang lipunang may kaiba ring hulma ng kultura, hindi maiiwasan ang salungatan. Walang istruktural na elemento ng pulitika na umiiral sa kawalan (*vacuum*). Anupa’t ang pulitika mismo ay bahagi ng kultura, kung tatanggapin ang malawak na katuturan ng huli bilang pamamaraan ng pamumuhay ng isang grupo ng mga tao. Nabubuo ang mga pulitikal na institusyon batay sa pangangailangang pampamunuan at





pangkapangyarihan ng isang grupo ng mga tao sa isang depinitong lugar at depinitong panahon. Isang normal na tendensiya na kapag dinala ito sa isang banyagang lugar ay mabibitbit din kasama nito ang mga “cultural baggages” na nagbuhat sa pinanggalingang lokasyon.

Gayunpaman, upang hindi mamisinterpreta ang naunang mga pangungusap at maiwasan ang ekstrimistang direksyon, marapat idagdag ang isang *caveat* o paunawa. Hindi ibig sabihin nito ay imposible ang pag-angkat ng anumang banyagang panlipunang institusyon mula sa labas na aangkop sa katutubong kultura. Binigyang diin na ito ni Ramon Guillermo sa kanyang tesis masterado na kalaunan ay ipinalimbag sa ilalim ng titulong *Pook at Paninindigan: Kritika ng Pantayong Pananaw*. Upang ipagtanggol ang Marxismo laban sa kritisismo ng Pantayong Pananaw ni Zeus Salazar, ipinaliwanag ni Guillermo na banyaga man ang pinagmulan ng isang institusyon o ideolohiya, kung dumaan na ito sa masinsinang proseso ng pagpopook patungo sa kasasadlakang lipunan ay aangkop na ito. Upang mapatibay pa ang kanyang asersyon ay sinipi niya ang mga salitang ito mula sa isa pang Marxista na si Francisco Nemenzo:

“Whether an ideology is purely indigenous or derived from external sources is a worthless problem. The fact that it has captured the imagination of a significant sector of the Filipino people is evidence enough that it has been indigenized, or that it is undergoing indigenization . . . Like other social processes, indigenization of ideology is dialectical, hence the proper subject of inquiry is the reciprocal influence of Marxism and indigenous revolutionary tradition.”¹⁶

Sa kasamaang palad, sa kaso ng burukrasyang Pilipino ay wala pang ganitong maayos na proseso ng “indigenization” o pagpopook na nagaganap. Kung mayroon nang integrasyon ay dili sana’y hindi na nagaganap ang malakihang banggaan sa pagitan ng burukrasya at kultura, at samakatuwid ay hindi na rin kakailanganin ang kasalukuyang pag-aaral.

Sa liwanag ng nailatag na kaligiran mainam siyasinat kung papaano ipinuwesto ni Duterte ang sarili sa gitna ng pagbabanggaan sa pagitan ng burukrasyang impluwensyado ng Kanluran at kulturang Pilipino. Tulad ng madalas gawin kay Donald Trump sa Estados Unidos, madalas na





ginagawang obheto ng katatawanan si Duterte sa “social media” ng mga kritiko, pinalalabas na mangmang sa pamamagitan ng pag-iinterpreta sa bawat maliliit na mga pangungusap nito (na sinasagot naman ng mga taga-suporta niya sa pamamagitan ng pamilyar na “inalis sa konteksto” na litanya). Liban pa sa akusasyon na mayroon daw sikolohikal na depekto ang pangulo (“bipolar”), pinaparatangan din na hindi na ganoong kalinaw ang pag-iisip dahil sa pag-inom ng gamot (partikular na ng “fentanyl”). Gayunman, ayon sa papel ni Efren Abueg na ipinrisinta kamakailan lamang sa isang akademikong pagtitipon, ang mga pahayag at aksyon ni Duterte ay bahagi ng isang malawakang istrategiyang retorikal.¹⁷ Ibig sabihin, ang mga ito ay hindi insidental at ironikong mga pahayag na bunga ng katandaan o sakit ng pangulo, bagkus ay parte ng isang planadong pagtatangka na ihain sa kolektibong kamalayan ng masa ang isang ispesipiko at nilalayong bersyon na imahe ni Duterte. Tulad ng ginamit na metapora ng presidente ng La Salle na si Armin Luistro sa isang kumperensya sa Ateneo, bumubuo si Duterte ng isang arkitekturang magsisilbing instrumento para sa aktuwalisasyon ng kanyang mga layunin.¹⁸ At sa pananaw ng mga mananaliksik, isa sa mga primaryang pundasyon ng arkitekturang ito ay ang paglalata sa imahe ni Duterte bilang representante ng tunay na kultural na kakanyahang Pilipino; anupa’t ang imaheng ito ay idinadambana bilang salungat sa hungkag at mapagkunwaring burukrasyang latak ng Kanluraning kalinangan. May limang malalaking tipak ng ideya sa loob ng naturang imahe na marapat buksan at siyasatin para sa talakayan.

A. Melodramatikong Kampanya

Isa sa mga pinaka interesanteng suriin sa retorika ni Duterte ay ang urong-sulong na kandidatura sa panahon ng kampanya. Animo’y isang teleseryeng sinusubaybayan ng mga Pilipino, na tila baga nasasabik sa “character development” ni Duterte sa “plot” ng kwento ng kanyang kandidatura. Ito marahil ang dahilan kung bakit noong panahon ng pampanguluhang kampanya ay mapapansin na parang may mali sa proporsyon ng pagbabalita sa malalaking institusyon ng midya. Ang malaking espasyo ng pahayagan (kapwa ng “print media” at “broadcast”) ay nailaan para sa mga material na may kinalaman kay Duterte. Sadya man ito o hindi (mas malamang ang ikalawa), kapwa ang midya at ang taumbayan





ay nabighani sa naratibo ng melodramang ito. Hindi man puro positibo ang laman ng mga balitang ito, hindi maitatangging naging instrumental pa rin ang pagiging dominante niya sa laman ng mga pahayagan para sa kanyang pagkapanalo. Sa katunayan, maaalala pa nga ang mga pananakot ni Duterte laban sa dalawang malaking kumpanya ng midya na Philippine Daily Inquirer at ABS-CBN, dahil sa paratang niya na ang may-ari ng mga ito ay may personal na pagkiling sa oposisyon at sinasadyang magbalita ng masama ukol sa kanya.¹⁹ Ngunit hindi ito naging hadlang para sa binubuong arkitektura ni Duterte. Ito pa nga ay nakabuti, dahil lalong natuon ang atensyon ng masa sa makulay na karakter ng mayor ng Davao.

Matatandaan na hindi orihinal na kandidato si Duterte. Ipinalit lamang siya kay Martin Diño bilang kinatawan ng PDP-Laban, matapos bawiin ng huli ang kanyang kandidatura.²⁰ Ipinrisinta ni Duterte ang sarili bilang isang bantulot na kandidato, na hindi sigurado kung tatakbo ba o hindi. Ang urong-sulong na melodramatikong tagpong ito ay kumiliti sa pagkamausisa ng mga Pilipino. Animo'y isang dalagang nagpapapilit si Duterte sa bahaging ito ng kanyang kampanya. At kung nagpapakipot lamang siya dahil sa kanyang kalooban ay gusto naman talagang maging pangulo, nagtagumpay ang kanyang plano. Sa persepsyon ng marami ay naibakat ang imahe ni Duterte bilang isang pinunong nag-aatubili at hindi hayok sa kapangyarihan. Sa ganitong paraan siya nakita ng kolumnistang si John Nery noong panahon ng kampanya. Ani ni Nery,

“It’s been four months since Davao City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte visited the INQUIRER, and I see no reason to change my original view: He is deeply conflicted about running for the presidency. His increasingly scandalous conduct on the campaign trail—call it politics of mutual outrage—confirms me in my view. He is looking for a way out.”²¹

Bahagi ng naratibo ng pamimilit ay ang kwento ni Duterte na si Fidel Ramos daw ang pinaka unang nagkumbinsi sa kanya para tumakbo. Nagtungo pa raw ito ng personal sa Davao para lamang hikayatin si Duterte, at nagwika pa na panahon na upang magkaroon ng pangulong mula sa Mindanao.²²





Walang choice, walang pagpipilian, para sa bayan, napilitan lamang. Patuloy pang makikita nang paulit ulit ang temang ito sa kanyang mga pahayag. Isa sa mga pinaka eksplisito sa mga ito ay ang sumusunod na sipi:

“Gusto ko na sanang magpahinga. Matanda na ako e. Pero nakikita ko kasi ang—the sadness of this country. Gusto ko na sanang mag-retire, pero nakikita ko ang bayan. Tang—buti sana kung masasamang tao lang ang nagpapahirap sa mga Filipino. Dito ngayon, it is the government itself that’s oppressing the people! Ayaw ko ng droga, ayaw ko ng kidnapper, ayaw ko ng holdaper, ayoko ng snatcher. Palalayasin ko talaga kayong mga kriminal.”²³

Ang pagiging bantulot at pakipot ni Duterte ay nakapukaw sa damdamin ng mga Pilipino, lalo pa’t positibo ang persepsyon natin sa mga pinunong tila nagdadalawang isip sa paghawak sa kapangyarihan. Mapapansin na may pagkakahawig ito sa kaso ng nakaraang pangulo. Hindi rin orihinal na kandidato sa kompetisyong pampanguluhan si Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino III. Ang kanyang kasikatan ay dulot lamang ng “Cory magic” matapos mamatay ng kanyang nanay noong papalapit na ang kampanyahan. Dahil dito ay nagparaya si Mar Roxas upang ibigay sa kanya ang pagiging kinatawan ng Partido Liberal. Ang imahe niya bilang “napilitang kandidato” ay mababanaag sa kanyang dating pahayag:

“Tinatanggap ko ang hiling ng sambayanan. Tinatanggap ko rin po ang bilin at habilin, tagubilin ng aking mga magulang. Tinatanggap ko ang responsibilidad na ituloy ang laban para sa bayan. Tinatanggap ko ang hamong mamuno sa labang ito. Bayang Pilipinas, tatakbo ako sa pagka-pangulo sa darating na halalan.”²⁴

Ang ganitong pagpapasabik sa masa ay bahagi ng istratohiyang naglalayong makakalap ng mas malawak na atensyon. At ito ay malinaw na nag-resonahe sa pagkahumaling ng mga Pilipino sa melodramatikong mga teleserye. Ang teleserye ay bahagi ng popular na kulturang humuhubog sa kamalayan ng masa, at nagbibigay sa kanila ng balangkas na maaaring





magamit sa pagtanaw sa reyalidad ng lipunan. Naipaliwanag itong maigi ni Anna Pertierra sa kanyang papel na *Celebrity Politics and Televisual Melodrama*:

“The emotional impact of daily soap operas and other melodramatic programs connect viewers at home to a public world in which political leaders and advertisers compete for their loyalty. But the Philippines has gone one setp further in bringing together dramatic entertainment and national publics.”²⁵

At ito ay siguradong hindi lihim kay Duterte at sa kanyang mga tagapayo. Na-utilisa niya ang penomenong ito sa popular na kulturang Pilipino. Dagdag pa ni Pertierra:

“I argue that Duterte is a beneficiary of a political culture where policies and processes have been less electorally effective than the glitz of showbusiness and success of personal charisma. His ongoing political popularity rests not only on his deployment of media in his own political performance, but also more broadly on the convergence of entertainment and politics as it is experienced in the Philippines (and in other parts of the world) through emotional connections with audiences who are also publics.”²⁶

Sa katunayan maging hanggang sa kasalukuyan ay patuloy ang pag-utilisa ni Duterte sa mekanismo ng melodramatikong pag-akto. Wika nga ng presidente ng Public Relations Society of the Philippines na si Ron Jabal sa isang akademikong pagtitipon: “Duterte is not just giving you information but providing you drama . . . He’s giving you a performance. He’s performing.”²⁷ Hindi rin kalabisan ang ipilit na maging ang presentasyon kay Duterte bilang mapagpakumbaba at may simplistikong pamumuhay ay bahagi parin ng mala-teleseryeng tagpo at pagsunod sa “plot” ng “script.” Halimbawa sa mga itinatampok ay ang pagiging payak ng kanyang tahanan sa siyudad ng Davao. Mayroon pang larawan niyang kumalat kung saan siya ay natutulog sa kamang may nakapalibot na kumalbo. Ibinalita pa nga na namangha ang Punong Ministro ng bansang Hapon na si Shinzo Abe sa





kapayakan ng buhay ni Duterte nang dumalaw ito sa kanyang tahanan sa Davao.²⁸ Ang pagtanggap niya sa pananatili sa Palasyo ay binigyang katuturan din bilang pagpapakita ng kababaang loob. Inilarawan siya sa isang balita sa pamamagitan ng ganitong deskripsyon: “From a reluctant candidate, to a reluctant Palace occupant.”²⁹ Bukod sa pagpapasyang manatili sa Bahay Pangarap sa Maynila (na tinuluyan din ni Noynoy), minsan ding sinabi na nais niyang magpabalik-balik sa Maynila at Davao upang makatulog sa kanyang orihinal na bahay na siyang tinutuluyan ng kanyang pamilya sa Davao.³⁰ Maging ang maliliit na mga detalye tulad ng kanyang pagkain ay pinagtuunan din ng pansin ng midya. Ayon sa mga kinapanayam na mga komandante ni Duterte, matapos daw ang eleksyon ay umuwi si Duterte sa kanyang tahanan at kumain ng kanyang paboritong paksiw na isda.³¹ Patuloy pa ang “down-to-earth” na imaheng nalikha sa pamamagitan ng pangako na magkakaroon ang pamahalaan ng “grievance hotline,” kung saan maaaring direktang matawagan ng taumbayan ang pamahalaan kung mayroon silang mahalagang reklamo.³²

B. Kontra-Amerikanong Tindig, Suliranin sa Mindanao, at ang Kritika sa Imperyalismong Maynila

Isa sa mga lantad na tema sa rehimeng Duterte na kakikitaan ng pagbangga ng kultura sa burukrasya ay ang pag-atake sa pinaka pinagmumulan mismo ng impluwensyang Kanluranin sa pulitikal na istruktura ng bansa, ang Estados Unidos. Maaaninag ito halimbawa sa mainit na dugo ni Duterte sa mga sundalong Amerikano at sa kanilang base-militar sa bansa. Sa kanyang talumpati sa mga negosyanteng Hapon noong dumalaw siya sa Tokyo, sinabi niya:

“I have declared I will pursue an independent foreign policy. I want, maybe in the next two years, my country free of the presence of foreign military troops . . . I want them out and if I have to revise or abrogate agreements, executive agreements, I will.”³³

Gaya ng winika dito ng pangulo, ang dahilan ng negatibong trato niya sa mga base-militar ay dulot ng kagustuhang idistansya ang relasyon ng Pilipinas sa Estados Unidos. Ipinahayag pang mas gusto niyang ituan ang pansin ng Pilipinas sa ibang bansa gaya na lamang ng Tsina. Sa naganap





na Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation, nakipagpulong si Duterte sa Punong Ministro ng Tsina na si Li Keqiang at nangako sa huli sa siryoso siya sa kanyang kagustuhan na mas paigtingin pa ang relasyon ng dalawang bansa.³⁴ Sa isa pa ngang talumpati na naging kontrobersyal kamakailan lang, nagbiro ang pangulo na gawin na lamang probinsya ng Tsina ang Pilipinas,³⁵ bukod pa sa pagsasabi na kung babae lamang ang Tsina ay niligawan niya na sana ito.³⁶ Bukod sa Tsina, ipinahayag din ni Duterte ang pagnanasa na payabungin ang koneksyon sa Ruso, lalo pa't lubos niyang hinahangaan ang pinuno nitong si Vladimir Putin.³⁷

Ang maituturing na isa sa pinaka pinag-ugatan ng antagonistikong turing ng rehimeng Duterte sa Estados Unidos ay ang makailang ulit nitong pagpuna sa kampanya ng Pilipinas kontra droga, partikular na sa isyu ng karapatang pantao na sa wari nila'y nasasakripisyo sa Oplan Tokhang. Galit na ipinahayag ng pangulo na hindi siya "tuta" ninuman, lalo na ng Estados Unidos.³⁸ Ang pahayag na higit na naging kontrobersyal ay ang pagmura niya sa pangulo ng Estados Unidos na si Barack Obama.³⁹ Ayon kay Adele Webb, ang ganitong mga buwelta ay nag-resonahe sa maalab na damdamin ng mga Pilipino na may mahabang pangkasaysayang karanasan sa ilalim ng dominasyong Amerikano. Habang ang internasyunal na komunidad ay nagulantang sa mga pahayag ni Duterte laban sa Amerika, maraming mga Pilipino ang nagdiwang dahil sa wari nila'y kinatawan ni Duterte ang kolektibong poot ng isang maliit na bayang napuno na ang salop dahil sa matagal na paniniil ng isang higenteng bansa, kaya't handa nang lumaban. Ika nga ng isang sumulat sa Philippine Daily Inquirer:

"The first lesson from President Duterte is the charisma seen worldwide in a David who stands up to an overbearing Goliath like US President Barack Obama or an arrogant world organization like the United Nations. It does not matter what the issue is, who is right or wrong, or that Mr. Duterte has a 'bad mouth.' No Third World leader has defied a Goliath since the days of Malaysia's Mahathir Mohamad and India's Mahatma Gandhi."⁴⁰

Sa parehong mapagdiwang na tono ay kinomento ni Webb:

"In telling Obama to mind his own business, the president behaved badly, but in this very subversiveness lies his appeal.





The more his erratic and undisciplined behavior draws the disapproval of an international crowd, the more compelling to many is his leadership. Why? Because he embodies the scrutinized Filipino 'native' subject of history, subordinated and looked down upon by the 'foreign' outsider; in standing up for 'the people,' he signifies a refusal to continue the indignity of the past."⁴¹

Bilang pagpapatibay sa tesis ng papel, isa sa mga pinaka interesanteng tugon ni Duterte sa puna ng Estados Unidos sa kampanya kontra droga ay ang paggamit ng pangulo sa kasaysayan. Ipinahayag ni Duterte na nagpapaka-ipokrito mga Amerikano sa pagpapakita na nag-aalala ito sa lagay ng karapatang pantao sa Pilipinas, gayong napakaraming kasalanan ng kanilang bansa sa Pilipinas. Isa sa mga ito na binanggit ni Duterte ay ang paglipol ng mga Amerikano sa mga mamamayang Muslim ng Bud Dajo sa Sulu noong panahon ng kolonyalismong Amerikano.⁴² Sinabi niya na hindi man lamang nga humingi ng tawad ang mga Amerikano rito.⁴³ Ipinagdiinan ni Duterte noong siya ay nagbigay ng talumpati sa Laos sa gitna ng diplomatikong pagpupulong ng iba't ibang bansa, na nagkasala ang mga Amerikano sa kanyang mga "ninuno."⁴⁴ Sa pamamagitan ng ganitong wika ay malinaw na ginamit ni Duterte ang kanyang pagiging pinaka unang pangulong nagmula sa Mindanao. Ayon kay Altez at Caday, liban pa sa pagiging Mindanaoan, ang koneksyon niya sa mga Moro ng Mindanao ay higit pang pinatibay ng katotohanang ang kanyang lola ay isang purong Meranao. Sa katunayan, nagamit niya ito bilang kalakasan sa kanyang kampanya, na hayagang mapapansin sa isa niyang talumpati sa mga Muslim ng Mindanao:

"If I become President, if Allah gives his blessing, before I die since I am old, I will leave to you all a Mindanao that is governed in peace."⁴⁵

Liban pa rito, minsan niya ring sinabi:

"Let us establish an independent nation in Mindanao, and we will call it the republic of Mindanao."⁴⁶





Malinaw na ipinalabas ni Duterte na ang kanyang negatibong trato sa mga Amerikano ay hindi lamang dulot ng personal na sama ng loob sa mga ito, bagkus ay pagkatawan sa kolektibong galit ng mga Mindanaoan sa Estados Unidos. Maaalalang ang mga Amerikano ang dahilan kung bakit naisama ang Mindanao sa kalakhang teritoryo ng Pilipinas. Ang humigit-kumulang apat na siglong pagpapagal ng mga Kastila ay hindi naging sapat upang maipasailalim ang Mindanao sa Las Islas Filipinas. Gayunman, napahina ng napakaraming ekspedisyong militar kapwa ang Sultanato ng Sulu at Maguindanao, kaya naman pagpasok sa eksena ng mga Amerikano ay madali na itong nagapi at namanipula.⁴⁷ Maraming mga Muslim ang nawalan ng lupa dahil sa mga batas at polisiyang isinakatuparan ng kolonyalismong Amerikano.⁴⁸ Sa pinoprosesong disertasyon ni Propesor Bayona na iniharap niya sa isang akademikong pagpupulong sa PUP kamakailan, ginamit niya ang konsepto ng “inherited destinies” upang patunayan na matapos makamit ng Pilipinas ang kalayaan mula sa Estados Unidos ay naipamana ng mga Amerikano sa bagong Republika ang kontrol para sa kahihinatnan ng Mindanao. Nang makuha ng Pilipinas ang independensya, hindi naman naging malaya ang Mindanao, bagkus ay nagpalit lamang ito ng panginoong kolonyal.⁴⁹ Sa katunayan, ayon sa nakaraang dekanong Institute of Islamic Studies ng UP na si Julkipli Wadi, mas tumindi pa nga ang naging kalalagayan ng Mindanao sa ilalim ng Republika ng Pilipinas. Ani ni Wadi, nang makalaya ang Pilipinas mula sa Estados Unidos, ito ay napasailalim sa “neo-colonialism” ng dating mananakop. Ngunit iba ang sitwasyon sa katimugang bahagi ng bansa. Sabi niya, masyadong magaan ang terminong “neo-colonialism” upang isalarawan ang kasalukuyang kalagayan ng Mindanao. Ang kalunos-lunos na sitwasyon sa Mindanao ay mas angkop na isalarawan sa pamamagitan ng dalumat ng “multiple colonialism.”⁵⁰ Hindi lamang ito nasa ilalim ng neo-kolonyalismong Amerikano at multi-nasyunal na mga korporasyon, ito ay sakal-sakal din ng imperyalismong Maynila.

Samakatuwid, sa pamamagitan ng paggamit sa kaso ng Bud Dajo, inihanay ni Duterte ang kanyang sarili sa kapalaran ng Mindanao at kinastigo kapwa ang Estados Unidos at ang mga elit ng Maynila. Kasama sa malawakang retorika ni Duterte ay ang iprisinta ang Estados Unidos at mga oligarko ng Maynila bilang magkasabwat sa pagpapahirap sa mga Pilipino, kabilang na ang mga Moro. Mahirap na hindi mapansin na





ang ganitong litanya ay may pagkakahawig sa tindig ng Kaliwa, ang pag-atake kapwa sa neo-kolonyalismong Amerikano at sa mga naghaharing uri sa Maynila. Ang kanyang inihain na solusyon upang malabanan ang kambal na banta ng dalawang naturang grupo ay ang Pederalisasyon. Ipinipilit niya, simula palang noong siya ay alkalde palang ng Davao, na ang tanging makakasagot lamang sa matagal nang suliranin ng Mindanao ay ang basagin ang monopolyo ng kapangyarihan sa Maynila at ikalat ito sa buong arkipelago.⁵¹

Muli, ang mga ito ay sumusuhay na naman sa tesis ni Teehankee. Ang “EDSA Regime” na pinangangalagaan ng mga elitista ng Maynila ay itinuturing ding sinusuportahan ng neo-kolonyalismong Amerikano. Gayundin, ang kasalukuyang dominanteng burukrasya na pinapamunuan ng mga oligarko ng Maynila ay impluwensyado rin ng Estados Unidos. Sa retorika ng “Post-EDSA Regime” ni Duterte, hinahati sa dalawa ang arenang pulitikal. Sa hanay ng mga kontrabida, nariyan ang mga Aquino sampu ng mga pulitiko at negosyanteng mga “Dilawan,” Simbahang Katoliko, at ang nangingialam na Estados Unidos at United Nations. Sa hanay naman ng mga tagapagligtas na dating inapi ay ang mga Marcos, mga Moro, si Duterte, at ang tinaguriang “DDS” o mga sumusuporta kay “Tatay Digong.” Sa ganitong dikotomiya, ang kanluraning burukrasya ay isinasama sa unang grupo, habang ang ikalawang pangkat ay itinatanghal bilang tunay na tagapaglulan ng kultura at lehitimong tagapangalaga ng kasaysayang Pilipino.

C. Kampanya Kontra Droga, Awtoratikong Imahe, at Puna sa Liberal na Demokrasya ng Kanluran

Liban pa sa Estados Unidos, isa pa sa mga hinamon ni Duterte ay ang United Nations, sampu ng mga institusyon at samahan sa Pilipinas na kaisa ng United Nations sa kanilang kritika sa rehimeng Duterte. Ang sanhi ng kanyang pagkagalit dito ay tulad din ng sanhi ng antagonismo niya sa Estados Unidos: ang mga puna nito sa kanyang kampanya kontra droga at ang isyu ng karapatang pantao. Sa katunayan, bago pa siya manalo bilang pangulo, noon pa mang panahon ng kampanya ay nakatutok na sa kanya ang Commission on Human Rights (CHR), Ombudsman at Department of Justice (DOJ).⁵² Ang kanilang paghihinala ay bunga ng akusasyon kay Duterte na nakapagsagawa raw ito ng “extra-judicial killings” (EJK) sa





Davao bilang alkalde ng bayan sa loob ng dalawampu't dalawang taon. Mas tumindi ang disidenteng mga boses kay Duterte nang maging pangulo na ito at maipatupad na ang Oplan Tokhang, na naglalayon ng malawakang paghuli sa mga gumagamit at mga nagbebenta ng droga. Ayon kay Jayson Lamchek, sa loob ng unang pitong buwan ni Duterte sa puwesto, tinatayang pitong libo na ang namatay sa kampanya kontra droga na isinagawa ng dalawang libro at limang daang kapulisan.⁵³ Umani ito ng samu't saring batikos. Halimbawa, ang dating pangulo ng Colombia na si Cesar Gaviria ay sumulat sa *Time* ng ganito:

“Hitler massacred 3 million Jews. Now there are 3 million drug addicts. I'd be happy to slaughter them,” Rodrigo Duterte, the Philippines' President, has said. His approach is as ill considered as his grasp of history (more than half of Hitler's 11 million victims were Jewish). Since Duterte's inauguration last year, some 7,000 people have been killed. His ironfisted strategy alarms governments, human-rights organizations and faith-based groups while winning high approval ratings at home. When I was President of Colombia, I was also seduced into taking a tough stance on drugs. But after spending billions, I discovered that the war was unwinnable and the human costs were devastating. The cure was infinitely worse than the disease.”⁵⁴

Noon pa mang Oktubre ng 2016 ay humingi na ng kopya ang CHR ukol sa ulat ng kapulisan sa kanilang mga operasyon kontra droga mula buwan ng Mayo ng parehong taon. Gamit ang mga ulat na ito ay nagsimulang mag-imbetiga ang CHR.⁵⁵ Ang simbahang Katoliko Romano sa Pilipinas ay nagbigay din ng kritisismo kay Duterte. Nagpahayag ang Catholic Bishops' Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) na maaasahan ang hindi napapatid na pagpuna nila sa kalabisan ng kampanya ng pangulo kontra droga.⁵⁶ Liban pa sa kampanya kontra droga, negatibo rin ang naging tugon ng simbahan sa panukala ng pamahalaang ibalik ang kaparusahang pagbitay sa mga kriminal.⁵⁷ Ang radikal na kampanya ni Duterte kontra droga ay naging sanhi rin ng pagpapangalan sa kanya bilang isa sa isang daang pinaka maimpluwensyang tao sa buong mundo sa taong 2017, na naungusan pa





sina Pope Francis, Bill Gates, at Mark Zuckerberg.⁵⁸ Ngunit ang rurok ng pagbulalas ng mga puna sa programa ni Duterte ay sumulpot matapos maganap ang kontrobersyal na pagpatay sa labing-pitong taong gulang na si Kian delos Santos noong Agosto 2017.⁵⁹ Isa sa mga pangunahing tumugon dito ay ang CHR sa ilalim ng pinuno nitong si Jose Luis Martin Gascon o mas kilala bilang “Chito” Gascon. Sa isang lektura sa Ateneo na pinaunlakan ni Gascon, ipinahayag niya ang suporta sa pagkilos ng mga internasyunal na mga grupo laban sa kampanya kontra droga ng pangulo, at idinagdag pa na lehitimo ang pangiangialam ng United Nations na isyu ng karapatang pantao sa Pilipinas kaya naman hindi sila maaaring baliwalain ni Duterte.⁶⁰

Noong Abril ng 2017, sumulat ng bukas na liham ang Amnesty International sa kalihim ng DOJ na si Vitaliano Aguirre II ukol sa pag-aalala nito sa karapatang pantao sa Pilipinas. Hinimok nito ang kagawaran na magsagawa ng isang obhektibong imbestigasyon at pagdinig ukol sa mga kaso ng EJK na bunsod ng kampanya ng rehimeng Duterte kontra droga. Pumirma dito ang mga kinatawan ng samahan mula Australia, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Thailand, Taiwan, United States, at Pilipinas.⁶¹ Ang United Nations Human Rights Council ay nagpahayag din ng apila sa nangyayari sa Pilipinas. Ayon sa pinuno nitong si Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein:

“In the Philippines, I continue to be gravely concerned by the President’s open support for a shoot-to-kill policy regarding suspects, as well as by the apparent absence of credible investigations into reports of thousands of extrajudicial killings, and the failure to prosecute any perpetrator . . . The recent killing of a schoolboy who was dragged into an alley and shot in the head by plains-clothed policeman on August 16 was described by the Minister of Justice as ‘an isolated case.’ However, suspicion of extrajudicial killings has now become so widespread that the initials EJK have reportedly become a verb in some communities—as in ‘he was EJKed.’⁶²





Subalit ang maituturing na pinaka agresibong pagkilos ng internasyunal na komunidad laban sa rehimeng Duterte ay ang pagsasampa rito ng kasong “crime against humanity” sa International Criminal Court (ICC).⁶³ Ngunit hindi natinag si Duterte sa alin man sa mga ito. Sa isang talumpati ay nagbato ng maaanghang na mga tirada si Duterte laban sa UN:

“Ang mahirap nitong United Nations, you guys, you are employed by an organ composed of nations whose officials are elected by the people. Kayong mga opisyal, sitting there on your asses, we pay you your salaries. You idiot, do not tell me what to do. I am your employer, and do not do it to a nation. Who gave you the right? Kulang kayo ng international law. Kami ang may contribution sa United Nations, kung hindi ka ba tarantadong, p—ina ka, at ako ang nagbabayad sa sweldo mo. Huwag kang magsalita diyan akala mo ako ang empleyado mo. I am a member state, a sovereign state. Kulang kayo ng international law. Kami ang may contribution sa United Nations, kung hindi ka ba tarantadong, p—ina ka, at ako ang nagbabayad sa sweldo mo. Huwag kang magsalita diyan akala mo ako ang empleyado mo. I am a member state, a sovereign state.”⁶⁴

Habang kaharap ang pinuno ng iba’t ibang miyembrong bansa ng ASEAN, pinagdiinan ni Duterte ang kahalagahan ng paggalang sa “law of non-intervention.” Ayon sa kanya, mas magiging produktibo ang relasyon ng mga bansa kung respetuhin ang pagiging malaya ng bawat isa. Lalo’t higit itong totoo sa kaso ng pakikipag-ugnayan ng mga Kanluraning bansa at mga samahan sa mga bansa sa Asya. Sinabi niya na dapat na raw itigil ng Kanluran ang panghihimasok sa mga isyu ng mga bansang Asyano, partikular na ang mga puna nito sa kampanya niya kontra droga.⁶⁵ Hinimok pa niya ang mga kaalyadong bansa sa ASEAN na mahalaga ang kanyang programa, yamang maging sa kanilang mga bansa ay laganap din ang banta ng droga.⁶⁶ Maging ang kanyang mga kaalyado ay matapang ding tumugon sa UN. Halimbawa, ang Tagapagsalita ng Kapulungan ng mga Kinatawan na si Pantaleon Alvarez ay nagwika na wala naman daw silbi ang UN kaya dapat na itong buwagin. Ani niya, ang dapat na buuin ay ang “United Nations of Asia,” upang maprotektahan ang mga Asyano laban sa pangiangalam ng mga Kanluranin. Dinagdag pa niya na ang tunay na





banta ay hindi ang kampanya ni Duterte kontra droga, bagkus ay ang panghihimasok ng mga Amerikano sa mga bansang may soberanya.⁶⁷

Ang mga ganito at iba pang kawangis na mga retorika ang ginamit ng rehimeng Duterte upang itanghal ang Estados Unidos, United Nations, at ang Kanluran sa kalakhan bilang mapagbalat-kayong mga elemento na nagkukunwaring nag-aalala sa kalagayan ng Pilipinas. Sa pamamagitan nito ay nailantad niya ang liberal na demokrasya bilang hungkag na banyagang konseptong ginagamit lamang upang maaktuwalisa ang dominasyon ng Kanluran sa mga bansa ng Ikatlong Mundo. Halimbawa, ang peryodistang masugid na tagasuporta ni Duterte na si Sass Sasot ay nagsulat sa Manila Times ng artikulong kumakastigo sa hindi pantay na pagtrato ng Estados Unidos at United Nations sa kampanya kontra droga sa Pilipinas at sa Mexico. Pinagkumpara niya ang lagay ng dalawa at sinabi na habang pilit na ginigipit ng Estados Unidos si Duterte sa Pilipinas, hindi naman nito pinakialamanan ang kampanya kontra droga sa Mexico, sa kabila ng katotohanang mula 2007 hanggang 2014 ay umabot na sa 160,000 ang biktima sa naturang bansa.⁶⁸ Nasambit din ni Propesor Abueg sa isang akademikong pagtitipon na ang mga may kaso lang naman ng “crimes against humanity” ay mga maliliit na bansa sa Asya at Aprika, habang ang mga malalakas na bansa sa Kanluran ay binibigyan ng espesyal na trato at pinalalagpas.⁶⁹

Sa parehong linya ng pangangatwiran ay pinagpilitan ni Duterte at mga kaalyado na ang konsepto ng karapatang pantao ay isa lamang banyagang konseptong hindi lapat sa kaligirang kultural ng mga bansang Asyano. Sa isang pahayag pa nga ay nagwika ng ganito si Duterte:

“Huwag kayong makinig dyan sa human rights, because human rights is always the anti-thesis of government.”⁷⁰

Dinagdag niya pa na ang paglalapat sa Pilipinas ng mga Kanluraning konsepto ng karapatang pantao at pagpaparusa sa pamamagitan ng pagkulong sa mga kriminal ay pag-aaksaya lamang ng oras.⁷¹ Ang mga sumusuporta kay Duterte ay umaalma na hindi naman daw naiintindihan ng mga Kanluranin ang nangyayari sa Pilipinas sa partikular at sa Asya sa pangkabuuan, dahil sila ay mga banyagang may naiibang karanasang pangkasaysayan. Ayon pa sa ganitong argumento, ang Kanluran ay malabis





na nagbibigay kapakanan sa karapatang pantao dahil sa kanilang diin sa indibiduwalismo. Mahalaga sa kanila ang karapatang pampulitika at panlipunan ng indibiduwal. Gaya nga ng sinabi ng Amerikanong sosyolohista na si John Macionis, maibubuod sa iisang salita ang kulturang pampulitika ng Estados Unidos: indibiduwalismo.⁷² Samantala, sa Asya ay mas pinapahalagahan ang komunidad higit sa indibiduwal. Kaya naman, marapat na ang indibiduwal ay magsakripisyo para sa ikabubuti ng higit na nakararami sa lipunan. Madalas na gamitin sa puntong ito ang ehemplo ni Lee Kwan Yew sa Singapore. Ayon sa kanila, ang awtokratiko at disiplinadong pamumuno niya ay nagbunsod sa pagkamit ng Singapore sa kasalukuyang pang-ekonomiyang pag-unlad na tinatamasa nito ngayon.⁷³

Sa loob ng ganitong balangkas ay hindi mahirap gawing lehitimo ang awtokratikong pamumuno ni Duterte. Sapagkat kung ilalagay sa ganitong kaligiran, makikita si Duterte bilang sumusunod lamang sa dikta ng kultura. Habang ang binibigyang diin sa liberal na demokrasya ng Kanluran ay indibiduwalismo (kaya naman mahalaga ang karapatang pantao), mas kinikilingan naman ng mga komyunal na kultura sa Asya ang kolektibong ikabubuti ng bayan. Sa una ay mas bagay ang mga pangulong tulad nina Noynoy at Obama. Ngunit sa ikalawa ay mas angkop sina Duterte, Marcos, Lee Kwan Yew, Kim Jong Un, at sampu ng mga awtokratikong pinuno ng mga Islamikong lipunan, sapagkat nangangailangan ng malakas na pinuno ang mga kulturang komyunal upang mabilisang maipatupad ang nais na mga programa nang hindi na dumadaan sa napakahabang demokratikong proseso. Sa ganitong konteksto dapat intindihin ang mga pahayag ni Duterte ukol sa kanyang pagiging “diktador.” Noon pa mang panahon pa lamang ng kampanya ay nagwika na si Duterte ng ganito:

“I am a dictator? Yes it is true. If you don’t like it then don’t vote for me.”⁷⁴

Kamakailan lamang ay nagbulalas din siya ng parehong mensahe:

“If you say dictator, I am really a dictator. Because if I don’t [act like a] dictator . . . nothing will happen to this nation. That’s true.”⁷⁵





Bago rin opisyal na maupo sa pwesto ay pinaalalahanan na niya dati pa ang oposisyon na kapag nangialam sa kanya ang mga institusyon tulad ng Kongreso, CHR, Ombudsman at ang Korte, hindi siya mangingiming umakto bilang diktador habang nasa likod niya ang militar at kapulisan.⁷⁶ Habang marami ang nagugulantang sa ganitong mga pahayag, madali lamang makita kung paano ito nakakabit sa sistematikong sapot ng retorikang Duterte, kung ikokonsidera ang mga natalakay sa itaas: na ito ay pagtalima lamang sa awtokratikong tradisyong nakaugat sa kulturang Asyano.

Paglalagom

Sa isang personal na komunikasyon ng isa sa mga mananaliksik kay Dr. Vicente Villan ng UP Departamento ng Kasaysayan, ipinahayag niya ang kanyang opinyon ukol sa relasyon ni Duterte sa kulturang Pilipino, at kung paano bumabangga ang ugnayang ito sa diwang Kanluranin:

“Nakita ko Mark Joseph Pascua Santos na ang tinutugunan ng papel batay sa iyong inilahad ay kung papaanong ang istelo ng pamumuno ni Duterte ng katapangan at malasakit ayon na rin islogan ng kaniyang kampanya noon at isinasakatuparan ngayon ay tinanggap ng sambayanan. Ang kahayagan ng kaniyang katapangan ay nakita natin sa pamamagitan ng paglatigo niya sa huwad at hungkag na pangako EDSA, pagiging di angkop ng liberal democracy ng kanluran, at pagsalungat laban sa kanluraning ideya ng human rights na isinusulong ng UN. Habang sa malasakit naman ay nakatuon sa tangkang pagpapagaan sa buhay ng mga sektoral na pangkat-mag aaral (free tuition), magsasaka (free irrigation), ofws (OFW bank at special envoy for OFW), train (pagpasan ng upper class at middle sa buwis para sa triple b project) etc. Sa kultural na perspektibo, ang tapang ay isa tatlong manipestasyon ng dungan (isug, kusog, kinaadman) na mahalaga sa pamumunong bayan. Nasa isug makikita ang tapang, giting at inaasahang bisa ng bayan sa isang pinuno na walang dudang wala kina cory, tabako, erap at lalo kay pnoy. Ito ang dahilan kung bakit hindi natitinag ang bayan sa kanilang suporta kay digong kahimat sanlaksang





paratang ang pinagsaluhan ng elite-amerikano upang siya ay pabagsakin sa tulong pa ito ng sektor media at academe. Itong dalawang sektor lalo ang huli ay tuwirang bighani ng kanluran at maging ng ideolohiya ng silangan. Pawang umangkin o sumalo sa ipot na idelohiyang kapwa nanggaling sa labas. Hindi nauunawaan ng mga ito ang taal na konsepto ng pamumunong bayang nakasalig sa ideya ng sakop na inaral ni Zeus Salazar gayunma'y di naipook sa dungan bilang pinagnunukalan ng gahum sa pamumuno. Lalong wala ring pagsilip na nakikita mula sa sosyolohiya at agham pampulitika upang unawain ang political culture ng mga Pilipino na nagpatuloy mula sa kadatuan tungong panguluhan. Ang ideya ng sakop at dungan ang pundamental na kaisipan para maintindihan ng mga ito ang malalim na diwa at kamalayang pulitikal ng mga Pilipino. Nakasandig din dalawang ito ang pag-unawa sa pahinungod ng lahat ng gawain sa paglilingkod bayan, karapatang pantao, at pinaiiral na batas alinsunod sa matagal ko nang hinihiyaw na kaloobang bayan—buhay, ginhawa, at dangal!"⁷⁷

Sa loob ng simple ngunit makulay na retorika ng rehimeng Duterte, naiprisinta ang pangulo bilang pinunong nakaugat sa kulturang bayan. Sa balangkas na ito, ang konsepto ng pagbabago sa islogang "Change is coming" ay binigyang kahulugan hindi bilang pagdating ng panibagong mga sistema't ideya, bagkus ay pagbabalik-loob sa kalinangang Pilipino. Kailangan ang pagbabalik-loob sapagkat tatlong dekadang nahiwalay at napadpad sa malayo ang burukrasya. Napasa-kanluran ito at nahumaling sa liberal na demokrasya. Ang indibiduwalistikong diin ng karapatang pantao ng Kanluran ay iniharap vis-à-vis sa komyunalismong prayoridad ng Silangan. Ito ay nagsilbing lehitimasyon sa uri ng awtokratikong pamamahala ng pangulo. Isinaad na naka-ugat lamang ito pilosopiyang pampulitika ng mga bansang Asyano na nanganak ng Lee Kwan Yew ng Singapore, Mahathir Mohamad ng Malaysia, Kim Jong Un ng North Korea, at mga awtokratikong pinuno ng Kanlurang Asya. Ang mga demokratikong pinuno ng "EDSA Regime" mula kay Cory hanggang kay Noynoy ay itinanghal bilang hindi lapat sa naiibang karanasang Pilipino na humihingi ng mga pangulong "strongman" gaya nina Marcos at Duterte. Ang paghanay





ng huli sa una ay lantad na lantad sa proyekto nitong “historical amnesia,” na naisagawa sa pamamagitan ng pagpapalibing kay Marcos sa Libingan ng mga Bayani, pagsuporta sa kandidatura ni Bongbong, at hindi pagpansin sa pagdiriwang ng EDSA.⁷⁸

Upang tuluyang maibandera ang sarili bilang tunay na tagapaglulan ng diwang Pilipino, hinagupit isa-isa ang mga puwersa ng EDSA at mga kapanalig nito: mula sa simbahan at mga oligarko ng Maynila, hanggang sa patron nilang Estados Unidos at United Nations. Itinambad na kaya mabango si Noynoy sa mga internasyunal na komunidad kumpara sa masangang na reputasyon ni Duterte ay sagpagkat ang una’y nakakapit sa banyagang burukrasya samantalang ang ikalawa’y nakasalig sa kulturang Pilipino. Kaya naman sa Pilipinas ay kabaliktaran ang turing sa dalawa: habang papasama ang pagtingin kay Duterte ng mga banyaga sa labas ay papainam naman ang trato sa kanya ng mga Pilipino sa loob. Patuloy pa ang pagsakay sa daloy ng kultura sa pamamagitan ng pag-utilisa sa imahe bilang ama: “Tatay Digong.” Isang amang dumidisciplina sa mga anak na pariwala (i.e. mga lulong sa droga) at gumagamit ng kamay na bakal para mapanatiling buo ang pamilya. Kapag kinanti ang tatay ay tila mga bubuhog na lulusob ang mga anak upang ipagtanggol ito. Hindi na marahil nakapagtataka kung bakit sa kabila ng samu’t saring mga kontrobersyang umiinig sa kanyang rehime ay nananatili paring malaki ang porsyento ng kanyang suportang galing sa masa. Ang mga pagmumura, pag-astang siga, kawalan ng pormalidad at pagsasambit ng mga seksistang pahayag ay hindi nakabawas sa pagkabighani ng mga tao kay Duterte. Sa halip ay nakapagpadagdag pa nga ito dahil tinanggap ito bilang kapareho sa pang-araw-araw na lengguwaheng naririnig ng isang tipikal na Pilipino sa komunidad. Matapos masulyapan ang lahat ng ito ay tila mahirap pabulaanan ang kuro ng isang kapwa dalubguro sa kagawaran ukol sa posibilidad na marahil mayroong mga antropologong tagapayong nakapalibot kay Duterte mula pa man noong kampanya.

Subalit tila kailangang iwang nakabitin ang isang tanong na marapat ikonsidera para sa mga susunod pang saliksik. Ang pagkastigo ba ni Duterte sa burukrasyang latak ng Kanluran at pagsakay sa kulturang bayan ay sapat na lehitimasyon ng kanyang rehime? Batayan ba ito upang ipagkatiwala ang direksyong tatahakin ng bayan sa susunod na apat na taon, kung bababa man sa puwesto?



Mga Tala

1. Alfred McCoy, *An Anarchy of Families: The Historiography of State and Family in the Philippines* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994).
2. Ibid.
3. Michael Cullinane, "Patron as Client : Warlord Politics and the Duranos of Danao." In *Anarchy of Families*, ed. Alfred W. McCoy (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila Press, 1994).
4. G.M. Guthrie, *The Psychology of Modernization in Rural Philippines* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1959).
5. Michael Cullinane, "Patron as Client: Warlord Politics and the Duranos of Danao" in *Anarchy of Families* edited by Al McCoy.
6. James Fallows, "A Damaged Culture," *The Atlantic*, inilathala noong Nobyembre 1987, matatagpuan sa theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1987/11/a-damaged-culture/505178/, inakses noong 24 Oktubre 2017.
7. Randolph S. David, *Understanding Society, Culture, and Politics* (Mandaluyong: Anvil Publishing Inc., 2017), p. 60.
8. Ferdinand E. Marcos, *The Philippine Experience: A Perspective on Human Rights and the Rule of the Law*, pp. 26, 30–31.
9. Carmen A. Abubakar, "Is Islam Compatible with Democracy," sa Maria Serena I. Diokno at Miriam Coronel Ferrer, mga patnugot, *Democratic Transitions, Kasarinlan: Philippine Quarterly of Third World Studies, Volume 12 Number 1 3rd Quarter 1996*, pp. 25, 40–42.
10. Arlene Torres-D'Mello, *Brown Outside, White Inside: A Study of Identity Development among Children of Filipino Immigrants in Australia* (Quezon City: Giraffe Books, 2003), p. 81.
11. Ibid., p. 89.
12. Randolph S. David, "Blindsided by Duterte: A Postmortem," *Public Lives, Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A1, 12 Mayo 2016.
13. Julio Teehankee, "Was Duterte's Rise Inevitable?" sa Nicole Curato, patnugot, *A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Duterte's Early Presidency* (Lunsod Quezon: Bughaw, 2017), pah. 37–53.

14. Tingnan ang Zeus Salazar, "A Legacy of the Propaganda: The Tripartite View of Philippine History," sa Salazar, patnugot, *The Ethnic Dimension: Papers on Philippine Culture, History and Psychology* (Cologne: Caritas Association for the City of Cologne, 1983); gayundin ang Zeus Salazar, "Ang Pantayong Pananaw Bilang Diskursong Pangkabihasnan," sa Atoy Navarro et al, mga patnugot, *Pantayong Pananaw: Ugat at Kabuluhan* (Lunsod Quezon: Palimbagan ng Lahi, 2000), pah. 94.
15. Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992), pah. xi.
16. Francisco Nemenzo, "The Millenarian-Populist Aspects of Filipino Marxism," sinipi sa Ramon Guillermo, *Pook at Paninindigan: Kritika ng Pantayong Pananaw* (Lunsod Quezon: University of the Philippines Press, 2009), pah. 5.
17. Efren Abueg, "Ang Retorika sa Panahon ni Duterte at Trump: Globalisasyon, Nasyonalismo at Panitikan," papel na binasa bilang bahagi ng Serye ng Lekturang Propesoryal noong ika-23 ng Pebrero, 2018, sa Nemesio Prudente Hall, Politeknikong Unibersidad ng Pilipinas, Sta. Mesa, Maynila.
18. Anthony Q. Esguerra, "The fist bump is the architecture that allows fake news"—ex-DepEd chief," *Inquirer.Net*, nilathala noong 13 Pebrero 2018, matatagpuan sa <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/968547/the-fist-bump-is-the-architecture-that-allows-fake-news-ex-deped-chief>, inakses noong 25 Pebrero 2018.
19. Randy David, "Strongmen and the Mass Media," *Public Lives*, Philippine Daily Inquirer, A14, 30 Abril 2017.
20. Leila B. Salaverria, "Does Digong need an image make-over?" *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A1, 3 Enero 2016.
21. John Nery, "Outrageous Duterte wants out," Newsstand, *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A9, 5 Enero 2016.
22. Leila B. Salaverria, "Now it can be told: FVR pushed Duterte to run," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A3, 2 Hulyo 2016.
23. Khuey Garces, patnugot, *The Duterte Manifesto: Mga Aral Mula sa mga Banat at mga Talumpati ni President Rodrigo Duterte* (Lunsod Quezon: ABS-CBN Publishing Inc., 2016), pah. 14.



24. Sophia Dedace, "Noynoy Aquino announces bid for presidency in 2010," *GMA News Online*, 9 Setyembre, 2009, matatagpuan sa <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/171814/noynoy-aquino-announces-bid-for-presidency-in-2010/story/>, inakses noong 25 Pebrero 2018.
25. Anna Cristina Pertierra, "Celebrity Politics and Televisual Melodrama," sa Curato, *A Duterte Reader*, pah. 226–227.
26. *Ibid.*, pah. 219–220.
27. Patrick Quintos, "'Feeling opposition,' Duterte remains on 'campaign mode': analyst," *ABS CBN News*, 12 Pebrero 2018, matatagpuan sa <http://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/02/12/18/feeling-opposition-duterte-remains-on-campaign-mode-analyst>, inakses noong 26 Pebrero 2018.
28. Rina Jimenez-David, "The Tokhang Tour," *At Large, Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A15, 30 Abril 2017.
29. Marlon Ramos at Nestor Corrales, "Rody's 2nd home: Bahay Pangarap," A1, 7 Hulyo 2016.
30. Trisha Macas, "Duterte plans to shuttle between Palace and Davao City daily despite security risks," *GMA News Online*, 30 Mayo 2016, matatagpuan sa <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/568155/duterte-plans-to-shuttle-between-palace-and-davao-city-daily-despite-security-risks/story/>, inakses noong 26 Pebrero 2018.
31. "He likes to be called 'President Rody,'" *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A14, 13 Mayo 2016.
32. Kristine Fellise Mangunay, "Rody to open hotline: 'just don't lie to me,'" *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A6, 2 Hulyo 2016.
33. Leila B. Salaverria, "Du30: Foreign troops out in 2 years," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A10, 27 Oktubre 2016.
34. Catherine S. Valente, "Duterte seeks deeper relations with China," *The Manila Times*, 16 Mayo 2017, matatagpuan sa <http://www.manilatimes.net/duterte-seeks-deeper-relations-china/327436/>, inakses noong 26 Pebrero 2018.
35. Nestor Corrales, "Make PH a province of China, Duterte jokes in front of Chinese envoy," *Inquirer.Net*, 19 Pebrero 2018, matatagpuan sa <http://globalnation.inquirer.net/164413/rodrigo-duterte-jest-making-ph-chinese-province>, inakses noong 26 Pebrero 2018.





36. Karl Norman Alonzo, "Duterte jokes about 'Philippines, province of China,'" *Philstar Global*, 19 Pebrero 2018, matatagpuan sa <http://old.philstar.com/headlines/2018/02/19/1789428/duterte-jokes-about-philippines-province-china>, inakses noong 26 Pebrero 2018.
37. Dharel Placido, "Duterte: PH-Russia ties entering a new chapter," *ABS CBN News*, 22 Mayo 2017, matatagpuan sa <http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/05/22/17/duterte-ph-russia-ties-entering-a-new-chapter>, inakses noong 26 Pebrero 2018.
38. Gil Cabacungan, "Duterte: I'm not a 'tuta' of anyone," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A18, 6 Oktubre 2016.
39. Dharel Placido, "Obama: I didn't take Duterte's cursing personally," *ABS CBN News*, 8 Setyembre 2016, matatagpuan sa <http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/09/08/16/obama-i-didnt-take-dutertes-cursing-personally>, inakses noong 26 Pebrero 2018.
40. Bernie V. Lopez, "Lesson from and for Duterte," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A14, 27 Oktubre 2016.
41. Adele Webb, "Hide the Looking Glass: Duterte and the Legacy of American Glass," sa Curato, *A Duterte Reader*, pah. 139.
42. Tingnan ang Vic Hurley, *Swish of the Kris: The Story of the Moros* (New York: E.P. Dutton Co., Inc., 1936), pah. 126–133.
43. "Pushing split with America, Counters Deep Philippine Ties," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A7, 31 Oktubre 2016.
44. John Nery, "Duterte's American fixation," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A12, 29 Oktubre 2016.
45. Jesse Angelo L. Altez at Kloyde A. Caday, "The Mindanaoan President," sa Curato, *A Duterte Reader*, pah. 116.
46. Garces, patnugot, *The Duterte Manifesto*, pah. 28.
47. Eliseo R. Mercado, "The Moro People's Struggle for Self-Determination," sa Mark Turner, et al, mga patnugot, *Mindanao: Land of Unfulfilled Promise* (Lunsod Quezon: New Day Publishers, 1992), pah. 160.
48. Lualhati Abreu, "Colonialism and Resistance: A Historical Perspective," sa Bobby M. Tuazon, patnugot, *The Moro Reader: History and Contemporary Struggles of the Bangsamoro People* (Lunsod Quezon: CenPEG, 2008), pah. 14.





49. Jorge Bayona, "Inherited Destinies, Phantom Limbs: Empire, Settler Colonialism, and Trauma in the Philippines and Peru," papel na ipinrisinta noong ika-20 ng Pebrero 2018, sa Nemesio Prudente Hall, Politeknikong Unibersidad ng Pilipinas, Maynila, sa programang inisyatibo ng Institute of Human and Social Development.
50. Julkipli Wadi, "Multiple Colonialism in Moroland," sa Tuazon, patnugot, *The Moro Reader*, pah. 21.
51. Trisha Macas, "Duterte: Federalism will bring peace in Mindanao," *GMA News Online*, 30 Nobyembre 2015, matatagpuan sa <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/546270/duterte-federalism-will-bring-peace-in-mindanao/story/>, inakses noong 26 Pebrero 2018.
52. Edilberto C. de Jesus, "The Duterte Dilemma," *Business Matters, Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A16, 2 Enero 2016.
53. Jayson Lamchek, "A Mandate for Mass Killing? Public Support for Duterte's War on Drugs," sa Curato, patnugot, *A Duterte Reader*, p. 199.
54. César Gaviria, "Rodrigo Duterte," *Time*, matatagpuan sa <http://time.com/collection/2017-time-100/4736340/rodrigo-duterte/>, inakses noong 27 Pebrero 2018.
55. Dona Z. Pazzibugan, "CHR Wants Police Reports on Drug Kills," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A20, 31 Oktubre 2016.
56. Jhesset Enano at Leila B. Salaverria, "It's bishops vs Duterte," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A2, 26 Enero 2017.
57. Julie M. Aurelio, "Church: Law enforcement, not death, needed," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A11, 29 Abril 2017.
58. Christine O. Avendaño at Nikko Dizon, "Duterte tops Time's online list of 100 most influential people in the world," *Inquirer.Net*, 18 Abril 2017, matatagpuan sa <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/889917/duterte-tops-times-online-list-of-100-most-influential-people-in-the-world>, inakses noong 27 Pebrero 2018.
59. Tetch Torres-Tupas, "Kian was killed without mercy — NBI," *Inquirer.Net*, 31 Agosto 2017, <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/927083/kian-delos-santos-killing-no-mercy-nbi-case-police-criminal-complaint>, inakses noong 27 Pebrero 2018.





60. Jose Luis Martin Gascon, "Rights in the Philippines: Prospects and Challenges," isang porum na inorganisa ng Loyola Schools Department of Political Science noong ika-29 ng Setyembre 2017 at pinasinayanan sa Leong Hall, Ateneo de Manila University.
61. Dona Z. Pazzibugan, "Oppose War on Illegal Drugs in PH, Amnesty Int'l Urges ASEAN leaders," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A6, 27 Abril 2017.
62. Pathricia Ann V. Roxas, "UN rights chief 'gravely concerned' by Duterte's support for 'shoot-to-kill policy,'" *Inquirer.Net*, 12 Setyembre 2017, matatagpuan sa <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/930063/un-human-rights-zeid-raad-al-hussein-president-duterte-philippines-drug-war>; inakses noong 27 Pebrero 2018.
63. Jenny Jean B. Domingo, "Understanding the International Criminal Court," Commentary, *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A13, 29 Abril 2017.
64. Trisha Macas, "Duterte launches profanity-laced tirade vs. UN human rights high commissioner," *GMA News Online*, 22 Disyembre 2016, <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/593423/duterte-launches-profanity-laced-tirade-vs-un-human-rights-high-commissioner/story/>; inakses noong 27 Pebrero 2018.
65. Leila B. Salaverria, "Non-interference policy: Du30 tells West to stop meddling," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A4, 30 Abril 2017.
66. "ASEAN facing 'massive' drug menace, says Duterte," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A4, 30 Abril 2017.
67. Erwin Colcol, "Alvarez wants abolition of UN, creation of 'United Nations of Asia,'" *GMA News Online*, 22 Pebrero 2018, matatagpuan sa <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/644263/alvarez-wants-abolition-of-un-creation-of-united-nations-of-asia/story/>; inakses noong 27 Pebrero 2018.
68. Sass Rogando Sasot, "Tale of 2 drug wars," *The Manila Times*, 8 Agosto 2017, matatagpuan sa <http://www.manilatimes.net/tale-2-drug-wars/343074/>; inakses noong 28 Pebrero 2018.
69. Efren Abueg, "Ang Retorika sa Panahon ni Duterte at Trump: Globalisasyon, Nasyonalismo at Panitikan," papel na binasa bilang bahagi ng Serye ng Lekturang Propesoryal noong ika-23 ng Pebrero, 2018, sa Nemesio Prudente Hall, Politeknikong Unibersidad ng Pilipinas, Sta. Mesa, Maynila.





70. Dharel Placido, "Duterte: Human rights is 'anti-thesis' of government," *ABS CBN News*, 30 Setyembre 2016, matatagpuan sa <http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/09/30/16/duterte-human-rights-is-anti-thesis-of-government>, inakses noong 28 Pebrero 2018.
71. Manuel Quezon III, "Why no one is stopping Duterte's drug war," *The Washington Post*, 10 Agosto 2017, matatagpuan sa https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/08/10/why-no-one-is-stopping-dutertes-drug-war/?utm_term=.be291b75e071, inakses noong 28 Pebrero 2018.
72. John Macionis, *Society: The Basics* (New Jersey: Pearson Education Inc., 2004), p. 319.
73. Joel Ruiz Butuyan, "Yearning for a strongman," Flea Market of Ideas, *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A16, 16 Mayo 2016.
74. Mel Lopez, "Duterte: Yes, I'm a dictator, so what?" *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A3, 25 Pebrero 2016.
75. Philip C. Tubeza, "Duterte: I'm really a dictator," *Inquirer.Net*, 9 Pebrero 2018, matatagpuan sa <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/967393/duterte-im-really-a-dictator>, inakses noong 28 Pebrero 2018.
76. Gene Lacza Pilapil, "Democracy in the time of Duterte," Commentary, *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A8, 17 Mayo 2016.
77. Personal na komunikasyon kay Dr. Vicente Villan, 22 Pebrero 2018.
78. Tingnan ang Cleve Kevin Robert V. Arguelles, "Duterte's Other War: The Battle for EDSA People Power's Memory," sa Curato, patnugot, *A Duterte Reader*, pah. 263-282.

Mga Sanggunian

A. Aklat

- Cullinane, Michael. *Patron as Client: Warlord Politics and the Duranos of Danao. Quezon City. Ateneo de Manila Press. 1994.*
- Curato, Nicole. *A Duterte Reader: Critical Essays on Rodrigo Duterte's Early Presidency.* Lunsod Quezon. Bughaw. 2017.
- David, Randolph S. *Understanding Society, Culture, and Politics.* Mandaluyong: Anvil Publishing Inc. 2017.





- D'Mello, Arlene Torres. *Brown Outside, White Inside: A Study of Identity Development among Children of Filipino Immigrants in Australia*. Quezon City. Giraffe Books. 2003.
- . *Being Filipino Abroad*. Quezon City. Giraffe Books. 2001.
- Fukuyama, Francis. *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York. Free Press. 1992.
- Garces, Khuey. *The Duterte Manifesto: Mga Aral Mula sa mga Banat at mga Talumpati ni President Rodrigo Duterte*. Lunsod Quezon. ABS-CBN Publishing Inc. 2016.
- Guillermo, Ramon. *Pook at Paninindigan: Kritika ng Pantayong Pananaw*. Lunsod Quezon. University of the Philippines Press. 2009.
- Guthrie, G.M. *The Psychology of Modernization in Rural Philippines*. Quezon City. Ateneo de Manila University Press. 1959.
- Hurley, Vic. *Swish of the Kris: The Story of the Moros*. New York. E.P. Dutton Co., Inc. 1936.
- Macionis, John. *Society: The Basics*. New Jersey. Pearson Education Inc. 2004.
- McCoy, Alfred. *An Anarchy of Families: The Historiography of State and Family in the Philippines*. Quezon City. Ateneo de Manila University Press. 1994.
- Navarro Atoy, Mary Jane Rodriguez, Vicente Villan. *Pantayong Pananaw: Ugat at Kabuluhan*. Lunsod Quezon: Palimbagan ng Lahi. 2000.
- Salazar, Zeus. *The Ethnic Dimension: Papers on Philippine Culture, History and Psychology*. Cologne. Caritas Association for the City of Cologne. 1983.
- Tuazon, Bobby M. *The Moro Reader: History and Contemporary Struggles of the Bangsamoro People*. Lunsod Quezon. CenPEG. 2008.
- Turner, Mark, R.J. May, Lulu Respall Turner. *Mindanao: Land of Unfulfilled Promise*. Lunsod Quezon. New Day Publishers. 1992.
- B. Dyornal, Monograp, Seminar, Forum at Komunikasyong Personal
- Abubakar, Carmen A. "Is Islam Compatible with Democracy." sa Maria Serena I. Diokno at Miriam Coronel Ferrer. Democratic Transitions,





Kasarinlan: Philippine Quarterly of Third World Studies. Volume 12, Number 1, 3rd Quarter 1996.

Abueg, Efren. "Ang Retorika sa Panahon ni Duterte at Trump: Globalisasyon, Nasyonalismo at Panitikan." *Serye ng Lekturang Propesoryal sa PUP*. Nemesio Prudente Hall, Politeknikong Unibersidad ng Pilipinas. Sentro ng Malikhaing Pagsulat. 23 Pebrero 2018.

Bayona, Jorge. "Inherited Destinies, Phantom Limbs: Empire, Settler Colonialism, and Trauma in the Philippines and Peru." Nemesio Prudente Hall, Politeknikong Unibersidad ng Pilipinas. Institute of Human and Social Development. 20 ng Pebrero 2018.

Gascon, Jose Luis Martin. "Rights in the Philippines: Prospects and Challenges." Leong Hall, Ateneo de Manila University. Loyola Schools Department of Political Science. 29 Setyembre 2017.

Marcos, Ferdinand E. *The Philippine Experience: A Perspective on Human Rights and the Rule of the Law*.

Villan, Vicente. Personal na Komunikasyon. 22 Pebrero 2018.

C. Artikulo sa Dyaryo

Aurelio, Julie M. "Church: Law enforcement, not death, needed." *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A11. 29 Abril 2017.

Butuyan, Joel Ruiz. "Yearning for a strongman." Flea Market of Ideas. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A16. 16 Mayo 2016.

Cabacungan, Gil. "Duterte: I'm not a 'tuta' of anyone." *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A18. 6 Oktubre 2016.

David, Randy. "Strongmen and the Mass Media." Public Lives. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A14. 30 Abril 2017.

———. "Blindsided by Duterte: A Postmortem," Public Lives, *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A1. 12 Mayo 2016.

David, Rina Jimenez. "The Tokhang Tour." At Large. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A15. 30 Abril 2017.

De Jesus, Edilberto C. "The Duterte Dilemma." Business Matters. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A16. 2 Enero 2016.





- Domingo, Jenny Jean B. "Understanding the International Criminal Court." Commentary. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A13. 29 Abril 2017.
- Lopez, Bernie V. "Lesson from and for Duterte." *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A14. 27 Oktubre 2016.
- Lopez, Mel. "Duterte: Yes, I'm a dictator, so what?" *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A3. 25 Pebrero 2016.
- Mangunay, Kristine Fellise. "Rody to open hotline: 'just don't lie to me.'" *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A6. 2 Hulyo 2016.
- Nery, John. "Outrageous Duterte wants out." Newsstand. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A9. 5 Enero 2016.
- . "Duterte's American fixation." *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A12. 29 Oktubre 2016.
- Pazzibugan, Dona Z. "CHR Wants Police Reports on Drug Kills." *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A20. 31 Oktubre 2016.
- . "Oppose War on Illegal Drugs in PH, Amnesty Int'l Urges ASEAN leaders." *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A6. 27 Abril 2017.
- Pilapil, Gene Lacza. "Democracy in the time of Duterte." Commentary. *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A8. 17 Mayo 2016.
- Ramos, Marlon Nestor Corrales. "Rody's 2nd home: Bahay Pangarap." A1. 7 Hulyo 2016.
- Salaverria, Leila B. "Does Digong need an image make-over?" *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A1. 3 Enero 2016.
- . "Now it can be told: FVR pushed Duterte to run." *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A3. 2 Hulyo 2016.
- . "Du30: Foreign troops out in 2 years." *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A10. 27 Oktubre 2016.
- . "Non-interference policy: Du30 tells West to stop meddling." *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A4. 30 Abril 2017.
- "ASEAN facing 'massive' drug menace, says Duterte," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, A4, 30 Abril 2017.
- "He likes to be called 'President Rody.'" *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A14. 13 Mayo 2016.





“Pushing split with America, Counters Deep Philippine Ties.” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. A7. 31 Oktubre 2016.

D. Artikulo sa mga Pahayagan sa Pormang Elektroniko

Alonzo, Karl Norman. “Duterte jokes about ‘Philippines, province of China.’” *Philstar Global*. 19 Pebrero 2018. <http://old.philstar.com/headlines/2018/02/19/1789428/duterte-jokes-about-philippines-province-china>.

Avendaño, Christine O., Nikko Dizon. “Duterte tops Time’s online list of 100 most influential people in the world.” *Inquirer.Net*. 18 April 2017. <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/889917/duterte-tops-times-online-list-of-100-most-influential-people-in-the-world>.

Corrales, Nestor. “Make PH a province of China, Duterte jokes in front of Chinese envoy.” *Inquirer.Net*. 19 Pebrero 2018. <http://globalnation.inquirer.net/164413/rodrigo-duterte-jest-making-ph-chinese-province>.

Dedace, Sophia. “Noynoy Aquino announces bid for presidency in 2010.” *GMA News Online*. 9 Setyembre 2009. <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/171814/noynoy-aquino-announces-bid-for-presidency-in-2010/story/>.

Esguerra, Anthony Q. “The fist bump is the architecture that allows fake news’—ex-DepEd chief.” *Inquirer.Net*. 13 Pebrero 2018. <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/968547/the-fist-bump-is-the-architecture-that-allows-fake-news-ex-deped-chief>.

Gaviria, César “Rodrigo Duterte.” *Time*. <http://time.com/collection/2017-time-100/4736340/rodrigo-duterte/>.

Macas, Trisha. “Duterte plans to shuttle between Palace and Davao City daily despite security risks.” *GMA News Online*. 30 Mayo 2016. <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/568155/duterte-plans-to-shuttle-between-palace-and-davao-city-daily-despite-security-risks/story/>.

———. “Duterte: Federalism will bring peace in Mindanao.” *GMA News Online*. 30 Nobyembre 2015. <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/546270/duterte-federalism-will-bring-peace-in-mindanao/story/>.





- . “Duterte launches profanity-laced tirade vs. UN human rights high commissioner,” *GMA News Online*, 22 Disyembre 2016, <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/593423/duterte-launches-profanity-laced-tirade-vs-un-human-rights-high-commissioner/story/>.
- Fallows, James. “A Damaged Culture.” *The Atlantic*. Nobyembre 1987. theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1987/11/a-damaged-culture/505178/.
- Placido, Dharel. “Duterte: PH-Russia ties entering a new chapter.” *ABS CBN News*. 22 Mayo 2017. <http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/05/22/17/duterte-ph-russia-ties-entering-a-new-chapter>.
- . “Obama: I didn’t take Duterte’s cursing personally.” *ABS CBN News*. 8 Setyembre 2016. <http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/09/08/16/obama-i-didnt-take-dutertes-cursing-personally>.
- . “Duterte: Human rights is ‘anti-thesis’ of government.” *ABS CBN News*. 30 Setyembre 2016. <http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/09/30/16/duterte-human-rights-is-anti-thesis-of-government>.
- Quezon, Manuel III. “Why no one is stopping Duterte’s drug war.” *The Washington Post*. 10 Agosto 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/08/10/why-no-one-is-stopping-dutertes-drug-war/?utm_term=.be291b75e071.
- Quintos, Patrick. “‘Feeling opposition,’ Duterte remains on ‘campaign mode’: analyst.” *ABS CBN News*. 12 Pebrero 2018. <http://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/02/12/18/feeling-opposition-duterte-remains-on-campaign-mode-analyst>.
- Roxas, Patricia Ann V. “UN rights chief ‘gravely concerned’ by Duterte’s support for ‘shoot-to-kill policy.’” *Inquirer.Net*. 12 Setyembre 2017. <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/930063/un-human-rights-zeid-raad-al-husseini-president-duterte-philippines-drug-war>.
- Sasot, Sass Rogando. “Tale of 2 drug wars.” *The Manila Times*. 8 Agosto 2017. <http://www.manilatimes.net/tale-2-drug-wars/343074/>.
- Tubeza, Philip C. “Duterte: I’m really a dictator.” *Inquirer.Net*. 9 Pebrero 2018. <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/967393/duterte-im-really-a-dictator>.





Tupas, Tetch Torres. "Kian was killed without mercy — NBI." *Inquirer.Net*. 31 Agosto 2017, <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/927083/kian-delos-santos-killing-no-mercy-nbi-case-police-criminal-complaint>.

Valente, Catherine S. "Duterte seeks deeper relations with China." *The Manila Times*. 16 Mayo 2017. <http://www.manilatimes.net/duterte-seeks-deeper-relations-china/327436/>.





The Origins and Rise of Philippine Political Corruption: On the Diversion of *Kaginhawahang Bayan* by the Elite during the Spanish and American Regimes and Its Lasting Impact on Philippine Politics and Administration¹

MA. CARMEN V. PEÑALOSA, DPA
University of the Philippines, Diliman



Introduction

Historically and culturally, political corruption in the Philippines comes from two sources. One derives from the colonial systems of Spain and America. Filipinos had to work within these, serving above all the political, economic and social interests of each “mother country.” The other was brought by the native elites into each colonial system—*i.e.*, the traditional relationship between themselves as “*pinuno*” (leaders) and their “*sakop*” (wards). The earlier meaning and value of the acquisition and management of “*kaginhawahang bayan*” (community “wellbeing” and welfare) was each time redefined and adjusted within both colonial regimes. They had to preserve their socio-economic stature and leadership roles in the face of foreign intrusion, first in 1588 and then from 1901 until 1946 and beyond.

In the end, the subversion of the two successive Western politico-administrative cultures, Spanish and American would result in the elites’ no longer leading for the common good (“*kaginhawahang bayan*”), but primarily on the colonial models for self-aggrandizement (“*pansariling kapakinabangan*”) and the perpetuation of the socio-economic interests of their families through corruption or “*ginagawang hanapbuhay ang trabaho*” (“turning one’s work into a livelihood”)² which is the Filipino metaphor for political corruption. Thus, the formerly mutually beneficial “*pinuno-sakop*” relationship would be transformed during the Spanish





colonial era into the exploitative patron-client relations; and during the American period into patronage and spoils politics. All this would bring about contemporary bureaucratic and political corruption.

Using historical and socio-cultural analysis informed by two major indigenization movements in the Philippine Social Sciences—*i.e.*, the *Pantayong Pananaw* (“for us, of us, among ourselves, about ourselves and others” perspective) and *Sikolohiyang Pilipino* (“Filipino Psychology”)³—in its referencing of the discussion on the indigenous concept of “*ginhawa*,” particularly in relation to “*kaginhawahang bayan*,”⁴ this paper looks into the historical and socio-cultural development of the Philippine State from 1588 to the present. Additionally, it explores how and to what extent the Philippine State in the course of its becoming has taken on relevant foreign cultural elements as a consequence of its colonial past and how in this context, “political corruption” may be viewed in a manner more consistent with socio-cultural expectations.

On the one hand, *Pantayong Pananaw* (PP) as conceptualized by Salazar (1996) may be understood in its four important aspects: 1) as perspective and method in research; 2) as philosophy of (essentially Philippine) history; 3) as an analysis of contemporary Philippine culture-and-society which has resulted from its unique double-colonial history; and 4) as an agenda towards a new Filipino socio-political-cultural entity.⁵ Its introduction in the 1970’s ushered in a New Philippine Historiography which has significantly changed the complexion of history as narrative and craft in the country. Relevant to this is PP’s methodological perspective in research whose core tenet is the “centering” of Filipino language-and-culture, understood at once as the national language and as the other Philippine languages which are all of Austronesian origin, in historical investigation and interpretation. On the other hand, *Sikolohiyang Pilipino* which was initiated by Enriquez (1989) sprang from the discipline of psychology and remains anchored in that discipline, except for the fact that it is an indigenized or rapidly indigenizing psychology resulting from the legitimate scientific concerns arising from the cultural and socio-political realities of its locus (*pook*), the Philippines. *Sikolohiyang Pilipino* refers to psychology derived from the experience, knowledge and orientation of the Filipino,⁶ based on the use of Filipino language-and-culture and has therefore had almost identical preoccupations with *Pantayong Pananaw*.





These two national projects on theory revision would generate discourse on indigenization that would eventually find their way into the field of Public Administration in the Philippines largely due to the interdisciplinary engagement of its academic scholars at its very inception in 1952 up to present.⁷ Thus in a general concern for finding relevance amidst the institutionalization by the Americans of specialized disciplines in the Philippines such as Public Administration, this paper attempts to contextualize the history of political corruption through conscious decolonization or the reorientation of academic discourse towards the privileging of social phenomena interpreted from the perspective of the national “self” using our own referents of language-and-culture.

Centralized Socio-Political and Economic Power in the Spanish Colony: The Origins And Rise Of Political Corruption in *Felipinas* (1588–1898)

The crushing of the Tondo Conspiracy in 1588 resulted in a new system of leadership and administration in the incipient Spanish colonial domain. It also established a broader base for national unity beyond petty kingdoms and rajaships. These forms of state construction on the basis of kinship, social relations, continuous alliance-building and nurturing of interpersonal relations among *pinunos* through efficient management of *ginhawa* would be replaced by centralized government on the archipelagic level through politico-administrative coercion and the spread of Christian missions.

The relative success of this endeavor was facilitated by the *datu/hari/raha* and the *timawa/timagua/maharlika* gradually adjusting to the system of social stratification separating colonizer and subject population. This was a reflection of the distribution of wealth and power within the mercantilist money economy which had replaced the native sharing of *ginhawa/kaginhawahan* while this persisted in communities remote from the centers of colonial administration.

Colonial Dispensation: Birth of the *Principalia*

A formal and extensive bureaucratic structure thus mediated between the subjects (*Indios*) and the citizens (Spaniards) of the colony, and between these and the Crown in Spain. This “civil service” (*función*





pública) contrasted with traditional relations. Where earlier the *pinunos* generated, managed and distributed *ginhawa/kaginhawahan* among their *sakops*, the new *función pública* now distinguished, at least theoretically, between “public” and “private” domains—*i.e.*, the previously unknown concept of “office.” “Public service” encompassed official pronouncements and acts deriving authority from colonial rule. This involved the conversion of the natives to Christianity; subjugation and pacification of the islands; supposed protection of the natives against their enemies, at first by the *encomendero* and subsequently by the civil government and the Church; and the allocation of funds for public infrastructure. In exchange, the subjects were to pay tributes, submit to forced labor (*polos y servicios*), subscribe to the *bandala* (forced sale of agricultural products to the government), and defend the colonial government.

Two contradictory principles of administration prevailed in the implementation of policies from the Crown: “*no se haga novedad*” (“do not introduce any innovations”) and “*obedezco pero no cumpro*” (“I obey but do not comply”). Thus, if official policies were at all implemented, these were done only sparingly, depending on the discretion of administrators. Policy demands were usually resolved in favor of self-aggrandizement rather than “public service,” which was of course imparted to the Spanish public or the Crown, but not to the “King’s subjects,” the *Indios*, nor to the mainly Chinese foreigners.

At first bestowed upon early “colonists” as reward for services and later sold to the highest bidder, public office came to be considered as “private property,” particularly on the provincial and municipal levels. This encouraged graft and corruption because money spent to buy office/s had to be recuperated, with a profit in order to amass sufficient funds for retirement in Spain or Mexico.

Previously at the apex of politics and administration, the former *datu/hari/raha* found themselves at the lowest levels in the colonial set-up as *cabezas de barangay* and *gobernadorcillos* of the *bayan* now reorganized into *pueblos*. In exchange for privileges, they were used by the Spaniards to implement and enforce tax collection and colonial laws. They did not however possess real politico-administrative powers, which resided in the *curas*, monks who displaced the former *babaylan/katalonan*.





As for the *timawa/timagua/maharlika*, quite a number landed in clerical/secretarial jobs with the *curas* and *alcaldes mayores*, the Spanish provincial governors, or *corregidores*, the equally Spanish military governors. Others were recruited or forced to work as local officials and later *tenientes* and *guardias civiles* in the various *pueblos* and cities including Manila. Some served as sailors and soldiers in the galleon trade and for the maintenance of Spanish power in the archipelago, also for various military expeditions and colonial efforts both in the Philippines (principally, Mindanao and Sulu) and elsewhere in Asia (East Indonesia, Cambodia, Thailand) and the Pacific (Marianas). In general, they served in the colonial administrative machinery as *abogadillos*, *directorillos*, clerks, secretaries, accountants and managers, aside from being singers, actors and actresses, musicians, printers, poets, translators and eventually priests. They were now under a system of salaries and wages that were neither enough to equal incomes from their earlier possessions nor to maintain a decent way of life ("*maginhawang buhay*"). The rest of the bureaucracy was occupied by Spanish *mestizos* and *insulares*, Spaniards born in the Philippines.

By the 19th century the Spanish colonial system, more deeply rooted in racism, was firmly in place. At the top were the Spaniards who now had practically become a ruling caste (in all aspects of government, from central administration, to judiciary and the military, and the Church). In general, this caste was not accessible to non-Europeans, particularly non-Spaniards. Among the Spaniards themselves, the *peninsulares* or those born in Spain ranked higher, in terms of precedence in society and the right to office, than the *insulares*. Next in the hierarchy were the Spanish *mestizos* who could occupy subaltern positions in the administration and military. Then came the Chinese *mestizos* who had control over the economy, together with their more foreign forbears. From the alliance of the former aristocracy with Spanish and Chinese *mestizos* would rise the *principalia*, prosperous economically but deprived of politico-administrative authority. From them would come the leaders of the Secularization Movement and the Propaganda. Finally, at the bottom were the rest of the "*Indios*," the former *sakops*. These were now mainly poorer and unacculturated, or acculturated to a much lesser degree than their collaborating leaders.





The abolition of “slavery” had allowed the *principales* to dispose of their *alipins* (“slaves”), including the *aliping namamahay* (tenants) who in olden days could not be sold. They collected money from those who avoided *polo y servicio*, and fudged the accounts. They also earned from interest rates on loans to those “exempted” from work. In some cases, they would not release the allowances of those who were not. There were accounts of forced “public service” detailing not only human exploitation but also torture, and deaths resulting in depopulation of certain localities.

These resulted from connivance between the Spaniards and the collaborating aristocracy.⁸ But in the nineteenth century, the *principalia* had reached such a level of political maturity that Marcelo H. del Pilar collided with the parish priest of Malolos who bloated the list of taxpayers for the aggrandizement of his church,⁹ an act which did not endear him to what he later called the “*frailocracy*.”¹⁰ Rizal described the bureaucratic red tape and corruption that discouraged Filipino entrepreneurship, thus:

All the Filipinos know how many documents, what comings, how many stamped papers, how much patience is needed to secure from the government a permit for an enterprise. One must count upon the good will of this one, the influence of that one, a good bribe to another in order that the application be not pigeon-holed, a present to the one further on so that it [*sic*] may pass it on to his chief¹¹

Rizal’s Chinese migrant in the *Fili*, Quiroga, completes this picture of corruption. Unlike Simoun who corrupts society, the political system and bureaucracy with a view to bringing about a revolution, Quiroga does it for personal commercial ends.¹²

On the top levels of the colonial government, the *visita* and *residencia* sent by the King through the *Consejo de Indias* often revealed graft and corruption among the Spanish civil servants up to the governor-general. The *residencia* more properly involved the governor-general’s official acts during his term. These were examined by the incoming governor-general in a formal judicial review which admitted all complaints, including those of graft and corruption. At the end of the eighteenth century, Félix Berenguer de Marquina was accused of having





... amassed a great fortune through trade and by diverting the proceeds of the royal revenue to his own private advantage. After ... years of trial, he was found guilty of having shown favoritism in the dispensation of official favors; ... authorized the expenditure of public money for private ends; ... (negligence) in the supervision of the various departments of real hacienda, particularly of tobacco ...¹³

The tobacco monopoly was riddled with graft and corruption from its beginning in 1782 until its abolition in 1881. According to Feodor Jagor who travelled in the Philippines in 1859-60, monopoly officials and the local government

... appropriated the fields of the peasantry without the slightest indemnification ...; forced them ... to raise, on the confiscated property, an article which ... yielded a very uncertain crop; and they then valued the harvested leaves arbitrarily and without ... appeal, and, in the most favorable case, paid for them at a nominal price fixed by themselves.... Spain regularly remains indebted to the unlucky peasants in the amount of the miserable pittance allowed, from one year's end to another.¹⁴

Earlier in the Visayas until 1814, no worse system "could scarcely be devised" than the tobacco monopoly in which

... Officials, thinking only of their ... private advantage, suffered no competition in their provinces, employed their official power to oppress the producer to the utmost extent ...; and the Government treasury ... suffered frequent losses through bankruptcies, inasmuch as the magistrates, who drew a salary of \$600 and paid a license of from \$100 to \$300 for the right of trading, in order to make money quickly, engaged in the most hazardous speculations.¹⁵

The "right to trade" referred to the *indulto de comercio* or *indulto para comerciar* which was granted to the *alcaldes mayores* and *corregidores* in 1751 to allow them to engage in commerce in order to curb corruption on





their part.¹⁶ Together with friar partners, they enriched themselves with the help of the *principalia* whose members were the *de facto* entrepreneurs in local trade, whether overland or the coasting trade¹⁷ with Manila and beyond.

The coastal trade had developed over the years and by then “all the provinces were covered, and . . . many rich natives and mestizos . . . could take over the *alcaldes*’ role” so that in 1844, the *indulto* was abolished and the *alcaldes* were required to be lawyers and their offices were “no longer sold but filled by appointment from Madrid or by the governor-general in Manila.”¹⁸ Emilio Aguinaldo who, like his father served as *gobernadorcillo* of his town, like him also engaged in the “coastal trade” between northern Luzon and Manila and Cavite.¹⁹

Transition: Socio-Economic Changes and Native Reaction

In the nineteenth-century, the population in the Christianized areas had grown partly beyond kinship aggrupations. With the politico-administrative reach of the colonial government extending its territory, the former leaders, while retaining their concern over their former *sakops*, would have no basis for accountability other than probably the *compadrazco* system (an artificial extension of the *kamag-anakan* or clan). The general inclination was to gain as much from the colonial system to be able to reestablish their former wealth and prestige, and therefrom continue as managers and distributors of *ginhawa* among their former *sakops*. However, this accountability did not grow to include those beyond their former territorial domains and *sakops*.

The freeing of the *alipins* had likewise loosened their ties to their *pinunos*. The *timawa/timagua/maharlika* not only had joined the freed *alipins* in the common disarray of “freedom” but had likewise lost the basis for their relationship with their “*panginoon*” (lord). And since land was no longer at their *pinunos*’ disposal, and raiding and trading (“*pangayaw*”) could no longer be done,²⁰ money and profits from land now became the exclusive source of *ginhawa* to secure the leaders’ hold on their *sakops*, thereby preserving their social standing. And because jobs and careers were now open to both *pinunos* and former *sakops*, the only way for the old *panginoons* to maintain their relationship with them





was through reciprocal relations within the new money economy and political dispensation.

Preoccupied with personal enrichment, the former *pinunos* had joined the Spaniards in the exploitation of the civil service on the local level. This now took the form of patron-client relations, oftentimes sustained through the *compadrazco*. Bureaucratic corruption flourished throughout the colonial bureaucracy, aggravated by influence peddling from businessmen. Then there was the intimate politico-economic relationship between the *gobernadorcillo* and his backers from the *principalia*. According to Glenn May,

... If roads and bridges were to be repaired ... , the ones that would get the first priority would be those ... (leading) to the sugar estates, sugar mills, warehouses, and other facilities of the particular family ... [in] control of the municipal tribunal [S]ince the *gobernadorcillo* initiated most serious legal cases and ... [marshalled] the evidence for the courts, he was in a position to quash any judicial action ... against members of the faction that had elected him ... [T]he judicial powers at his disposal [also] enabled him to make life difficult for the opposing faction Finally, in assessing taxes and collecting fees, the *gobernadorcillo* could ... be far more lenient on—and even bend the law for—the faction that sponsored him, and ... much less accommodating to the faction that did not²¹

Milking the colonial state of the little that was accessible to the *principalia* was regarded as justifiable, considering that the Spaniards distributed and redistributed among themselves the *Indios'* wealth and the products of their labor. All this was further aggravated by *frailocracy* and the plunder of the economy by Chinese and Spanish businessmen. Elizabeth Medina synthesizes “the kinds and causes of corruption in 19th century Philippines” thus:

The most important practices were the falsification of accounting documents. The evidence of embezzlement ... were (*sic*) destroyed and ... *cabezas de barangay* ... were obliged to





sign blank financial statements. Corrupt governors hid monies from the administration in Manila. They also found ways to discourage the natives from working so that they would . . . be liable to fines. Taxes and fees were arbitrarily set and excessively high, and illegal fines . . . often collected. Governors could embezzle the salaries of public officials . . . , often . . . [demanding] gifts from their hosts when . . . [on] official visits. Gifts were also necessary so that false documents would not be issued. The reasons for corruption were many: the governors had executive, legislative and judicial powers. No checks and balances were built into the system, and when there were, they were unenforceable. There was a vague limit between what were public goods and private ones. Turnover was high . . . governors often did not stay long enough in their posts to . . . develop healthy relationships with their constituents. The salaries of public officials were low . . . There was a monetary crisis in the 19th century . . . The laws were so complex as to easily hide misappropriations and fraud . . . Finally, the common people had no idea of the law and submitted meekly to . . . injustices and abuses . . . In monetary terms, in the province of Negros [in] . . . 1860, approximately twenty-five thousand pesos were siphoned away . . . (probably equivalent in modern currency to hundreds of thousands of dollars). The political price was even higher: the population's increasing alienation from the colonial regime . . .²²

This looks very familiar in our own times when the elite survivors of both the Spanish and American colonial regimes have taken over the role of colonial masters, adopting their ways and languages one after the other. The resulting linguistic and cultural barrier has led to the alienation of the majority. Much of what is attributed by scholars to Filipinos as systematic graft and corruption is therefore not exactly "Filipino" at all but actually Spanish colonial practice inherited by our elites who have only given it a "native" flavor, derived from the ancient *pinuno-sakop* relationship.





Revolutionary Ferment in the Late 19th Century: *Principalia* and *Bayan*; Incipient and Aborted National Bureaucracy

Not only did Spanish colonization disrupt the development of the Philippine ethnic states then already at supraregional levels, thereby stifling the formation of a native national consciousness as basis for politics and administration, it likewise established a different basis for political leadership and social cohesion—one that would become oligarchic in nature, exploitative and locality-based.

The last quarter of the 19th century would give rise to two major political challenges to colonial rule. The first and more fundamental was the *Himagsikan 1896*.²³ This was the culmination of a long series of uprisings and revolts that sought freedom and the reconstitution of the former way-of-life in modern guise. Using native concepts and categories, its proponents, the *Bayan*,²⁴ struggled for the formation of a new socio-political entity called *Inang Bayan* of “*Katagalugan*.” The other challenge initially sought reform in the Spanish colonial government through the Propaganda, but would eventually be drawn into the *Himagsikan 1896*, only to give it a different direction. Predisposed to Western culture and thought, the Filipino elites who took over sought the formation of a *Nación* called *Filipinas*. The ensuing struggle for control over the direction of the *Himagsikan 1896* resulted in the tragic death of Andres Bonifacio, founder of the *Katipunan* and first Philippine President. *Inang Bayan* would be redirected towards the formation of *Nación* by Aguinaldo and the elites from the Propaganda, only to subsequently submit to the Americans after a futile revolutionary war.

The Katipunan: Putative State and its Incipient Bureaucracy (1892–1897)

Established shortly before January 1892,²⁵ the Katipunan may not have formally attained the status of a state, having been displaced as a result of the Aguinaldo *coup d'état* at the Tejeros Convention on March 22, 1897, it had nonetheless formed a *de facto* government with a bottom-top system of governance and administration conducted through popular councils²⁶ when the secret society on August 24, 1896 decided to simultaneously attack Intramuros on August 29–30.²⁷





It was thus already a democratic entity that was republican in character. The members of popular councils were directly elected at the local levels; they then democratically elected from among themselves representatives to the provincial councils whose members in turn elected from among themselves representatives to the supreme council. At each level of organization, there was a president, a vice-president, a treasurer, an auditor, a number of directors, and later a set of advisers. Official communication was in *Tagalog* and the use of the Spanish language during meetings banned, with fines imposed on those who failed to comply. The money collected augmented the revolutionary chest.

Although no specific descriptions exist in how the Katipunan state would have eventually operated, a general philosophy articulated by Jacinto provided the framework for it. Its fundamental concept was that of *ginhawa* as basis for leadership in the state known as *Haring Bayan* (sovereign state). In fact, *kaginhawahan* as goal and general direction of government is central to Jacinto's political philosophy of the state. For Jacinto, "[a]ng kadahilanan nga ng mga Pinuno ay ang Bayan, at ang kagalingan at **kaginhawahan** nito ay siyang tanging dapat tunguhin ng lahat nilang gawa at kautusan."²⁸ Moreover, everyone's "loob" (will) is the source of the "*kapasyahan ng kabuuang bayan*" (public will) giving its leaders "*kapangyarihan*" (power/mandate), thus:

. . . [A]ng loob naman ng Bayan (na nabubuo sa kapasiyahan ng lahat) ang *nagkakaloob* ng kapangyarihan sa mga pinuno ng Bayan, na bilang kabuuan ng pagpapasiya ng mga Anak ng Bayan, ay hindi maaaring magkamali. Kung mangyari man ito, ang loob din ng Bayan ang bumabawi ng kaloob niya sa mga pinunong ang inaatupag ay ang sariling kapakanan at "***hindi ang kaginhawahan ng Bayan.***"²⁹

Since political power or mandate resides in the people, its leaders are merely embodiments or executors of this will, one that is bestowed upon by "*langit*" (heaven) or "*Maykapal*" (divine creator), the ultimate source of mandate for leadership and governance. This is why, "*ang laki at tibay ng kapangyarihan ay sa pagkilala't pagsunod ng Bayan nagbubuhat.*"³⁰ This is primarily the reason why Bonifacio referred to the government





established by the Katipunan as *Haring Bayang Katagalugan*—*i.e.*, *Bayang Katagalugan* is *Hari*, meaning “sovereignty resides in the people,” the “Tagalogs” or “*ang lahat ng tumubo sa kapuluan*.”³¹

Although Jacinto’s concept of *ginhawa* did not stray from the early Filipinos’ appreciation of the concept—*i.e.*, economic and psychological well-being emanating from a recognized leader who was tied to everyone by kinship, whether consanguinal and affinal or simply ritual as in the case of *sandugo* and who in exchange for the common *ginhawa* that he/she facilitated, earned the utmost respect and loyalty of his/her *sakop*—the idea of people’s *pagkakapantay* (equality) is an important development in Filipino political and administrative thought. This concept was based on the human being’s *pagkatao* (humanity) and the idea and belief that one’s *pagkatao* is no different from his *kapwa tao* (fellow human being). It also referred to a status of equality among brothers (*mga kapatid sa/kay Inang Bayan*), which was absolute in the pursuit and maintenance of national freedom. Not even the ascension into office of leaders in this new socio-political order could nullify *kapatiran* or “association of daughters and sons of Inang Bayan” based on the equality of all human beings (*pinuno* and *sakop* alike) and sealed by the *sandugo* amongst the children of *Bayan*. In the words of Jacinto, while their “*kataasan ay nagbubuhay sa Bayang kumikilala sa kanila . . . ang sarili nilang pagkatawo ay kapantay din ng pagkatawo ng lahat*.”³²

Jacinto thus regarded leaders as neither servants nor masters but as absolute equals of the governed in their shared humanity (“*kapwa*”) and in their being siblings (“*magkakapatid*”) of the same *Inang Bayan*, their mandate being derived likewise from their brethren to whom they are accountable. This idea of “*pagkakapantay*” veers away from earlier notions of social class or other social and racial categorizations. This is probably due to the fact that by the 19th century, there were no longer *alipins* and *timawas* attached to the former aristocracy. Thus, unlike the *ilustrados-propagandistas*, the Katipunan did not espouse educational background as basis for political leadership; it required only “*kalinisan ng loob*.” For Jacinto, leaders could be distinguished according to the “*matuid*” they possessed; and that the worthy ones were also those known for their *katuiran*. It is in this context that, foreign concepts such as “public,” “public





will,” “public trust” and “public accountability” among others may find equivalence, if not relevance, to Jacinto’s articulations that are deeply rooted in Filipino culture.

Meanwhile, the struggle for nationhood based on European liberal ideas was conceived and sponsored by scions of the transformed Filipino aristocracy (*principalia*) and its *ilustrado* (enlightened/educated) progeny. They would espouse revolutionary ideas and would succeed in determining the eventual nature and character of Philippine government and administration, even if only for a short period of time, starting from Aguinaldo’s “Revolutionary Government” and ending with the fall of his “First Philippine Republic.”

The Malolos Republic and its Aborted Bureaucracy (1899–1901)

The constitution establishing the First Philippine Republic in 1899, was drafted mostly by *ilustrados* who were strongly influenced by liberal democratic philosophies then dominant in Europe. Their constitution was thus democratic and republican in form. Reference to it as “representative” however has to be qualified, since the *Bayan* (*i.e.*, the poor, uneducated, unacculturated and inarticulate majority) had neither the right to qualify for any position nor to vote for those qualified.³³ Within this system, Apolinario Mabini was among the first to espouse merit and fitness and careerism in the bureaucracy.³⁴ Predating his principles of accountability were moral precepts outlined by Jacinto as discussed above. Mabini’s *True Decalogue* suggests the development of a professional administrative class, carefully outlining the distinction between appointive and career positions, and therefore anticipating administrative structures that distinguished between political and professional aspects of public administration. The vices of the Spanish civil service were deplored; in its place was to be organized a “more modest, simple, and prompt . . . execution of public service.”³⁵

Not surprisingly, the Malolos Constitution outlined in large part the protection of private property mostly held by the *principalia*, thereby consolidating the power base and system of leadership attained by the elites within the Spanish colonial set-up. But whatever value the revolutionary government and the Malolos Constitution had was lost with





the establishment of American colonial rule. In a way, these Filipino elites were responsible for the general course of nation-building in the country through their abandonment and betrayal of the *Himagsikan* 1896 and their collaboration with the Americans, as their ancestors had done with the Spaniards. From the Propaganda to Mabini's *True Decalogue*; from Aguinaldo's *coup d'état* at the Tejeros Convention to the Malolos Republic; and from collaboration with the Spanish colonial administration to the American colonial state and civil service, the educated sons and daughters of the former aristocracy would exhibit a characteristic and unfortunate confluence of Filipino and Spanish cultural elements in their governance and administrative behavior.

Given their predisposition to collaboration for expediency, the *principalia* were either acculturated and became foreigners themselves (*i.e.*, unable to understand their former *kapatid*, and joined in the colonial exploitation for their own self-aggrandizement) or remained essentially Filipino, but capable of using the colonial system to their advantage. Either way, theirs was a behavior and predisposition that did not develop beyond their former interests in relation to their *sakop*, nor beyond their appreciation of inherited social position. Moreover, a new dimension would be added to the kinship system as basis for delineating *sakop* boundaries. Other than marriage, the *compadrazco* system that necessitated *compadre* relations and *ninong-inaanak* ties would be further developed. In fact, the *compadrazco* system would become, in contemporary Filipino politics, a popular means of cultivating not only the politicians' socio-political base and therefore stability in power, but also their constituents' *ginhawa*. Finally, the former practice of the *timawa* attaching themselves to their *pinuno* would find new meaning in warlordism or the employment by political leaders of local goons. But this time, the system was no longer primarily in the service of the *Bayan* as a whole or the entire *pinuno*'s *sakop*, but solely for the personal interest of the politician himself. *Ginhawa* was no longer being shared with *Bayan* but restricted by the elite to its sole *kapakinabangan*, although the instinct of self-preservation would later force the elite to restore some form of sharing with the "masses" in what would be called "patronage" in the struggle for political power among themselves within the new colonial dispensation characterized by patron-client relations with the Americans.





The period from the coup d'état in Tejeros (March 22, 1897) through the Pact of Biak-na-bato (December 14, 1897), the exile of the Aguinaldo faction in Hongkong, the return of Aguinaldo with the forces of Commodore Dewey, the establishment of the Revolutionary Government and subsequently the Malolos Republic (January 23, 1899) up to the capture of its president by the Americans (March 23, 1901) is an extremely turbulent one. It has not attracted solid research on the actual governance of the various "republics" including that of Malolos,³⁶ let alone on graft and corruption. Some inkling of how the "revolutionists" might have behaved under "normal" circumstances in a bureaucracy can however be surmised. Aguinaldo's gobernadorcillo and mercantile background has already been alluded to above. His displacement of Bonifacio and takeover of the Katipunan in the Tejeros Convention through electoral fraud already appears to be typical of *pueblo* politics in the last two decades of the nineteenth century.³⁷

In the so-called "second phase" of the Revolution, nearing capture by the Americans in the Isabela highlands Aguinaldo, pointing to the valley below, could still confide to his aide-de-camp Col. Simeon Villa that they would acquire lands like those when they won the war.³⁸ And then there is the story which links at least some funds of the Malolos Republic to the wealth of a family during the American Occupation and beyond. The story purports to explain:

... the "real" source of the Cojuangcos' now-fabled wealth. One account . . . cited a study reportedly made by Carlos Quirino, . . . former director of the National Library. [Supposedly], . . . General Luna . . . had collected a sizeable sum from contributions . . . to pay his soldiers. The person who collected for him . . . , [Pampango Governor] Tiburcio Hilario, . . . [was ordered by] Luna . . . to bring the valuables to Tarlac, where the revolutionary government planned to establish its capital. General Luna . . . turned over the treasure to Ysidra Cojuangco, then an attractive 32-year-old woman, for safekeeping. Then Luna proceeded to Cabanatuan to meet with Aguinaldo, there to be assassinated by [Aguinaldo's] troops.³⁹





Whatever the truth of the story, the predisposition for self-aggrandizement of some descendants of the politico-economic and cultural elites of the Malolos Republic [which they had learned from the Spanish socio-political system] would be carried over to the twentieth century, befuddling the new American colonialists.

Apolinario Mabini was painfully aware of this proclivity among what he called the “special class” around Aguinaldo. Two of three reasons why Mabini eventually distanced himself from Aguinaldo refer to it. One which Majul identified was:

... when Mabini feared that Aguinaldo was willing to give way to the demands of some *ilustrados* believed to be in connivance with the “rich of Manila” to form a Bank to grant a loan to the revolutionary government and who were to have representation in the government Treasury.⁴⁰

Mabini’s second reason was when the “special class” acquired predominant influence in the Paterno Cabinet. Mabini believed that

... the group of Paterno [was] ... more interested in their personal conveniences and the protection of their properties than the ideals of a struggle that was essentially a mass movement.... [their] instinct of self-preservation pointing out ... the danger that [this] ... was tending towards the satisfaction of the interest of a few ...⁴¹

In other words, *ginhawa* was no longer being shared with *Bayan* but restricted by the elite to their sole *kapakinabangan*. However, as already mentioned, the instinct of self-preservation would later force them to restore some form of reciprocity with the “masses”—*i.e.*, patronage in the struggle for political power among themselves within their patron-client relations with the Americans.⁴²

Imperialism and the Beginnings of the American Colonial Bureaucracy (1901–1946)

Cloaked in “benevolent assimilation,” American rule marked a new colonial subjugation amidst the Filipinos’ continuing struggle for





nationhood complicated by the collaboration of the elites. After the “pacification,” the First Philippine Commission headed by Jacob Schurman recommended in January 1901 the establishment of civil government in conjunction with a bicameral legislature. It was the Second Philippine Commission headed by William Howard Taft which carried out the recommendations, with Taft himself becoming governor of what was called the Insular Government. Aside from the various branches of civil government, the civil service was established, and in July 1902 the Philippine Organic Act was enacted. It provided for a Philippine legislature with the Commission as the upper house and a lower house, the Philippine Assembly, which was elected to office in 1907.

The most strategic areas of administration such as the treasury however remained in the hands of the Americans even after the government and the civil service were “turned over” to the Filipinos during the Commonwealth. By then, owing to the success of the American public educational system, the Filipino elites had already been Americanized and therefore largely predisposed to American influence if not direct persuasion. Extensive and rigidly organized, the bureaucratic system mediated between the subjects (“natives” of the archipelago) and the citizens (Americans) in the colony, and between the colony and Washington. The American President however had a stronger hold on the colony compared to the Spanish King earlier, due mainly to proximity and modern means of transportation and communication.

New Colonial Dispensation and the Wages of Cooptation (1901–1913)

In terms of the congruence between policy pronouncements in America and their implementation in the colony, American imperial administration was more “honest” and “efficient,” thus showcasing America’s first imperial conquest in Asia and its ascension to world power status. Furthermore, the new colony attracted not a few young and competent American graduates and civil servants influenced by the Progressive Movement in America. In contrast to the evils of the spoils system that had plagued American politics from the late 18th century onwards, the reform movement had successfully introduced public administration principles such as political neutrality, careerism as well as merit and fitness for office.⁴³





America thus endeavored to establish a civil service that would implement a “sound, honest and economical” means of collecting and applying taxes and revenues. The intent was to “satisfy the well-founded demands and highest aspirations of the Philippine people,” but it actually primarily satisfied American imperial interests. Nonetheless, there were graft and corruption cases involving American high-ranking officials and Filipino municipal treasurers. Among the latter was the case against Ramon Melencio of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija who was accused of not turning over to his successor “the sum of 1.133.35 4/8 pesos, Mexican currency.” Convicted on the basis of Spanish colonial jurisprudence, he appealed to the new Philippine Supreme Court organized in 1901, stating that the amount got lost during a fire. Quite naturally, the decision was affirmed⁴⁴ by no less than Associate Justice Victorino Mapa who became Secretary of Justice in 1913.

Another case involved a former member of the Malolos Congress, Nueva Ecija Governor Epifanio de los Santos. He was accused of falsifying a will by “six poor men and an illiterate woman” represented by Lt. Amzi B. Kelly, an American attorney who had been dismissed as treasurer of San Isidro by the Philippine Commission. In an open letter to President Roosevelt, the Congress and the Commission, Kelly affirmed that he had in his possession

. . . the sworn affidavits of . . . residents of Cabanatuan, to the effect that . . . Epifanio de los Santos, . . . while Provincial Treasurer of this Province, forced them to come into San Isidro, and in his residence sign a forged and false will.⁴⁵

Nothing came out of Kelly’s protest. In fact, cases involving high-ranking officials were rare and did not usually prosper. The most famous of these was that of Secretary of Interior and member of the Philippine Commission Dean C. Worcester who felt alluded to in an editorial of *El Renacimiento* entitled “*Aves de Rapina*” (“Birds of Prey”) accusing certain American government officials of using public funds “to finance gold prospecting in Benguet mountains for personal gain.” The editor, Teodoro M. Kalaw, and his city editor were sued for libel and meted a sentence of imprisonment which was appealed to the Philippine and American supreme courts





which both upheld it. In 1913, however, Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison pardoned the Filipinos.⁴⁶

As for the previous governor-general, William Cameron Forbes, it was in the American Congress itself that he was accused—by William Atkinson Jones, Chairman of the House Committee of Insular Affairs and future author of the Jones Bill which granted autonomy to the Philippines—of “transferring \$1,695,514 from the gold standard fund to the Treasury;” of having “spent frivolously” the 3 million dollars of the Congressional Relief Act of 1903 intended “to relieve hardship, including . . . expenditures for the Benguet Road.”⁴⁷ Naturally, nothing came out of Atkinson’s charges.

A scandal in the American-manned police force in 1912 was brought to the fore by Forbes himself.⁴⁸ The investigations, resulting in the dismissal of the chiefs of police and detectives, were concluded only after Harrison became governor-general. There was also evidence of corruption in the Nozaleda Yard of the Bureau of Public Works where the American foremen “seem[ed] to have been conniving at petty graft with native *capataces* . . . [who were overissuing lumber which went] into the houses of American employees. At the Philippine General Hospital American doctors “had been making money unethically, and [it was felt] that Forbes was protecting the culprits out of a sense of Harvardian or Bostonian loyalty.” One Dr. Gregg was dismissed from the P.G.H. but “immediately placed in the University Hospital.”⁴⁹

Another case which was leniently pursued by Forbes but assiduously investigated during the Harrison administration was the Manila Railroad’s right-of-way scandal.⁵⁰ It involved a private company heavily subsidized by the government. The head of its right-of-way department, Jose Robles-Lahesa, transacted

. . . . the company’s business through his own bank account, paying for land purchased by the railroad in personal checks, then billing the company for much larger amounts. Moreover, he himself refused to deal directly with the original owners . . . , insisting instead upon buying through a clique of middlemen An investigation in 1913 estimated that on account of this network of corruption approximately half of the P3,067,121.68





expended for acquisition of land "... went into the hands other than those of the original proprietors ..."⁵¹

The judge was instructed not to prosecute. Those incriminated escaped either to Spain or to China. One Lafuente, who could have been

... an invaluable witness for the prosecution, was smuggled out of the country by Chief of Police Harding himself, and maintained ... in China by railroad money ... On March 10, 1913, complaint was filed against him and ... Robles Lahesa for defrauding the railroad company of P200,000. Lafuente, hearing of this in Shanghai, started back for Manila, and got as far as Hongkong where he was met by Chief of Police Harding ... He therefore made a trip to Europe and returned later to Shanghai ...⁵²

According to Gleeck, Jr. nothing "came out of the investigation, probably because there were indeed prominent Filipino politicians involved, and Harrison's zeal for prosecuting those responsible for the scandal did not include them."⁵³

Overall however and compared to the American bureaucracy in the United States at that time, the colonial civil service was not only successful in applying punitive measures especially in cases involving low ranking officials but it was also generally free from the economic conditions that could otherwise predispose American civil servants to graft and corruption.⁵⁴ Mostly professionals, they were generally adequately compensated. Occupying positions through Washington, they were dependent on the socio-political or patron-client relations obtaining in the colony amongst Americans.

The Filipino bureaucrats definitely were part of the patron-client relations among Americans. However, they received salaries that were half or much less of what their American counterparts received,⁵⁵ limited as they were to non-policy determining positions of no strategic importance.⁵⁶ Nonetheless, although the merit principle as "administrative practice and a tenet of political faith for the controlling American officials ... during the period between 1899 and 1913, the Filipinos ... were as yet not





bound by such limitations in their quest for political patronage.”⁵⁷ The system continued beyond 1913; but, although the Filipino politicians strengthened their control over the appointing power, “the number of political appointments to major civil service offices . . . was very small indeed.”⁵⁸

“Filipinization” of the Colonial Civil Service and the Consequent Americanization of the Principalia (1913–1946)

The year 1913 was thus crucial to the integration of the colony and subsequently to the formation of national unity. After the massacres at the *ilihan* (fortified mountain communities) of Bud Bagsak and Bud Talipao by the forces of General Pershing⁵⁹ the “pacification” of Jolo was considered terminated and the Moro Province which had been established in 1903 was abolished and transformed into the Department of Mindanao and Sulu with a civilian governor, Frank W. Carpenter. By the Carpenter Agreement negotiated by him, the Sultan of Sulu, while remaining the “titular spiritual head of the Mohammedan Church in the Sulu Archipelago,” ratified and confirmed “without any reservation or limitation whatsoever” his “recognition of the sovereignty of the United States of America,”⁶⁰ thereby completing the territorial limits of the colonial state.

A new governor-general, Francis Burton Harrison, had taken office in October. It was Harrison who would carry out President Woodrow Wilson’s policy of “Filipinization,” preparatory to what the ruling Democrats then considered the necessary independence of the Philippines. However, this also signaled what may be properly called the “Americanization” of Filipino bureaucrats, considering that they had to acquire mastery not only of the English language but also of American values. Ricardo Jose summarizes Harrison’s term of office ending in 1921 thus:

Harrison took steps to increase the number of Filipinos in the government, while simultaneously reducing the number of Americans in the civil service . . . [approving] bills from the Philippine legislature that offered early-retirement benefits to Americans in civil service jobs and reduced the salaries of those who stayed on in government. Posts vacated by Americans were then filled by Filipinos.





Harrison increased the number of Filipinos heading executive departments and bureaus and allowed Filipino politicians, led by Manuel L. Quezon . . . and Sergio Osmeña, to form the Council of State, a body that served as a link between the executive and legislative branches of the government./

Harrison also . . . allowed increased government participation in the economy, through government-owned and government-controlled corporations He authorized the establishment of the Philippine National Bank and agreed to having it directed by a Filipino president"⁶¹

But it was the PNB under its Filipino president which caused the biggest graft and corruption scandal during Harrison's term. A director of the board since its establishment, Venancio Concepcion became president of the bank in March 1918. A general in Aguinaldo's army and later deputy collector of internal revenue, Concepcion was a protégé of Speaker Osmeña whose life he had once saved. The antithesis of the more professional and conservative first American president of the bank, Concepcion brought to office "a pronounced disdain for rigorous or specialized forms of knowledge [leading] the fight in 1916 against the employment of trained American bankers to the PNB."⁶² Furthermore, possessing

. . . an extraordinary network of personal links, a penchant for money making, and an impressive facility at intrigue and manipulation, he undertook to guide the bank, the economy, his friends, and his personal fortunes through the heady excitement and risks of the wartime boom.⁶³

Board Member Archibald Harrison, the governor-general's brother, began an investigation in May 1918 and by August had found out that in Negros Occidental alone:

. . . loans had been made for large amounts, for agricultural purposes, on mountain land 25 miles from the nearest market that [had] never been cultivated and, owing to its location and formation, [could] never be cultivated. Many loans were found to be in excess of the assessed value of the land and, in other





cases, the owner had declared the land at several times its value for the purpose of getting a larger loan . . .⁶⁴

In an attached document Harrison detailed 35 specific irregularities and presented “a 59-page indictment of agricultural and crop loan operations in Negros alone.” Concepcion ignored the charges and roused the Filipino members of the board to vote “with the acquiescence of Quezon” to withdraw the appropriation for Harrison’s investigation, forcing him to resign and, angry and humiliated, leave the islands.⁶⁵ As for Concepcion, he finally resigned in November 1920; but Governor-General Harrison seemed to have concealed the anomalies in his report for 1920, where he simply mentioned that the PNB had suffered during the year of crisis from “a too enthusiastic assistance to the development of the industrial and commercial resources of the Islands” and that “E. W. Wilson, . . . an expert and highly trained banker, has just arrived to take over . . . with all the former powers of president.”⁶⁶ Stanley’s assessment of the whole affair, however, although circumspect, was as follows:

Clearly, there was more to this extraordinary expansion of credit than simply heady nationalism and professional incompetence. Many of the loans were grossly and obviously unethical. Directors of the bank authorized extravagant loans to companies in which they were themselves investors, and General Concepción subsequently was sent to jail for misuse of the bank’s funds for his own advantage . . . [T]he bank had become a vehicle for elitist profiteering and back-scratching an institutional reflection of . . . Philippine personal ethics.⁶⁷

Familiar to contemporary Filipinos, the practice is known as patronage, patron-client relations or clientism, also dubbed as caciquism by pre-World War II American “colonials.”

Lenient with regards to the PNB scandal and the Manila Railroad scam, Harrison was adamant despite political pressure from Filipino elites in the case of General Mariano Noriel, best remembered as the president of the War Council which condemned Andres Bonifacio to death. This time Noriel was himself condemned to death for having ordered the murder of





landowner Gregorio Magtibay in 1909, brandishing his political influence as an “untouchable” even by Americans.⁶⁸ Harrison “threatened President Wilson with his resignation if the death sentence was not allowed to stand.”⁶⁹ In his view, Noriel had to be executed not only because

. . . of the terrible crimes he has committed . . . , but because even a commutation of his sentence would weaken the courts . . . He is a most dangerous example of the abuse of power by the *cacique* class, and not content with terrorizing the people of his province, he threatened the Judge and Prosecuting Attorney in open court and assured his people that the law was not strong enough to execute him . . .⁷⁰

A number of Noriel’s faction in the Revolution rallied to his side, including Aguinaldo who attempted to stay the execution. Felipe Agoncillo who defended Noriel in the court of first instance, however, subsequently withdrew from the case. Speaker Osmeña also tried to help but faced with Harrison’s intransigence stepped aside. For Harrison was indispensable to the Filipino struggle for independence, aside from the fact that Osmeña worked perfectly well with him, after having been the “client” to Forbes’s “patron.”

Both Osmeña and Quezon came from the provincial elites who with the 1907 Philippine Assembly elections had begun to replace the old aristocratic politicians who had abandoned the Malolos Republic, like the scholarly Trinidad Pardo de Tavera who adjusted to the new regime by quickly learning the ways and language of the Americans. They were rapidly being joined by products of the new educational system in English introduced in conjunction with the civil service. Entry into the bureaucracy required passing through the educational system, declaring an oath of allegiance to the United States, and passing “merit” examinations that were not only in English but were subtle indoctrination to American imperial rule.⁷¹

Members of the Spanish-speaking elite were more apt to conform and would internalize the Anglo-American language and culture in a little more than one generation. And, because the public educational system was accessible to all, the playing field was opened even to the formerly





unacculturated *Bayan*, although in a limited way. Some of them through education or successful Americanization would rise in social status, eventually joining the then rising “middle class” composed mainly of the transformed *principalia*. These new and ancient acculturated elites would come to dominate politics and administration in the country; while the majority of the *Bayan*, generally unacculturated to both Spanish and American cultures, would remain the bastion of Filipino culture but powerless, voiceless and marginalized.

Osmeña and Quezon represented precisely the transitional cohort between the hispanized generation and the new generation of English-speaking Filipinos whose descendants would become our contemporary *Ingleseros*. Whatever its actual cost and effect, for the former Filipino *pinunos*, the “Filipinization” of the colonial bureaucracy re-opened the opportunity for them to consolidate their former power base, to acquire a more visible role in governance and to obtain access to sources of *ginhawa* (money, property and offices) that could further establish or sustain their relationships with their *sakop*.

The Republic: Post-Colonial “Freedom” and its Consequence (1946–present)

The moment Philippine Independence was achieved and the President became Filipino, patronage and spoils politics would become pervasive, but this time among the Filipino elites, with the former American “colonials” in the background. In this context, there could be some truth to the Wood-Forbes critique and other American reports⁷² on instances of graft and corruption that were supposedly proportional to the “Filipinization” of the Philippine Bureaucracy. These reports designated the *caciques* as the culprits, that “1% of political and social parasites” who engaged in “exploitation or deliberate legal robbery of the other 99%.”⁷³ In some cases, the “native” official was mentioned in contrast to the “higher” ones—a distinction probably made between the lower echelon and still relatively unacculturated recruits to the bureaucracy on the one hand and the American-educated/acculturated and largely *mestisized* Filipino elites descended from the *principalia* of the Spanish period on the other. In this view, the *cacique* was “affected by political considerations more





than [by] a sense of right," viewing and deciding on matters "in the light of personal and political advantage for himself, his friends, and his party" while the efforts of the second category "have been directed towards the acquisition of increased power."⁷⁴

There was no turning back on the "Filipinization" of the civil service. Not only because of the Filipino elites' resolve to regain the status that their forbears had lost to the Spaniards and the Americans but also because of international developments. The devastating effects of World War I on the American economy on the 1920s and the anxieties brought about by the impending new world war in the 1930s, defined American receptiveness to the idea of divesting themselves of the Philippines. At the same time, trade imbalances that led to high unemployment rates and unreasonably low wages fueled the growth of radicalism. These, combined with an already simmering countryside because of exploitation in the *haciendas* of Central Luzon and the Western Visayas, became the springboard for the anti-imperialist uprising in the 1930's and the development of the leftist resistance movement.

This was the context of Wood's administration and the rise of Quezon, who was able to consolidate the support of all Filipino political parties into one unified nationalist front on the struggle for independence which went hand in hand with the "Filipinization" process. A process that however could not be reversed, the "Filipinization of the American bureaucracy" or "Americanization of Filipino bureaucrats" was completed only when independence was eventually granted. In the meantime, it was practical to retain patron-client relations with high-ranking American officials; but at the same time nurture party affiliations and public support that could be used to protect one's position of power and influence. Moreover, the government's intensified centralism before "Independence" as a reaction to the growing radicalism in the country meant delays in administrative processes and the proliferation and institutionalization of "personalized services" needed to avoid them. Since Quezon's social amelioration and economic development policy asserted state leadership over the economy, the Filipino elites were further exposed to influence peddling from the business sector comprised mostly of Chinese and *mestizo* Chinese, and thus predisposed to political corruption.





Quezon also appointed city mayors and councilmen on the pretext that the people anyway “could exercise their control through the election of the president,”⁷⁵ a decision that further cultivated patronage and spoils politics. In fact, with the introduction of the electoral system, American patronage and spoils politics had also crept into the bureaucracy. Now transformed into a system that also drew heavily from the distinctly Filipino patron-client relations, the bureaucracy would thus provide the basis for political corruption among Filipino politicians. Offices were a crucial source of means to sustain reciprocal relations with one’s constituents, relations that although exploitative on the national level, were regarded as mutually beneficial to the public official and his/her constituents on the local scene.

Thus, political corruption became a vicious cycle of grooming the public to gain access to public office; and using that hold on power to ensure the continued support of one’s constituency. In this case, the widening of one’s support base for and during elections became crucial. Thus nepotism and the accommodation of influence peddlers, mostly businessmen (some of whom also became politicians, in the “bureaucrat capitalists” mold), became expedient for purposes of reelection. Political corruption would become up to the present the most pervasive and exploitative form of corruption.

Meanwhile, bureaucratic corruption would also become pervasive. Being limited mostly to small time graft and corruption cases, its effects although cumulative should not be underestimated; but it would not be as devastating as the political corruption which involved people principally at the helm of government and governance. Filipino politicians engaged here in a “client-patron relationship” with the American occupants to obtain both power and *ginhawa* from them, offering *ginhawa* in turn as patrons of the people who as clients would accord to them the power of representation in the electoral system obtaining both on the municipal and provincial levels.

Quite obviously, this was no longer the original locus and ethos of *ginhawa* as the central binding force of the traditional community for the towns and provinces no longer acted on their own since they were now attached to an ever-widening hierarchy of patronage politics.⁷⁶ Quezon is said to have consolidated this hierarchy of clientelist politics into one





single system. And this he was able to do in the context of the “nationalist” struggle of the Filipino elites against the anti-independence Governor Wood. Through “judicious use of government regulatory and financial agencies,” he

... placed himself at a junction of interaction between the State and the private corporate sector ... [cultivating] coterie of the country’s richest American, Spanish and Filipino businessmen. In return for government contracts, loans, or regulatory intervention, Manila’s millionaires made large donations to Quezon’s Nacionalista faction and generous gifts to the President himself ... /Quezon’s wealthy backers were lavish in their support ... /All were rewarded for their generosity ...⁷⁷

In October 1926 Quezon himself revealed the “private” corruption of his political opponent, Aguinaldo, who allegedly maintained

... questionable ties with an American “carpetbagger,” Carl W. Hamilton, who allegedly used Aguinaldo as a business front with a salary of P1,000 a month. Aguinaldo was also rumored to have received a flashy Packard limousine on top of his salary. Aguinaldo’s son also allegedly got free board and lodging in Hamilton’s house in the United States.⁷⁸

Patronage was (and still is) the *condicio sine qua non* in the accumulation of political power. Elaborating on Alejandro R. Roces’ comment that with regards to graft and corruption “What we have today ... is not a departure but a continuation of the Quezonian tradition,” Alfred McCoy has pointed out that by 1941, Quezon appeared to have

... many of the attributes of President Ferdinand Marcos’s martial law regime (1972-81). Through manipulation of constitution and bureaucracy both men sought ... to perpetuate their power ... Their relentless accumulation of power at the center spawned a regime characterized by corruption and cronyism—allies won government largesse and paid lavish gifts to their presidents, opponents faced a punitive





bureaucracy Through a reinforcing manipulation of media, constitution, and government financial agencies, both gained near total control of nominally autonomous areas of the State—legislature, judiciary, economy, and local government.⁷⁹

Both politicians were indeed at the crest, historically, of an expanding wave of corruption; but the wave that carried Marcos to the top began on a higher level and the succeeding ones have increased in intensity and destructive power, becoming quasi-tsunamis by the time of Gloria Arroyo.

With independence and the official end of American colonial “tutelage,” an altogether different appreciation of government and bureaucracy is necessary. On the national level, the Spanish-Filipino elite system would continue on a larger scale and, aggravated in the face of harsher economic conditions, the propensity for graft and corruption would contaminate even lower-level Americanized public servants. Supposedly a distortion of Senate President José Avelino’s rhetorical question on how to address the immediate economic problems of the people in 1949—“What are we in power for?”—became the emblematic rationale for patronage politics and corruption during and beyond the post-war reconstruction period—*i.e.*, the acquisition and exercise of political power necessarily involve corruption and vice-versa.

Although less fraught with controversy, Sergio Osmeña’s short-lived administration (1945–1946) was for all intents and purposes just the continuation of Quezon’s with regards to corruption. While there was little occasion for it as the country was in complete shambles and government institutions still had to be reconstructed, Osmeña’s regime was also “graft-ridden.” According to David Sternberg before the election in 1945, the biggest liability of Osmeña’s administration

. . . . “was the venality of some elements of [his] official family and the scandalous misuse of the fruits of his achievement in relief and reconstruction.” Sternberg was referring mainly to the distribution of relief goods coming from army surpluses at the outset and later from direct aid dispensed through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration





[UNRRA] which by March 1946, shortly before independence, had reached \$6,000,000.⁸⁰

With independence Manuel Roxas (July 1946–April 1948) would be confronted with a higher level of corruption, also involving the Army surplus property turned over by the United States to the Philippine government. Although it was quite understandable that

. . . stealing from the government was an inevitable result of deprivation, liberation and weak protection given to surplus property dumps . . . nonetheless, the vast extent and brazen character of corruption in the disposal of surplus property engulfed the Roxas government. The scandal was so gross and visible that even Press Secretary Orendain was obliged to admit it, though he blamed the Osmeña regime for having begun the looting . . .⁸¹

Nonetheless, in Carlos P. Romulo's assessment, "presidential leniency" was also partly responsible for the corruption, for when friends, government officials and colleagues grappled for the chance to realize a profit, President Roxas looked the other way.⁸² As with practically all the scandals since the beginning of the American "tutelage" there is little if any reference to the rank and file bureaucrats; patronage and graft and corruption involved mainly the political elite. The endlessly-repeated pattern of corruption in the *Third Republic*, according to Gleeck, Jr. was thus:

. . . A new president is elected, accompanied by old friends who at once seize new opportunities to abuse their positions. Wholesale robbery is followed by vociferous media criticism, usually exonerating the man at the top, who "could not say/no to his friends" . . . Under Quirino and his successors, the president's relatives joined the cronies as beneficiaries of presidential beneficence and toleration. The single exception to this dreary and dispiriting pattern was the Magsaysay administration . . .⁸³





Misinterpreted or not, Senate President Avelino's remark was made at the time of Quirino's bid to get elected on his own as President. One of Quirino's principal legacies was "his transmission of the corruption he inherited from Osmeña and Roxas . . . [L]ike . . . [them], he found it impossible to fire his friends, to refuse favors to his financial supporters, or to discipline his relatives."⁸⁴

For M. C. P. Alfiler, corruption during Quirino's term "permeated the entire gamut of the Philippine bureaucracy, extending from the lowest level of the civil service to the top, excepting the President himself,"⁸⁵ although the generalization is rather short on details, particularly with regards to the rank-and-file bureaucracy. Even Ramon Magsaysay had problems with his people regarding the Chinese influence in political decisions. He never failed "to explode in fury when he realized that someone in his government was exploiting his office for corrupt purposes . . . [particularly in conjunction with some Chinese *compadres*]." For instance, when a Senator connected the signing of a document by the Guy to "a considerable sum of money for the Nacionalista Party in its coming Presidential campaign" Monching thundered "No!" and "hit the desk so hard with his fist that the glass top broke."⁸⁶

Quirino created an "anti-graft and investigation agency" which lasted only six months; so did Magsaysay which lasted four years and seven months. All the other presidents followed suit up to Estrada. To no avail. The administrations of Magsaysay's successors were no different from that of Quirino's. The Nacionalista party's "master no less than its creature," Carlos P. Garcia, "faithfully exercised its traditional prerogatives of patronage and plunder, though little or none of the fruits of corruption clung to his skirts; he left office, if not a poor man, then one of limited means." Lost to his friends and family was the irony of his most publicized statement on corruption: "Every man has the right to provide for his family,"⁸⁷ which the common *tao* would hardly disclaim with regards to the *ginhawa* that it was likewise his duty to provide for his own.

But Garcia's precept does not quite jibe with the Supremo's "*Ang kasipagan sa paghahanap buhay ay pagmamahal din sa sarili, sa asawa, sa anak at kapatid o kababayan.*"⁸⁸





The difference is quite clear: the *ginhawa* one seeks for one's family and fellow countrymen redounds to the welfare and well-being of the nation. For this reason, the OFW's *pangayaw* or going abroad to look for *ginhawa* for one's family (and thus also for *kaginhawah*an of Bayan) actually makes him/her truly a *Bagong Bayani*.

Garcia's administration was indeed shot through with graft and corruption. Two cases in the "tide of corruption" engulfing it may be mentioned: the GSIS and the Bureau of Customs scandals. In June 1958, GSIS checks began to bounce due to insufficiency of funds, exposing a scandal involving prominent businessmen:

. . . . Out of nearly a quarter billion pesos loaned, some of the largest loans had been made, not to GSIS employees, but to financial speculators and real estate promoters. A one million-plus peso loan went to former Iloilo Sen. Jose Zulueta . . . Joseph Arcache, a Manila businessman, applied for a P2 million only four days after Magsaysay's death and received P1,400,000 12 days later However, it was Jose Cojuangco of Tarlac who really hit the jackpot. He received a GSIS loan . . . to purchase Hacienda Luisita . . .⁸⁹

To investigate the Bureau of Customs scam Garcia chose a man of integrity, Lt. Comdr. Marcelino Calinawan who duly submitted his report which however "never saw light of day." The *Free Press* nonetheless got hold of it, revealing that there were 15 syndicates in the bureau "that control our financial and economic life." Further,

. . . . the high government officials, their wives, the flight attendants who have been smuggling millions of pesos to Hong Kong should have been exposed; but nothing has been done. They are too big and too powerful . . . the sacred cows of the administration . . .⁹⁰

Things came to such a head that the CIA secretly intervened to "look for another Magsaysay" but all it could get to support was Diosdado Macapagal who also foundered in the Stonehill scandal.⁹¹ And then, of course, came





Ferdinand Marcos. He would create four anti-graft and investigation agencies, the last one surviving sixteen years until he was hounded out of power in 1986. The following is an assessment of graft and corruption under Marcos:

His declaration of martial law in 1972 under false pretexts not only protected the fortune he had already acquired, most illicitly over the past two decades. It also served to accelerate the amassing of even more power and wealth for several more years He lorded . . . over a rapacious team of trusted friends and associates whom he had given lucrative fiefdoms in the economy They treated the Philippine treasury as if it were their personal checking account.⁹²

. . . . [However] his regime for the first four years . . . was *less* corrupt than those of his two immediate predecessors, and the turnover of the economy to the cronies took several years after martial law⁹³

Years after 1986 Marcos's "politics of plunder" might have seemed a *non plus ultra*, beyond which there would be nothing else comparable. Nobody counted on Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, particularly almost immediately after the so-called EDSA II "revolution." The early "returns" on her regime have only just begun to explode on our faces, involving as they do not just "the usual suspects." But, with President Rodrigo Duterte and the "return of the trapos," we just might be headed for the apex of all apices. We have thus arrived at a critical point in our national history where we have to bring our institutions to a much sharper focus than ever before, especially in the face of the continual attacks perpetrated upon them. The PNoy administration had begun to take this focus seriously with its anti-graft and corruption agenda, putting behind bars "big time" politicians, justices and bureaucrats as well as their conniving counterparts in the public and private spheres both at the national and local levels.

Unfortunately, limited understanding of the historico-cultural foundations of Filipino political and bureaucratic behavior has led some scholars to conclude that ours is an administrative culture of





patronage, mediocrity, ambiguity, dualism and graft and corruption.⁹⁴ Supposed Filipino traits upon which these generalizations are based—*i.e.*, *personalism*, *familism* and *particularism* or *popularism*—are in fact simplistic and stereotypical constructs lacking in socio-psychological depth and historical perspective.⁹⁵ The incongruence of Western bureaucratic values like “efficiency, rationality, equity, impersonalism, universalism and discipline” with these supposed Filipino cultural norms is recognized in studies on the Filipino administrative culture; they nonetheless fail to address several fundamental concerns.

The bureaucracy remains unfortunately elitist as a result Americanization in both practice and membership. What has been dubbed as “Philippine administrative culture and its ills” cannot thus be attributed to the Filipino. For at the core of it all is the fact that both the language and the ethos of *Bayan* are different from, if not diametrically opposed to, those held by the acculturated Filipino elites now in control of the body politic. Furthermore, both the Western-imposed political and the bureaucratic systems have not been adapted to local conditions. As a result of the “great cultural divide” obtaining between the acculturated Filipino elites and the *Bayan*, the bureaucracy has in fact become alienated from Filipino culture and the general public.

Conclusion

Three configurations of politico-administrative power and its utilization may be observed in the course of Philippine history. The precolonial sociopolitical consensus rested on the centrality of *ginhawa*, its sustenance and distribution being the basis for accepting authority. Entrusted with the common good by the will of the governed, the leader ultimately derived his political and administrative power from a manifestation of divine disposition. Accountability therefore was owed not only to popular aspirations but sprang likewise from spiritual mandate. On the other hand, the colonial view may be divided into two abruptly implanted instruments of colonial exploitation. The Spanish thrived on the idea of office as private property, while the Americans introduced the Jacksonian experiment of public office as public trust, but nonetheless worsened the practice of patronage and spoils politics.





The present elitist state thus exhibits a confluence of foreign politico-administrative systems and governance revolving around *ginhawa* which was central to *pamumunong bayan* in the past. The *pinuno-sakop* relationship was the basis for the *pinunos'* acquisition and management of *ginhawa* for sharing among their respective *sakops* in exchange for their respect and loyalty, primarily for the benefit of the entire community. This relationship would be transformed during the Spanish colonial era into the exploitative patron-client relations; and then during the American occupation into patronage and spoils politics. The organizational structures and legal forms introduced by the colonizers were the only mechanisms accessible to the *principalia* (during Spanish times), and then their progeny (constituting Filipino elites since American colonization and beyond), to reassert, consolidate and perpetuate themselves in power through elections. These are now exploited by them in ways derivative of both Spanish bureaucratic and American political corruption.

Thus corruption as we know it today started during Spanish colonization and intensified under American rule. It was initially and largely limited to Spaniards and Americans in their practice of politics-and-administration. Spanish corruption was mostly bureaucratic; with minimal occurrence in the *pueblo*, where Filipino (*Indio*) participation in the system was concentrated, mainly in a subservient capacity. Political corruption however began with the introduction of elections in the country during the late 19th century *pueblo* politics, and intensified with the American introduction of electoral exercises concomitant to "Filipinization" which opened up participation in the colonial civil service to westernized Filipinos. Unlike bureaucratic corruption which mainly involved ordinary government employees' abuse of their offices in the fashion of their colonial masters, political corruption were practiced primarily by Filipino elites, politicians whose ascent to public office through elections gave them access to "foreign" sources of wealth and power to sustain reciprocal relations with their constituents, relations that although exploitative on the national level, was an oligarchic exercise meant to perpetuate their place in the political arena.

Under the new democratic environment (particularly more so after 1935), nurturing one's constituency became an important vehicle to acquiring electoral offices; and not just collaboration with the colonizers.





Thus, political corruption became a vicious cycle of grooming the public to gain access to public office; and using that hold on power to ensure the continued support of one's constituency. In this case, the widening of one's support base for and during elections became crucial. Nepotism and the accommodation of influence peddlers, mostly businessmen (some of whom also became politicians, the so-called "bureaucrat capitalists" in communist terminology, or those who had established relations with bureaucrats either through consanguinity or affinity), became expedient for purposes of reelection. Political corruption involving Filipinos proliferated and intensified in the 20th century becoming up to the present the most pervasive and exploitative form of corruption in the Philippines. This practice of "turning one's work into a livelihood" ("*ginagawang hanapbuhay ang trabaho*") is discussed more extensively by the author elsewhere.⁹⁶

Unfortunately, despite the "incipient" formation of a national community spanning the entire archipelago and uniting the formerly dispersed and independent socio-cultural, economic and political entities, the concept of *sakop*, traditionally kinship-based and *ginhawa*-driven, would not grow to encompass territorial domains beyond localities or *balwartes*; nor would it despite movements towards nationhood both by the Filipino elites and *Bayan* since the last quarter of the 19th century. Consequently, *pananagutan* (public accountability) of a politician would not go beyond one's family and local constituency, from the smallest "*barangay*" or towns to the regions, a phenomenon which gave rise to and continue to nourish what has come to be known as "regionalism." Consequently, political parties and interest groups on the national level would be based principally on what has been called "the anarchy of families" within an elite democracy.

With the politician's *sakop* now extending beyond the clan and hometown or province, the ties that bind her/him to the broader spectrum of political support are no longer as clear and strong, lacking the earlier compulsion to reciprocate support with accountability. This serves to perpetuate political corruption as a leader would now have to negotiate his/her way into continuous alliance-building among local leaders in order to assemble a wider base of public support. In the olden days, accountability was easier to exact because law and custom grew out of





a shared language-and-culture. Being custom and tradition, laws rarely drowned people in the complexities of western language and procedure that now provide the legal shield against prosecution of the educated and wealthy.

From the present *datus* (barangay captains) and *haris/rajas* (town mayors and provincial governors, regional chiefs and cabinet members) to the bigger *rajas* and *sultans* (congressmen, senators and presidents), the primary duty is no longer *kaginhawahang bayan* or community “wellbeing” and welfare but self and family aggrandizement. Thus, the persistence and pervasiveness of corruption despite countless efforts at reform, some genuine others merely token. All of that comes as reflexes from our history. But there is also the American contribution of electoral exercises which continue to foster the detachment of the moral and religious cultural bonds that formerly held the *pinuno* and *sakop* together. Now the only way to attach *sakops* to the *pinuno* is through the money economy, to create or increase *utang na loob* (debt of gratitude). The old systems of human relations tend to be replaced by Western reciprocity, “scratch my back, I’ll scratch yours.” Thus, vote buying, political accommodation and influence peddling persist as a way of ensuring reelection for the perpetuation of political power which in turn perpetuates the culture of graft and corruption as a politico-economic system and entrenches political dynasties.

Notes

1. Abridged version of the paper presented at the PHA National Conference on “Philippine Governance: Historical Perspectives,” held at the Ateneo de Davao University on August 18, 2016, based on “The Historical Roots of Philippine Bureaucratic Attitudes and Patterns of Administrative Behavior vis-à-vis Corruption,” Chapter IV of Dr. Peñalosa’s dissertation, “HANAPBUHAY”: The Filipino Bureaucrat’s Quest For “Ginhawa” in the Workplace: Its Implications for Understanding Bureaucratic Corruption, U.P.NCPAG (2014).
2. Peñalosa, *op. cit.*
3. For a broad discussion on the three major indigenization movements in the Philippines including *Pilipinolohiya* which is not discussed in the paper but is nonetheless important, cf. S. Lily Mendoza, *Between the Homeland and the*





- Diaspora. The Politics of Theorizing Filipino and Filipino American Identities. A Second Look at the Poststructuralism-Indigenization Debates*, New York & London: Routledge, 2002. Cf. Atoy Navarro & Flordeliza Lagbao-Bolante, *Babasahin sa Agham Panlipunang Pilipino: Sikolohiyang Pilipino, Pilipinolohiya, at Pantayong Pananaw*. Quezon City: C & E Publishing, Inc., 2007; and Maria Cynthia Rose Banzon Bautista, "The Social Sciences in the Philippines: Reflections on Trends and Developments," *Philippine Review of Economics*. Vol XXXVIII, No. 1 (June 2001), pp. 92–120.
4. Zeus A. Salazar, "Ang Kartilya ni Emilio Jacinto at ang Diwang Pilipino sa Agos ng Kasaysayan." *Bagong Kasaysayan*. Lunsod Quezon: Palimbagan ng Lahi, 1999.
 5. Zeus A. Salazar, "Ang Pantayong Pananaw: Isang Paglilinaw." *Pantayong Pananaw—Diskursong Pangkasaysayan: Isang Seminar sa Pamantasang Normal ng Pilipinas*, Taft, Maynila: Tanghalang Awdyo-Biswal, Ika-26 ng Pebrero 1996. Cf. also Atoy Navarro, Mary Jane Rodriguez & Vicente Villan, *Pantayong Pananaw: Pambungad na Pag-aaral sa Bagong Kasaysayan*, Lunsod Quezon: Palimbagan ng Lahi, 2000; and Mendoza, *op. cit.*
 6. Cf. Virgilio G. Enriquez, *Indigenous Psychology and National Consciousness*, Tokyo: Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, 1989; and *Pagbabangong Dangal: Indigenous Psychology & Cultural Empowerment*, Quezon City: Akademya ng Kultura at Sikolohiyang Pilipino, 1994. Cf. also Narcisa Paredes-Canilao & Maria Ana Babaran-Diaz, "Sikolohiyang Pilipino: 50 years of Critical-Emancipatory Social Science in the Philippines" in the *Annual Review of Critical Psychology 10: Critical Psychology in a Changing World: Building Bridges and Expanding the Dialogue*, pp. 765–783.
 7. Ledivina V. Cariño (ed), *The Philippine Social Sciences in the Life of the Nation. Vol 2: Enriching Each Other: The Encounter of the Social Sciences and Other Branches of Knowledge*. Quezon City: PSSC, 2001.
 8. Nilo S. Ocampo, *Katutubo, Muslim, Kristyano: Palawan, 1621–1901*. Kolonya, Alemanya: Bahay-Saliksikan ng Kasaysayan, 1985.
 9. Leon Ma. Guerrero, "Del Pilar," *The Philippines Free Press Online*. philippinesfreepress.wordpress.com/tag/marcelo-h-del-pilar/ (3/24/2013).
 10. Marcelo H. del Pilar, *La frailocracia Filipina*. Barcelona: Imprenta Ibérica F. Fossas, 1889.





11. Jose P. Rizal, *The Indolence of the Filipinos*. Translated by Charles Derbyshire. [joserizal.nhccp.ph/Writings/ Other/indolence.htm](http://joserizal.nhccp.ph/Writings/Other/indolence.htm) (3/22/2013).
12. *El filibusterismo*. Cf. also Aurora Roxas-Lim, "The Ideas of Gregorio Sancianco: A Blueprint for Economic Development in the Nineteenth Century Philippines," *Asian Studies Journal*, XXXIV (1998), 78–97.
13. Charles Henry Cunningham, *The Audiencia in the Spanish Colonies as Illustrated by the Audiencia of Manila (1583–1800)*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1919, pp. 141–143.
14. Fedor Jagor, *Travels in the Philippines*. London: Chapman and Hall, 1875, p. 233.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 240.
16. Norman Owen, *Prosperity without Progress. Manila Hemp and Material Life in the Colonial Philippines*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984, p. 5 and O.D. Corpuz, *An Economic History of the Philippines*. Q.C.: U.P. Press, p. 128.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*
19. Carlos Quirino, *The Young Aguinaldo: From Kawit to Biak-na-bato*. Manila: Aguinaldo Centennial Year, 1969.
20. James Warren, *The Sulu Zone, 1768-1898. The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast-Asian Maritime State*. Hawai'i: University Press, 2008, 420 pp.
21. "Civic Ritual and Political Reality: Municipal Elections in the Late Nineteenth Century," Ruby R. Paredes (Ed), *Philippine Colonial Democracy*, Manila: ADMU Press, 1989, p.25.
22. Elizabeth Medina (1998), "The Congress of the Centennial, Valladolid, Spain" as cited in Eric C. Batalla, De-institutionalizing Corruption in the Philippines: Identifying Strategic Requirements for Reinventing Institutions. [http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/ groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan013117.pdf](http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan013117.pdf) (3/22/2013).
23. Z. A. Salazar, "Wika ng Himagsikan, Lungguwahe ng Rebolusyon. Mga Suliranin ng Pagpapakahulugan sa Pagbubuo ng Bansa." *Bagong Kasaysayan*. Blg. 8, Lunsod Quezon: Palimbagan ng Lahi, 1999.





24. According to Zeus Salazar, "Elite" refers to that Westernized segment of Filipino society comprised of those educated through the English educational system, and who, having internalized American culture, have alienated themselves from the general population. They are distinguished from "Bayan" in their language, norms, beliefs and values system that are recognizably Western. "Bayan" on the other hand (in contrast "masses") refer to the relatively unacculturated majority who have retained much of the way of life of their forbears. Foreign or cultural borrowing in their hands are shaped by their way of life.
25. *Casaysayan: Pinagkasundoan; Mga daquilang cautosan*. Enero 1892. Archivo General Militar de Madrid: Caja 5677, Leg. 1.37.
26. Milagros C. Guerrero *et. al.*, "Andres Bonifacio and the 1896 Revolution," *Sulyap-Kultura* (Pebrero, 1996), pp. 3-12.
27. Zeus A. Salazar, *Agosto 29-30. Ang Pagsalakay ni Bonifacio sa Maynila*. Lungsod Quezon: Miranda Bookstore, 1995.
28. Jacinto in Salazar, *Ang Kartilya*, pp. 78 & 98.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
31. Guerrero, *loc. cit.*
32. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
33. Cesar Adib Majul, *Mabini and the Philippine Revolution*. Q.C.: U.P. Press, 1996, p. 168.
34. Danilo Reyes, *A Search for Heritage: An Analysis of Trends and Contents of Public Administration Literature at the U.P. College of Public Administration, 1952-1992*. Dissertation. U.P. CPA (1995).
35. *Ibid.*
36. Like his classic *Revolt of the Masses: The Story of Bonifacio and the Katipunan* (1955), Teodoro A. Agoncillo's equally classic *MALOLOS. The Crisis of the Republic* (Quezon City: U.P.Press, 1960) is mainly a narrative history in the nationalist-ideological-political historiographic tradition not an institutional one, so that there is practically no mention of topics like graft and corruption.
37. "How Filipinos elected town officials in the 1800s" In: GOTCHA By Jarius Bondoc (The Philippine Star). <http://www.philstar.com/opinion>



/2013/05/13/941417/how-filipinos-elected-town-officials-1800s (9/11/2013).

38. Simeon Villa, *Aguinaldo's Odyssey: as told in the diaries of Simeon Villa and Dr. Santiago* Barcelona. Manila: Bureau of Public Libraries, 1963.
39. Asia Finest Discussion Forum, KKK (Katipunan) treasures- source of wealth of the Cojuangco dynasty?, The General Antonio Luna—Donya Ysidra Cojuangco scandal. [#http://www.asiafinest.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=225538&start=0&p=4460090](http://www.asiafinest.com/forum/index.php?showtopic=225538&start=0&p=4460090) &#entry4460090 (9/12/2013).
40. Majul, *op. cit.*, p. 285.
41. *Ibid.*, pp. 285–86.
42. Ruby Paredes, "Introduction: The Paradox of Philippine Colonial Democracy," Paredes (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 1–12. In Paredes's view, the "clientelist technique of analysis" shows that "[s]omewhere in the middle ground between the colonial chronicles . . . and the nationalist . . . [epic of] heroic resistance, Filipino politicians and American administrators meet, wheeling and dealing in a way that would make their respective hagiographies most uncomfortable" (p. 11). This is a political science view. In *Bagong Kasaysayan* historiography (*supra*), it was the separation of the elites from Bayan which threw them into a clientelist relationship with the Spanish and subsequently the American colonialists in pursuit of their individual-personal and/or class *ginhawa*. This transformed their original relationship with their sakop towards the *kaginhawahan* of the entire Bayan into "patronage" of their *sakop* in order to function within the colonial dispensation.
43. Reyes, *op. cit.*
44. 1905 Supreme Court Decisions. IBP: Celebrating 40 Years, 1973-2013. [1905V86] THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RAMON MELENCIO, defendant-appellant. G.R. No. 1214. D E C I S I O N. MAPA, J.
45. LT AMZI B. KELLY. MARCH 3, 1930. SECTION A, PLOT 1E, GRAVE 11H. <http://www.cvcra.org/content-profiles-of-veterans/10.%20LT%20AMZI%20B%20KELLY.pdf> (8/21/2013).
46. Luis Teodoro, "Decriminalizing libel. Towards true self-regulation," *IN MEDIAS RES. A Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility Blog*. Date of Retrieval: III-23-2013; *Cf. also: Today in History*. philippine-islands-lemuria. blogspot.com/2011/01/19-january.html (3/23/2013).



47. Lewis E. Gleeck, Jr. *The American Half-Century (1898–1946)*. Revised Edition. Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1998, p. 158.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 152–153.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 193–194.
51. Peter Stanley, *A NATION IN THE MAKING. The Philippines and the United States, 1899–1921*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1974, p. 229.
52. Letter of Harrison quoted by Gleeck, Jr., *The American Half-Century*, p. 194.
53. *Ibid.*
54. Jose N. Endriga, “Historical Notes on Graft and Corruption in the Philippines,” *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, Vol. XXIII, Nos. 3 & 4 (July-October 1979), pp. 253–254.
55. Charles Edward Russell, *The Outlook for the Philippines*. New York: The Century Co., 1922, pp. 158-159; also cited in Jaime B. Veneracion, *Merit or Patronage. A History of the Philippine Civil Service*, Q.C.: Great Books Trading, 1988, p. 103.
56. Romeo V. Cruz, *America’s Colonial Desk and the Philippines, 1898-1934*, Q.C.: U.P. Press, 1974.
57. Joseph Ralston Hayden, *The Philippines. A Study in National Development*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1950, p. 91.
58. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
59. Cf. James R. Arnold, *The Moro War. How America Battled a Muslim Insurgency in the Philippines*, New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011, p. 228 *et seq.*
60. Official Gazette. Memorandum: Carpenter Agreement, March 22, 1915. <http://www.gov.ph/1915/03/22/memorandum-carpenter-agreement-march-22-1915> (8/22/2013).
61. “HARRISON, FRANCIS BURTON (1873-1957). Champion of Filipinization,” *Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopedia. From Angkor to East Timor*. Edited by Ooi Keat Gin. E-book: Santa Barbara, California, 2004, p. 563.
62. Stanley, *op. cit.*, pp. 240–241.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 241.





64. *Ibid.*
65. *Ibid.*, pp. 241–242.
66. Gleeck, Jr., *The American Half-Century*, p. 239.
67. Stanley, *op. cit.*, p. 244.
68. The LAWPHil Project. Arellano Law Foundation. Philippine Laws and Jurisprudence Databank. Republic of the Philippines. Republic of the Philippines. SUPREME COURT. Manila. EN BANC. G.R. No. 12109 December 1, 1916. THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMZI B. KELLY, defendant-appellant. *Amzi B. Kelly in his own behalf. Attorney-General Avanceña for appellee.* JOHNSON, J.: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1916/dec1916/gr_12109_1916.html (8/28/2013).
69. Gleeck, Jr., *The American Half-Century*, p. 197.
70. *Ibid.*, pp. 197–198.
71. Veneracion, *op.cit.*
72. Examples are by Herbert L. Health, A. Stiver, John W. Green and Victor C. Hall of the Robert Dollar Company and A.B. Cresap of the Luzon Brokerage Company.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
74. *Ibid.*
75. Veneracion, *op.cit.*, p. 121.
76. Alfred McCoy, “Quezon’s Commonwealth: The Emergence of Philippine Authoritarianism,” In: Paredes (Ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 120, 140.
77. *Ibid.*, pp. 132, 134.
78. Samuel K. Tan, *1921-1930. The Critical Decade.* Quezon City: CSSP Publications, 1993, pp. 83–84.
79. McCoy, *loc. cit.*, pp. 117–118.
80. *The Milwaukee Journal.* Thursday, March 28, 1946, p. 3.
81. Lewis E. Gleleck, Jr., *The Third Philippine Republic, 1946-1972.* Q.C.: New Day Publishers, p. 64.
82. Carlos P. Romulo, *Philippine Presidents: Memoirs of Carlos P. Romulo with Beth Day Romulo.* New York: Cellar Book Shop, 1989, p. 79.
83. Gleleck, Jr., *The Third Republic*, p. 64–65.



84. *Ibid.*, p. 142.
85. "Administrative Measures against Bureaucratic Corruption. The Philippine Experience," *Philippine Journal of Public Administration*, XXIII: 3-4, p. 323.
86. Gleeck, Jr., *The Third Republic*, p. 64-65.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 209.
88. Andres Bonifacio, "Katungkulang Gagawin ng mga Z.L.I.B." Dekalogo ng Katipunan ng mga Anak ng Bayan, sa Teodoro A. Agoncillo at S.V. Epistola, eds, *The Trial and Writings of Andres Bonifacio*. Maynila: Manila Bonifacio Centennial Commission at Unibersidad ng Pilipinas, 1963.
89. Gleeck, Jr., *The Third Republic*, p. 237.
90. *Ibid.*, pp. 237-238.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 234 *et seq.*
92. Belinda A. Aquino, *The Politics of Plunder. The Philippines under Marcos*. 2nd Edition. Quezon City: U.P. CPA, 1999, pp. 120-121.
93. Gleeck, Jr., *The Third Republic*, p. 328.
94. Amelia P. Varela, *Administrative Culture and Political Change*, Q.C.: CPA & U.P. Press, 1996, pp. 299-312.
95. Contrary to these findings of the Bulatao-Lynch school of "pakikisama" or SIR (Smooth Interpersonal Relations), studies in Sikolohiyang Pilipino since the 1970's have already proven the complexity of Filipino behavior. In fact, while one can easily identify a host of negative Filipino attitudes, there are also equally valued positive Filipino traits and values, all of which revolve around the central Filipino concepts of "loob" and "kapwa." The simplistic enumeration of values in the manner of Jocano disregards other traits for which the Filipino is known, such as "pagkamakabayan," "kalinisan ng loob," "pagkamatulungin," "pakikiramay," "kasipagan" and "katapatan."
96. Peñalosa, *op. cit.* Cf. also, Ma. Carmen V. Peñalosa, "FILIPINO GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES' SEARCH FOR 'GINHAWA' (Wellbeing*) IN THE WORKPLACE: Social Acceptance and Tolerance for Bureaucratic Practices that may be Construed as Corruption following Western Bureaucratic Norms and their Implications for Public Human Resource Management." 2016 Eastern Regional Organization of Public Administration (EROPA)-Civil Service Commission (CSC) Conference, Manila Hotel, 10-14 October 2016.



Regulating the Opium Contract System in the Late-Spanish Philippines: The 1896 Iloilo Inspection Reports

FERDINAND PHILIP F. VICTORIA
Mentari Intercultural School, Jakarta, Indonesia



Abstract

As the flame of the 1896 Philippine Revolution was engulfing the island of Luzon, a small party of Revenue Inspectors of the Spanish colonial government was busy conducting its inquiry regarding blatant violations of the outgoing contractor of the Iloilo-Antique opium franchise. However, it was not so much as the nature of the violations that stood out but rather the response it generated from the central government that reflected the inherent weaknesses of outsourcing such private contracting ventures by the nineteenth-century colonial state.

The focus of this paper is to analyze the 1896 findings and situate it within the larger context of the privately-run opium franchising system in the late Spanish Philippines. It argues that although the monopoly was usually a lucrative venture for contractors, one contributing factor to its success as a business venture was the laxity in the implementation of the rules regarding the opium contract system of the Spanish colonial government. The goal of this analysis of the inspection reports could be compared to what historian Ashley Wright argues in her study of the opium regime in British Burma, that is “to obtain a better understanding of the nature of the relationship between opium regulation and the exercise of imperial power” (Wright 2014, 77). The clash of views between the colonial officials and the opium contractor in the case of the Iloilo-Antique franchise offers an interesting case study of how power between the colonial government and contractors was contested and renegotiated over the consumption of a substance that assured a steady revenue source for Spain during its years of decline in the Philippines.





Introduction

As the city of Manila was placed on alert at the eve of Jose Rizal's execution, a Spanish functionary named Benito Perdiguero was busy writing a recommendation to his superior. He proposed a review of the implementation of the privately-run opium monopoly contracts in the colony. Since the establishment of the monopoly in 1843, the opium contractors were required to license *fumaderos de anfon* or opium-smoking establishments and that these places were to be supposedly publicly open to the colony's legal clientele- the ethnic Chinese.

However, an investigation conducted by a small party of Revenue Inspectors of the Spanish colonial government in mid-1896 in the city of Iloilo revealed what they thought were blatant violations of the contract terms committed by the outgoing contractor of the Iloilo-Antique opium franchise. As it turned out, of the 100 licensed *fumaderos* authorized by the contractor, more than half were granted to concessionaires who were allegedly operating them clandestinely—that is—away from the prying eyes of the general Chinese consumer. What stood out was not so much as to the nature of the contractor's alleged violation but rather the response it generated from Perdiguero: the central government had tacitly tolerated the existence of these privately-licensed dens throughout the colony for such a long time that contractors had grown accustomed to the practice and the colonial state had ostensibly given these places quasi-legal status. The Iloilo investigation addressed the elephant in the room. "[It] seems," wrote Perdiguero, "that the time has come for the Superior Authority of the Islands to deliberate on this matter" and formally allow licensed *fumaderos* to operate privately for the eventual benefit of the colony's finances (NAP 1896a, 27-27b).

The focus of this paper is to analyze the 1896 findings as compiled in the inspection reports for the Iloilo-Antique opium franchise and to situate the incident within the larger context of the privately-run opium franchising system in the late Spanish Philippines. It argues that although the monopoly was usually a lucrative venture for contractors, a contributing factor to its success was the laxity of the Spanish colonial government in implementing strictly the contract terms of the opium franchise. The Iloilo incident was but one of the ways by which contractors





contested and renegotiated the central government's management of the colony's opium regime. Perdiguero's acknowledgment that the government tolerated the practice of allowing contractors to grant opium-smoking licenses to private individuals or groups reflected the inherent weaknesses of outsourcing such ventures by the nineteenth-century colonial state.

The goal of this analysis of the inspection reports could be compared to what historian Ashley Wright argues in her study of the opium regime in British Burma, that is "to obtain a better understanding of the nature of the relationship between opium regulation and the exercise of imperial power" (2014, 77). In this case study, the clash of views between the investigators and the opium contractor's network of interlocutors in this incident involving the Iloilo-Antique franchise offers an interesting glimpse of how these spheres of governance and influence were contested and renegotiated between the colonial government and contractors over the consumption of a substance that assured a steady revenue stream in the last days of Spain's Pacific empire.

Before proceeding to the discussion, a few points are in order. The term 'regime' as used will be based on the definition made by historians Timothy Brook and Bob Wakabayashi in their collection of essays called *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839–1952* "to signify a system in which an authority declares its right to control certain practices, and develop policies and mechanisms to exercise that right within its presumed domain." By imposing conformity to "policies that are profitable to it in the public realm" it allows one to "highlight the systematic and comprehensive character of drug-control structures and to stress their capacity for operating in the political realm" (2000, 4–5).

Also highlighted in the article is the revenue farming system, with opium being one of the most lucrative supply-and-service contracts in nineteenth-century Southeast Asia. Defined by the Southeast Asian scholar Howard Dick as "the sub-contracting by the state to private interests of the sovereign right of tax collection" the system was supposedly a transitional institution created to allow the state to consolidate its administrative capability through an alliance of convenience with the local business elite (1993, 3).





Opium consumption in nineteenth-century colonial Southeast Asia, including the Philippines, was at one point or another indirectly taxed by regimes through the opium revenue farm, as referred to by specialists in the history of opium such as Carl Trocki (1990, 1999, 2000), James Rush (1990), Hans Derks (2012, 401), and more recently Ashley Wright who described it as “a system of organizing opium sales and collecting opium revenue” (2014, 23). These regimes, in general, auctioned off the exclusive right to private individuals or groups to import, process and sell opium for smoking at retail within a designated territory for a set term. In exchange for the fixed monthly rent or payment to the government already set by the winning bid, the concessionaire or contractor also acquired the right to issue licenses to interested retailers (Trocki 2000, 80-81). The outsourcing of this right to private entrepreneurs enabled the colonial government to reallocate valuable human, logistical and financial resources as it would have “in effect [hired] a bureaucracy and, to some extent, a police force” (Dick 1993, 3). As the Filipino nationalist Jose Rizal put forward this observation through one of his characters in his novel *El Filibusterismo*, this arrangement “produces for the government, without effort of any kind” a steady revenue stream to support its state-building projects. This would be accomplished without significant outlays from the colonial government (Rizal 1891, 111). This view squares neatly with Derks’ claim that reliance on revenue farming was not so much as to increase income but rather to have a more predictable and regular source of income through taxation of its subjects (2012, 403).

Although indeed monopolistic in nature, it is more apt to describe opium revenue farming as a type of private concession or franchise than the term opium monopoly. This was because in colonial Southeast Asia, the management of opium monopolies underwent two phases: the opium revenue farm (which was privately-run) and the government monopoly (*Opium Regie*) system that supplanted it. The latter system was established, albeit in various forms, in French Indochina (1883), Netherlands East Indies (from 1894), Siam (1907) and the Straits Settlements and Malaya (1910) (Brown 1993, 241; Diehl 1993, 206; Nankoe, Gerlus and Murray 1993, 182; Taylor 1967, 321-323; Trocki 1990, 214; Trocki 1999, 153-155). Although the Philippines was considered to be an exception as





the American regime which rejected the government monopoly option by adopting a high license approach in 1906 that eventually led to total prohibition in 1908, the scholar Hans Dirks claims that this was “in fact, an *Opiumregie* system, including heavy taxation plus free opium trade” (Trocki 1999, 95; Derks 2012, 564).

Wright explains that from the state’s viewpoint, the monopoly aimed to achieve two objectives: “to limit the amount of opium available, by restricting the number of sellers, while increasing government revenue by the sale of the licenses” (2014, 23). As Butcher also points out, however, as the colonial bureaucracy may not have the capacity to collect the revenues themselves, the delegation of taxation powers would be at the expense of both the state’s revenue and the regulations it imposed (Butcher 1993, 37). While certain restrictions were in place as to whom, where and how opium was to be consumed, as in the Philippine case, the state usually did not curb nor limit the volume of opium consumption for the legal user. So long as the contractor (the opium revenue farmer) complied with the contract terms, he was largely given a free hand in addition to some law enforcement support.

On the other hand, the opium contractor’s motive was to generate maximum profits as far the contract would allow by marketing it, interdicting smuggling by blackmarketeers and even agents of rival contractors, as well as keeping prices high in order to recoup the cost of the license and the overhead expenditures from transporting and processing opium to the hiring of managers and spies. When not spurred by rivalry, contractors also leveraged their position before the state by boycotting auctions when the cost of the license was too high to force the government to lower the bid (Rush 1990, 43-82; Trocki 1990, 167-177; Wickberg 1965, 115-116; Wright 2014, 23). While opium revenue farming was a viable administrative solution from the government’s perspective, it created an *imperium in imperio* situation as it undermined its own sovereignty and by delegating its powers of coercion, created a shadow bureaucracy of managers and enforcers (Butcher 1993, 37; Dick 1993, 5-6). Opium revenue farming thus “placed a great deal of political and economic power outside the direct control of the state” (Wertz 2013, 468).





While there are a range of instances where these contestations of power played out throughout the life of the opium revenue farm in the Philippines, the 1896 Iloilo Inspection Reports offer a glimpse of one such dynamic between the Spanish colonial government and the opium contractor. The dispute lay in interpreting what was thought to be a contract provision that seemed to be honored in the breach- the question of whether licensing opium consumption in private spaces was permissible. Although the early opium contracts did allow for private consumption, later contracts stated that opium was to be consumed only in publicly-licensed opium-smoking establishments or *fumaderos de anfion*. Despite the stated specifications and a claim that the Chinese consumers were actually consuming opium privately beginning in the late 1860's, no legal action nor policy revision was undertaken by the colonial government to address this. The *modus vivendi* policy of tolerating private consumption of opium was reinterpreted to mean that being publicly-licensed meant that a private space could be used as a *fumadero* provided that the license and the supply were obtained legally from the contractor. That the practice was apparently more honored in the breach as a way of accommodating and increasing consumption reveals the consequence of this *imperium in imperio* arrangement and the inherent weakness of the colonial state in delegating its control and supervision of an addictive substance at the regional and local levels.

The discussion will first provide an overview of the evolution of Spanish opium regime in the Philippines. A brief sketch of the general characteristics of the Philippine opium revenue farm system and how this fit in with its emergence in Iloilo follows. Finally, details of the reports' findings will be presented and analyzed in terms of its implications on Spanish opium policy and beyond.

Creating the Spanish Opium Regime

The Philippine opium revenue farm system was known in Spanish through various names. Colonial officials and legal documents called it the *Estancamiento del Opio* (Opium Monopoly), *Contrata de Anfion* (Opium Contracting or Opium Franchise), *Renta de Anfion* (Opium Concession)



or *Servicio de Arriendo de los Fumaderos de Opio* (Opium-smoking Establishment Licensing Service). While the first three terms placed an emphasis on the exclusivity of supply and distribution rights to opium in a territory, the latter term highlighted the authority to sub-contract rights to interested retailers by issuing licenses to publicly operate opium-smoking establishments (*fumaderos de anfion* or *fumadoria de anfion*) where opium can be exclusively bought and consumed. To convey the idea that the supply-and-service private concession was indeed sanctioned by the Spanish government in Madrid, the institution was called *Real Asiento de Opio* (Royal Opium Concession) (Comenge 1894, 153; NAP 1857; NAP 1868; NAP 1884; NAP 1887; NAP 1896a; see Figure 1).

The concession catered only to a specific group, the immigrant Chinese coming mostly from Southern China. Chinese immigration gradually accelerated in the second half of the nineteenth century after the Spanish colonial government adopted a series of policies intended to promote economic development and profitability. The Chinese population in the




Photo of an opium receipt dated 15 April 1868 signed by the Manila opium contractor Alejo Felix to Tan Toco, who bought 3 tahils for use in the Binondo *fumadero* the latter operated. He also bought 1 tahlil the previous week. A tahlil weighs 1.3 ounces or 36.85 grams. (NAP 1868)

Figure 1. Photo of an Opium Receipt



Philippines surged from just 5,700 in 1847 peaking to around 90,000 in the period 1876 to 1886. By 1894, only 48 percent of the 50,000 Chinese were residing in Manila, suggesting an outward migration and settlement to the provinces (Wickberg 1965, 59–61). Although the Spanish government's hope was to have Chinese laborers work in the agricultural or plantation sector somewhat similar to that in Malaya and Singapore (Trocki 1990, 78–86; Trocki 1999, 137–149), Chinese economic activity in the Philippines eventually became predominant in the areas of retail trade of export crops, revenue farming and brokering coolie labor (Wickberg 1965, 62–63).

It was in sixteenth-century Southeast Asia that opium trading and consumption patterns would undergo a profound change with global ramifications. Although opium was already known in China for a long time and was believed to be traded as a luxury item along the Southeast Asian maritime route, the introduction of tobacco to Southeast Asia and China either by the Portuguese or the Spanish prior to 1570 made it into what the historian George Souza calls a transformed and a transformational commodity. Opium, it turns out, can be smoked. Whereas previously opium could only be ingested by chewing, swallowing or through a solution, inhaling or smoking opium mixed with tobacco and herbs meant that “the lungs with a different physiological capacity in handling and delivering the drug's narcotic properties produced an enhanced reaction for users and the doses that could be consumed were increased” (Souza 2009, 116). This Southeast Asian tobacco-opium-herbal blend became known as *madak/madat* or *tike* in Java and the Malay Peninsula. (Rush 1990, 30, 54; Trocki 1999, 37, 188; Dikotter, Laamann and Xun 2004, 32). It quickly made inroads into Taiwan and mainland China, leading an eighteenth century writer named Zhu Jingying to believe that the “opium smoke is from Batavia [Jakarta], Luzon and other ocean countries” (Zheng 2005, 26, 45). *Madak* smoking became so popular that Zhao Xuemin, another Chinese who also thought that it came from Luzon, noted that it was now preferred over an inhaled stimulant called *Agua de Guce* (Alvarez 2015, 279).

By the eighteenth century, opium smoking spread among the poorer classes of Chinese, coinciding with the shift to pure opium smoking and expansion of the opium trade. In Java and the Straits Settlements, the refined/processed opium was called *chandu*. (Trocki 1999, 35–37).





Compared to *madak* that bore only 0.2 percent morphine (opium's main active chemical), *chandu* may have contained from 9 to 10 percent morphine (Fay 1975, 8). In Tagalog, it was called *apiyan*, a cognate of the Chinese term *yapian yan* or opium smoke (Rizal 1890, 217–218; McMahon 2002, 34). Although the Spanish formal term for opium was *Anfion*, other terms used for *chandu* were *opio cocido*, *opio preparado* or *opio confeccionado* (Balanza 1855, 153, 172, 174; Balanza 1858, 104). In the Philippine case, opium was supposed to be consumed in the publicly-licensed *fumaderos*.

The Chinese regarded opium as medicine, providing relief from diarrhea, dysentery, sunstroke, coughing, asthma, pains and other ailments. By the late 1400's, however, opium was thought of as an aphrodisiac and later developed as a recreational commodity used in social gatherings¹ or as a work drug that deadened pain and therefore gave the feeling of vigor (Zheng 2005, 12, 21). Opium smoking also became a distraction for the migrant consumer cope with personal vicissitudes such as diseases, homesickness, the need for camaraderie or the need for sex or a substitute for one (Chu 2012, 145, 150; Montero y Vidal, 1876, 196, 204; Rush 1990, 35; Trocki 2000, 87, 91; United States War Department 1905, 150; Warren 2003, 237–257; Zheng 2005, 149).

The earliest Spanish official opium policy dates to 1814 when Governor-General Jose Gardoqui, alarmed at the proliferation of the clandestine and “pernicious” use and trade in opium, decreed a ban on its cultivation, trading and smoking throughout the colony. A regulative regime slowly emerged, however, beginning with the authorization to cultivate the opium poppy in 1828 with the goal of making the colony a major producer and exporter of opium to China (Comenge 1894, 155–156, 164–165). Supporters of the proposal to cultivate the opium poppy like Manuel Pizarro Bernaldez, Rafael Diaz-Arenas, Robert Macmicking and the renowned Spanish diplomat and ‘China expert’ Sinibaldo de Mas pointed out that Manila's proximity to the Chinese mainland meant a lot of potential revenues if ‘Philippine Opium’ can be made more available compared to Indian opium which took a longer time to ship. However, the plan eventually came to naught. The reason given was that there was no suitable site for the plantation near Manila. However, Diaz-Arenas





bewailed the government requirement for the private investor to pay a 25 percent export duty as a measure that will surely discourage investment. (Victoria 2018, 147–149). There seems to be some evidence that the Manila merchant Domingo Roxas may have experimented with opium poppy cultivation although it apparently did not prosper. De Mas also commented as early as 1843 that the Chinese have been illegally smoking opium in their homes already (Permanyer-Ugarteandia 2013, 444, 588). In a later work, he expressed that the real reason for the continued resistance by the Bourbon court was due to the prevailing fear that cultivating the opium poppy would make it easier for the native population to illegally obtain it and would further make them lazier. To the contrary, having them smoke opium “would create a new necessity and would certainly push them to work harder to acquire the means to pay for it” (Mas 1853, 34).

An 1832 petition was submitted by two Christian Chinese, namely Vicente Chun Yeo and Juan Pablo Ong Gamco, for the establishment of a place where opium smoking and gambling activities may take place. They argued that continuing these prohibitions will not be effective as both vices serve as forms of after-work recreation and that since the Chinese were accustomed to them, would not present a public health threat. Elements that would form the future terms of the opium concession twelve years later were inspired by this proposal such as the three-year contract term with payments in equal installments, the Chinese-only rule, the licensing of places and law enforcement support. Opposition to this view was communicated by Manila’s Fiscal of the *Real Hacienda* (Royal Treasury) who thought that allowing it would just increase the number of “aficionados” who would eventually be financially ruined (Permanyer-Ugarteandia 2013, 438, 574–577). The Queen Regent Maria Cristina eventually rejected the proposal in 1834 because the proposal was “contrary to public health, the law, and even good manners” (Berriz 1888, 69). The position taken by the Spanish court towards opium at this time was understandable as it was viewed as a moral question which was at the core of Spain’s imperial claim as a Catholic empire that was bound to safeguard its subjects. However, the colony still tried to make money from import/entrepot duties by allowing the relocation of thousands of Portuguese-owned opium chests from its Macao facility, reducing the duty





and even providing free warehouses as China embarked on its opium crackdown in early 1839 that would eventually lead to the First Opium War (Permanyer-Ugartemendia 2013, 438, 561–562).

Nonetheless, the opium consumption policy continued to be reviewed by the colonial government. The Intendant Juan de la Matta recalled submitting proposals to former Governor General Marcelino Oraa to consider opening the *fumaderos* to increase revenue-collection measures from the Chinese as it was observed that the Chinese sailors consumed opium at the Alcaiceria de San Fernando where the government required them to spend the night. In turn, a commission was created to study this proposal culminating in the 1843 decision of Governor General Francisco Alcalá to the establishment (apparently acting without prior authorization by Madrid) of the opium revenue farm but only for the exclusive consumption of the ethnic Chinese (AHN 1844; Permanyer-Ugartemendia 2013, 447–448, 593–597). Alcalá justified the decision for three reasons. First, the granting of opium concessions was being practiced by the “civilized nations” and by doing so it would not tarnish Spain’s reputation. Second, it aligned with the goal of improving the colony’s economy through a stable source of revenues. Third, it still disallowed unauthorized gambling, thus separating the two activities of opium smoking and gambling. Lastly, it seemed like a realistic compromise given that continuing prohibition will always “fail in the hands of determined Chinese” and will encourage the smugglers or *contrabandistas* (Comenge 1894, 153–154). This decision of Alcalá was upheld by Madrid in 1847, further directing the colonial government to continue exploring the possibility of opium poppy cultivation and production along the lines of the tobacco monopoly “as a new source of State revenue” as well as setting an import tax ceiling of 40 pesos per opium chest “or less” should the colonial leadership deem it so (Berriz 1888, 69–70).

When the first Opium Concession opened on January 1, 1844 under the Chinese mestizo businessman Don Ciriaco Bautista, the concession was good for a six-year period. From an opening bid of 13,000, he paid 22,100 pesos for it. Moreover, the *fumaderos* were first located within the Alcaiceria de San Fernando- a warehouse complex in Binondo (Buzeta y Bravo 1851, 225, 238; NAP 1851; Permanyer-Ugartemendia 2013, 451).





By 1850, a petition made by the new contractor to expand the scope of the concession to cover a single bloc of provinces and major cities was granted, paving the way for its eventual spread throughout the colony. This was because since the ethnic Chinese had begun emigrating to the provinces as restrictions began to be relaxed in 1839. The revenue farm covered the cities of Manila, Cavite and Zamboanga (where a trading colony was established) as well as the provinces of Bataan, Batangas, Bulacan, Laguna and Pampanga. Madrid upheld the decision but reminded the Governor General to ensure that the contractor will not abuse the system nor allow the opium habit to be acquired by the native population (Berriz 1888, 70; Wickberg 1965, 53, 58, 115).

The Manila contractor who successfully lobbied for the opium revenue farm's expansion was Matias Saenz de Vizmanos y Regidor (1828-?). A registered merchant and an officer in the colonial militia, Saenz de Vizmanos served as secretary for the *Real Sociedad Economica de Manila* in 1833. He had close links with, the opium trading company Jardine Matheson from 1839 to 1842. After winning the 1850-55 contract he managed to wrest his third six-year contract for which he paid 259,000 pesos from the opening bid of 222,000 pesos. (Camba 1839, 49, 55, 71; Diaz-Arenas 1850, 8; Buzeta y Bravo 1851, 225; NAP 1857; Permanyer-Ugarteandia 2013, 374-375; 417). It is interesting to note that given the vast scope of Vizmanos' jurisdiction, the only way that the sale and collection of revenues could be effectively undertaken was for the government to accord him several concessions.

One example was the appointment of sub-contractors (*subarrendadores*) and agents (*comisionados*). The sub-contractors managed the processing and distribution of the opium to the *fumadero* operators while the agents were basically tasked to provide support to the sub-contractors and protect the interests of the revenue farm from smuggling. From 1851 to 1853, all of Saenz de Vizmanos' seven sub-contractors were ethnic Chinese with two that had Christian names. Moreover, of the total of thirty-six agents deputized most were assigned to other provinces such as Pampanga (13), Bulacan (5), Tondo (5), the areas of San Pedro Makati (5) and Santa Cruz (1) as well as Manila/Intramuros (2). Since it was the contractor himself who assumed most of the risk and was accountable to the central authorities,





it is most likely that the subcontractors were persons he trusted. In the case of Pampanga, only the sub-contractor hailed from the province while the agents were from Tondo (NAP 1851–1853).

Another concession was the way the payment schedule was prorated as evidenced by the 1856–1861 contract. From 30,000 pesos in the first year, the payments rose by 2,000-peso increments up to the third year and then 4,000 pesos from the fourth year, reaching 46,000 pesos by the final year of the contract. This allowed Vizmanos to adjust into the business from the beginning. Another reason was because Clause 9 of the contract imposed a ceiling to the price of opium at ten *reales* per tahl.² The most interesting part of the contract was Clause 22. This authorized the contractor to allow rich Chinese (“*Chinos pudientes*”) to enfranchise their residences (“*en sus casas*”) as smoking areas provided that the homeowner provided the address, the number and frequency of clients visiting the place (NAP 1857).

However, as Chinese migration into the colony increased and with their dispersal into the provinces, the opium revenue farms also evolved. The concession’s opportunity for growth was already circumscribed by the presence and affluence of the Chinese consumer. It became incumbent for the colonial government to encourage Chinese immigration and adjusted regulations that achieved that goal if opium was not accessible to the Hispanized natives. The most immediate outcome was the break-up of the single bloc of market into smaller, provincial-level jurisdictions depending on Chinese presence and its financial viability. Moreover, the contracts were mostly set for three-year periods and the prorated payment schedule was abandoned in favor of equal installments. However, as evidenced by a late 1860’s Manila contract, Clause 22 was amended and now explicitly prohibited opium consumption at home or in any parts thereof “other than the establishments made out for this purpose” (NAP 1869). As will be seen in the case of the Iloilo-Antique concession, the definition of how these designated spaces were interpreted as a form of accommodation or policy adjustment would be one of the disputed issues raised in the inspection reports.

By 1864, a debate raged over the adverse health and social effects of opium smoking, prompting a policy review.³ Citing evidences provided





by the renowned Spanish doctor Pedro Mata and most likely Sinibaldo de Mas (who was not named in the document), the review panel resolved to retain the opium farm system and the ban on non-Chinese users (Jagor 1875b, 325). Since there was no contrary medical evidence that proved opium use was a health threat, the Council argued that to reimpose the total ban would run counter to the economic goals of the colonial regime:

The Chinese have certainly come to our archipelago in the expectation that they would be allowed to smoke opium here. Were we to suddenly ban opium, as had been done in the past when we punished the Chinese with fines and imprisonment, most of the Chinese living in Manila would be in jail or altogether abandon the islands. It would not be right and unjust; and we should certainly not allow it to happen. At the present such a policy is inappropriate and politically unwise. We want to enter into agreements with China and facilitate trade. What would the Chinese government say if we dealt with their subjects this way? . . . For the Treasury, the opium revenue is indispensable. (Jagor 1875b, 326)

Indeed, the opium revenue became an integral part of the colony's finances and kept it financially solvent. It is also important to note that unlike the case of Malaya, Singapore and Java, the Philippine case appears to follow what Carl Trocki identifies as the urban farm pattern as the Chinese clientele had more ties in trade and retail in port cities like Manila and Iloilo (Trocki 1999, 152; Permanyer-Ugartemendia 2013, 450). However, it should also be pointed out that substantial opium concessions such as the Cagayan-Isabela, Nueva Ecija and Albay franchises were associated with particular cash crops, the first two with tobacco and the third with abaca hemp. Some Chinese did become abaca producers themselves while Chinese moneylenders, traders and retailers acquired tobacco-producing lands or bartered their goods in exchange for tobacco (Wickberg 1965, 96-101). Combined with the other revenue farms (cockpits and slaughterhouses to name a few), it plugged the income gap in the post-tobacco monopoly period. Opium occupied a third of the income of the revenue farm system in 1884 but rose to half almost ten years later. The





highpoint of its share of revenues generated was reached in 1894 when it comprised 4.4 percent of the total collections. In fact, from 1866 and even until the Philippine Republic's adoption of the opium concession system in 1898, the projected and actual opium revenues never sank below six-figure digits (Victoria 2015, 143; Victoria 2018, 158). The Manila contract was the largest concession in terms of value. From a starting bid of 13,000 pesos, Ciriaco Bautista won the contract by paying 22,100 pesos. Revenues collected from both import duties and the contracts from 1844 to 1852 were estimated to be 21,269 pesos annually (Permanyer-Ugartemendia 2013, 448, 451). From the government's opening bid of 222,000 pesos during the 1855 auction, Saenz de Vizmanos was able to outbid three rivals by paying 259,000 pesos for the 1856-1861 contract, which covered the bloc of five provinces and three cities. By the late 1860's the contract was revised to a three-year term and just covered Manila. The opening bid was already pegged at 378,000 pesos. The value had already reached 532,127 pesos by the time of the 1890-1893 contract. It is also worth noting that Vizmanos' son- who was also named Matias Saenz de Vizmanos y Lecaroz (1856-1919) was also associated with the Manila contract at around this time (NAP 1857; NAP 1869; Wickberg 1965, 116).

Even the conservative Rafael Comenge grudgingly acknowledged the contribution of opium revenues by pointing out that aside from bringing the colony out of poverty, it also paid for the whole colonial justice system "from the justice of the peace (*alguacillo*) up to the Registrars of Property and Notaries" (1894, 162-164). When in 1901 the American government later met with the local elites to discuss the municipal code, some of them acknowledged that the opium revenues could become a stop-gap measure in funding the reorganized local governments (US War Department 1901, 143, 154). However, Philippine opium revenues were paltry in comparison to its Southeast Asian neighbors. Opium revenue farms accounted for 22 percent of the French income in Cochinchina in 1877. Singapore's revenues from opium were 70 and 66 percent in 1892 and 1893, respectively. It was 18.8 percent in the Kingdom of Siam (Thailand) in 1902. The Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia) opium accounted for 18 percent of the total revenues in 1895. Even British Burma's similar exclusionary opium regime collected an average of 8.5 percent from 1861 to 1885 (Trocki 1990, 188; Brown 1993, 233; Diehl 1993, 208; Derks 2012, 404; Wright 2014, 158).⁴





In short, the Spanish government was not heavily dependent on opium revenues.

The regulation of the opium concessions fell on the *Intendencia General*- the government body tasked with financial management and revenue collection. Both Manila-based merchants and businessmen in the provinces competed in separately-held auctions for that right, which at least from the late 1860's was limited to three-year terms. The opening bid was usually based on the previous contract's value. A contractor was given authority to sub-contract the service, deputize agents (*comisionados*) and request assistance from the Revenue Guards (*Resguardos*) and the municipal police (*Cuerpo de Carabineros*) in interdicting smugglers. These vast powers may have also translated into economic gain. One oft-cited estimate suggests that the contractor could net a profit of at least 10 per cent of the contract price which was earned from distributing processed *chandu* to his licensed retailers and possibly through the sale of the licenses. Prospective contractors also resorted to boycotting auctions whenever they thought that the contract was overvalued to which the government would respond by bringing down the contract price to an acceptable level, usually on 5 percent increments. At times, competition was fierce and would drive up the price. Since opium was an addictive substance, it was not surprising why bidders formed partnerships ostensibly to combine resources in order to outbid their rivals. The Philippine case has parallels with the 'battle of the kings' of Java and the 'opium syndicates' of Singapore and Malaya (Wickberg 1965, 115-118; Rush 1990, 43-64; Trocki 1990, 151)

However, just as the tangible and intangible rewards that came to being a contractor were great, so were the risks. The substantial mobilization of capital required to bid, organize the logistics, implement and enforce the opium contract was high considering that he himself had to set up his processing center/laboratory and distribution network. It was in these laboratories or factories where the imported raw opium ball weighing 1.5 to 1.8 kilos was boiled, refined and repackaged in tin cans to become *chandu* before it was distributed to the retailer. An 1886 report pegged each opium ball as weighing 1.8 kilos while an 1887 estimate claimed that a ball produced 26 tahils. This would have meant that between 30 to 50 percent of the raw opium's mass was lost during





the refining process (NAP 1886; NAP 1887, 23–24). The *fumaderos* were to be opened exclusively for the Chinese public until ten in the evening and were expected to be properly maintained and cleaned and not inconvenience the public. Conspicuous signage written in both Chinese and Spanish were required to be placed in public view. The contractor was also tasked to enforce compliance with the licensees in ensuring that no Spaniards, natives, mestizos, drunks, armed persons and gamblers were allowed inside. The contractor also deposited a bond that was 10 percent of the contract that was at times assumed by associates. He was also liable to pay the difference for any shortfall on the remittance. The contractor also ran the risk of being held liable for colluding in smuggling activities which incurred a permanent ban on opium contracting, not to mention a fine. In order to ensure compliance, licensees were issued permits as opium was dispensed by the contractor, who in turn, was to keep a ledger that monitored consumption. Moreover, opium transported outside of Manila was to incur an extra surcharge of 40 pesos per chest. Contraband opium was also a constant problem, especially when there was a lack or glut of supply. Rival contractors whose tenures were about to end could, in theory, dump illegally-acquired opium in the neighboring province or become blackmarketeers themselves. These assumed risks and threats to the profit margin meant that it made sense why the opium contractor had to surround himself with trusted individuals, business partners or front men to ensure that the contract remained profitable or when possible, collude with other bidders in boycotting auctions when the contract was overvalued (NAP 1869a; Wickberg 1965, 115–118; Bamero 2006, 59–66).

One way of mitigating these risks was for contractors to enter into strategic partnerships or associations, in order to create what Trocki calls a ‘syndicate’ of businessmen and their network. Not only did this concentrate and mobilize the financial resources needed for a capital-intensive venture, it also spread out the risk and used as leverage when going on the offensive against rival groups. These businessmen would have also been involved in other ventures. For the Chinese contractors, acquiring this status would have meant legitimation of the informal power and influence they negotiated and wielded within Philippine colonial society. Even bondsmen or front men posing as bidders stood to gain from such a network. In the case of the Vizmanos group of 1851, the sub-contractors





all had Chinese names but only two of them- the Batangas and Bulacan concessionaires- did not hail from those provinces but were Tondo-based. Most agents were assigned locally but a few were assigned to other areas or provinces (NAP 1851–1853; Wickberg 1965, 117–118; Trocki 1990, 76, 161). Another example was the group of Mariano Fernando Yu Chingco, Joaquin Tan Angco and the Spanish Eulogio Mendoza. Together, they controlled the Leyte-Samar and Cavite concessions in 1890. Yu Chingco (–1913) or Yang Zunqin was a *gobernadorcillo* associated with the expansion of the La Loma Chinese cemetery in 1878 when he purchased additional land for the cemetery. He was a close ally of Carlos Palanca Tan Quien-sien and played a role in the establishment of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce. Among Tan Angco's business interests involved operating a sugar refinery (Chu and Ang See 2016, 73–74; Wickberg 1965, 96, 118, 185; Wilson 2004, 177).

One of most dominant group of opium concessionaires in the 1880's and 1890's, however, was the group of Ramon Aenlle (–1900), Matias Lecaroz Saenz de Vizmanos and Carlos Palanca Tan Quien-Sien (1844–1901) who were linked with the Manila contract that included the district of Morong. Don Ramon Aenlle was a Spanish businessman who held opium contracts in various provinces in the early 1880's and later became a representative of Don Ramon Verzosa's Manila concession in the latter half of the 1880's. He became the Secretary of the Agricultural section of the Central Council for Agriculture, Industry and Commerce (*Junta Central de Agricultura, Industria y Comercio*) under the Department of Economic Development (*Fomento*). In addition, he established a commercial firm, Aenlle y Compania that served as the Manila agent of the Cavite and Bulacan contractors. He was also the owner and manager of the Maria Cristina Cigar Factory and later became mayor of Manila (NAP 1886; NAP 1887; Directory 1888, 581, 592; NAP 1892; MGH 1900; Wickberg 1965, 118). Vizmanos was the son of the 1851 Manila contractor and was himself involved in the concession. He also became the managing partner of Aenlle y Compania who oversaw the sale of the Maria Cristina Factory in 1901 after the death of Aenlle (RP Supreme Court 1904). Tan Quien-Sien (Chen Qianshan), who was also known as Tan Chueco or Chuey Liong was one of the most prominent Chinese businessmen during this period and one of these interests was managing the opium concessions in Bulacan, Pampanga





and the Binondo opium factory. He also acted as a representative for Aenlle y Compania. Palanca would be one of the petitioners for the establishment of a Chinese consulate in 1886 and was named consul *ad interim* in 1898. He also tried to open negotiations for the continuation of the opium franchise with the Aguinaldo government and 1900 was reported to be in control of the opium business in American-controlled Manila. The three were also, at one point or another, involved in the prosecution of smuggling cases (PRP 1898; Crafts 1905, 208; Alejandrino 1949, 227; Wickberg 1965, 199-201; Bamero 2006, 60; Chu 2010, 79, 81, 128-143). From the above examples, one can see how business partnerships played a crucial role in ensuring the continued viability of the opium concessions. As will be seen below, a similar dynamic existed with the Iloilo-Antique opium franchise.

Despite the amended condition that opium smoking-houses were to be made conspicuous and open to the public, this appears to be a provision that was more honored in the breach. Jagor cites a confidential report written by Governor General Jose de la Gandara that revealed that even with the 478 opium dens in the colony in 1867, there were still “hundreds of Chinese individuals” who allegedly brought opium to their homes for consumption since the dens “were always filled with Chinese” (Jagor 1875b, 326). This could have been a reflection of social stratification among the ethnic Chinese. Writers such as Jose Rizal, Jose Montero y Vidal and Rafael Comenge perceived well-off Chinese households with its “peculiar odor” and was even served at parties as a form of hospitality or as a form of distraction from the vicissitudes of life. Montero y Vidal and Rizal noted in their fictional works how easy one gained access the drug. That the native Capitan Tiago, for example, was not only able to freely enter a *fumadero* despite the prohibition but had his opium delivered to him in person by Padre Irene was a commentary on the weakness of the colonial opium regime in strictly observing the regulations of the concession. (Rizal 1891, 168; Victoria 2018, 161-177).

Comenge provides us with a glimpse of these *fumaderos*. He described the distinctiveness of those in private homes and the public ones. “There is nothing seedy about an opium den in a private home,” he wrote. “To the contrary, it is a seductive and mysterious place with sweet shadows.” He described in vivid detail the opulent motif of such places which are





decorated by curtains, paintings of birds and flowers and a dragon tapestry to top it all. One is met by a distinct odor that makes one nauseous.

The area where smoking is leisurely done has only but two beds, two narra floorboards with white Sumatran mats and rattan headrests as soft as feather pillows. An oblong table divides the two platforms and on it is a lamp with its light softened by a colored screen, an opium porcelain jar or tin (O-jun) and two pipes (O-junché): two clarinet-like tubes with silver inlays and onlays . . . (1894, 145)

By contrast, he characterized the public *fumaderos* as that quintessential space characterized by filth and unworldly gloom:

a stable, various bamboo *lancares* [beds], some wooden benches, flames burning in glasses of coconut oil and a collection of cadavers with blue and ash-colored clothes. The air can be quite sour, in it float all the bad odors emitted from a base of rotting fish and opium extract [*chandu*]: all constitute an asiatic perfume, the Orient in general, which is capable of putting in place and overcoming the more resistant nerves. (Quoted in De Viana 2001, 146)

And, as if to highlight their ambience:

[There are] no paintings nor canvasses: the storks and pheasants have all flown away. Roses, daisies, lotus flowers have not decorated the gloomy lounge. Only a something of a rag covers the platform and illuminating the darkness through the clouds of smoke, are the glow of the lamps.

Several times we have watched with disgust these human herds, frozen by opium, sleeping on a hard bed, thousands of reclining men enjoying themselves. And, considering that contradiction between the body's state of rest and the fire of one's vain soul, we concluded that imbecility is the proper way to happiness. (Comenge 1894, 151; see Figure 2)





Opium smokers pose for this photo attributed to the Frank Carpenter Collection in the Library of Congress. The photo identifies the illegal *fumadero*'s location at Malinta Street, taken around 1924 (US Library of Congress, 1924). Comenge thought that it was shameful for statesmen to consider how "those mummies, those pigsties can become revenues for the Treasury" while the "Chinese willingly consent to their humiliation as they gladly pay the tax and they do not more or less, have to make a fuss about the drug" (1894, 151, 164). Non-medical opium use was outlawed in the Philippines in 1908, kicking off the modern-day regime of criminalizing the drug user.

Figure 2. Photo of a Manila *fumadero*, c. 1924

Comenge also gives us a clue on the price of opium in the 1890's. Depending on one's age and temperament the initial effect usually sets in at the first or second pipe for the first-timer. "A dose of a single pipe consists of just three puffs and is not enough to any smoker," he writes. "The vice is expensive because one pipe costs a half-peseta.⁵ You need to be rich to repeat and get to smoke three, five or even twelve or more pipes" (1894, 148).

Although the colonial authorities required the contractors to submit lists of licensed *fumaderos*, we are only able to sketch a broad picture as to the extent of their operations throughout the colony. Governor General Gandara reported that there were 478 *fumaderos* in the colony in 1867 and around this time there were at least twelve opium concessions in existence of which there were three types. First were the single-province concessions





of Bataan, Batangas, Bulacan, Cavite, Laguna, Manila (including Tondo), Nueva Ecija, Pampanga and Tayabas. The second type were the multiple-province concessions that had two or more provinces combined as they had a small or more dispersed Chinese clientele. These included Ambos Ilocos (Ilocos Norte and Sur) and the Yslas Visayas concessions that were made up of Cebu, Iloilo and Antique. The third type are what I call the frontier concessions because their scope was limited to Spanish-controlled settlements along the colonial frontier of which Zamboanga fell under. It may be recalled that the City of Zamboanga was part of the Vizmanos bloc from 1851 to 1862. Afterwards, however, the Zamboanga concession was separated and expanded to include the areas of Basilan, Pollok (Cotabato) and the Rio Grande de Mindanao (Pulangi River) where an active riverine trade existed (Victoria 2018, 152). The Zamboanga concession had 7 *fumaderos* in 1870; the Ilocos Norte- Ilocos Sur combined franchise had 15 and 17, respectively; Albay had 61 in 1884; Nueva Ecija had 74 in 1882 while the neighboring Cagayan-Isabela concession had 40 *fumaderos*. Finally, 56 of the 100 *fumaderos* of the Iloilo-Antique concession were located in Iloilo city proper alone in 1896 (NAP 1870; NAP 1874; NAP 1882a; NAP 1884a; NAP 1896b).

It is possible to come up with an informed estimate as to the number of opium consumers in the colony despite the absence of hard statistical data. One method of calculation that was employed could be seen in an 1888 report that tried to determine the size of the consuming public. The study took the estimated number of Chinese in Manila and the six neighboring provinces and made the assumption that 15 percent of them were users. The figure arrived at was 4,617. If one were to apply the same formula to Chu's estimate of 66,000 Chinese in 1886, then there would be around 10,000 Chinese consumers. Even assuming that we could account for the non-Chinese users, the figure is still way below the proposed 15,000 estimate as suggested by Juan Gamella and Elisa Martin, based on 3.1 gram-a-day rate of consumption (NAP 1888a; Gamella and Martin 1992, 78; Chu 2010, 6). The report also made an estimate of the number of opium balls that could be allocated for that population based on the assumption that there were 26 tahils of extractable *chandu* for every ball. This leads to an average daily consumption of 1/3 tahlil or 12 grams of *chandu*. Consuming this amount of opium as one study suggests translates into an absorption





of 80 milligrams of morphine which is indicative of drug dependence or addiction (Kramer 1979, 247–256).

Both Rizal and Comenge critiqued the colonial opium policy. For Rizal, it was the antithesis of progress, as his description of the addict Capitan Tiago whom he called “the monster of the vice” showed (Victoria 2018, 133–179). For Comenge, the humiliation and the “poisoning” of the Chinese had become a source of income, and made the Spanish no better than the English. He also thought that a “contribution imposed against vice would be an honest contribution- a tax which arises from vice itself is a disgrace.” Nonetheless, the opium revenue is in a way a “lien on foreigners, and for the natives this offers a certain satisfaction knowing that the Chinese pay a large tax on opium smoking by strong-arming them” (Comenge 1894, 151, 164).

It is through an understanding of the historical context behind the opium revenue farming system in the Philippines that enables us to situate the Iloilo Inspection Report. The motivation of encouraging Chinese immigration to boost the economic fortunes of the colony provided the impetus behind the revenue farm. The sustained expansion of these concessions provided a crucial revenue stream that balanced the colony’s finances. The adoption of an exclusionary policy on use was the attempt of the colonial state to provide a veneer of its image as protector of the native population but at the same time created a type of racial separation determined and identified by a commodity. By doing so, the state was able to retain a semblance of control over the bodies of its inhabitants. While this limitation legally restricted the concession’s full potential for growth, it also served to curb the array of discretionary powers of the contractor which functioned like the head of a quasi-sub state. Or did it? We shall see below how that semblance of the state’s control was brought to bear and negotiated upon in the hands of the contractor and his network.

The Emergence of the Opium Revenue Farm in Iloilo

A brief narrative of this incident has been discussed in Edgar Wickberg’s classic survey on the Philippine Chinese (1965, 118–119). His short overview was based on a cursory analysis of a dossier compiled by the Intendencia General. The file now forms part of the Iloilo province’s *Anfion* compilation at the Philippine National Archives. The Iloilo volume,





however, is quite limited in providing information on the farm's evolution. Another limitation is that the conditions in Antique province are not discussed. That said, we first turn to a discussion of the ethnic Chinese presence in Iloilo before looking at the report's contents.

Iloilo province traditionally formed part of a node of commercial activity in the Visayan region linking China with Sulu and the Moluccas. By the eighteenth century, there was a shift from the shipbuilding industry to local textile production. The town of Iloilo was linked with Jaro and Molo. When Iloilo was opened to foreign commerce in 1855, the demographic, social and economic transformations that followed significantly altered life in the region. In 1859, British Vice-Consul Nicholas Loney reported that 30 of Molo's established Chinese merchants were business partners or agents of Manila-based Chinese import-export wholesalers, indicating that their ties went beyond the local and regional. With the internationalization of Iloilo and the emergence of the sugar industry, the port now became a center of sugar exports in the Visayas and some headmen established their operations in Iloilo and Cebu. Since some exports can now bypass Manila, this spelled the end of the mestizo-run shipping business and the local textile trade (Wickberg 1965, 76-77; McCoy 1982, 301-302).

In the seventeenth century, there were more than 100 Chinese married to local women and were based in Molo, which was the mandated *parian* (Chinese quarter) of the Western Visayas. Their mestizo offspring developed a prosperous trading economy by shipping goods and native textiles. A new wave of Chinese immigration entered Iloilo City after 1855. From 32 in 1857, there were now 1,995 Chinese adult males, 79 children and 10 women in 1895 living along what is today's Iloilo's Chinatown. Aside from that, there were 250 men and 6 women living in the provincial towns. Chinese immigrants thereafter managed import-export wholesaling and retail trade in the province (Wickberg 1965, 76-77; Omohundro 1981, 15; McCoy 1982, 301, 310). In short, the economic policies of the latter half of the nineteenth century had the effect of creating a surge in Chinese presence in Iloilo and its surrounding areas. In turn, this created the demand for opium among the Chinese in the area.

Sometime during the late 1860's, an 'Islas Vizayas' opium concession was already in existence and covered the provinces of Iloilo, Antique and Cebu. The contractor was the merchant Don Ygnacio Rocha He was a





member of the *Comite de Reformadores*, a group of reformist intellectuals who supported Governor-General Carlos Maria De La Torre's regime along with his artist brother Lorenzo. He headed a commercial firm named Rocha y Compania (NAP 1869b; Chronicle 1877, 375; Corpuz 1989, vol 2:9; Schumacher and Cushner 1969, 488–491). From a cursory investigation of the *Anfion* files, the Cebu farm seemed to have been detached in the 1870's, with the provinces of Iloilo and Antique retained as a single concession perhaps because the latter had a few Chinese consumers in the area. From here, one is unable to determine the succeeding contractors. However, the chain becomes clearer in the 1880's when we have the following concessionaires' names, who were all ethnic Chinese: Tan Janco (c. 1884), Sebastian Yap Tangco, Yap Tamco or Yap Tanco (1890–1893), Don Jose Enrique Yap Joco (1893–1896) and Ong Caosay (1896–?). In the case of Tan Janco, he appears to have deputized two persons to run the farms per province (NAP 1884b). The 1896 Reports focus on the period where Yap Joco ended his tenure in running the franchise.

We know very little about Yap Joco. He appears to be a business partner or an agent of Francisco Manzano Yap Tico, who ran a hemp and sugar exporting firm under his name and was based in Iloilo (Wickberg 1965, 88). We definitely know more about Yap Tico. He appears to have established a substantial presence in Iloilo due to the expanse of his business interests in the 1880's and 1890's that the historian Alfred McCoy credits him as the only one who was "equal in stature to the major European or mestizo merchants" (McCoy 1982, 310). The Hokkien merchant expanded operations to Manila and Cebu and also became a Saigon rice importer (Doeppers 2016, 115–116). He may have been the same person who in 1886, was among the four merchant leaders who petitioned for a Chinese consulate to be established in the Philippines (Wickberg 1965, 216). An 1888 Hongkong business directory bears this evidence as his firm was the only one with a Chinese surname. In the 1894 edition of the directory, one finds Yap Joco's name under the firm but Yap Tanco and Caosay were not listed. This suggests that Yap Joco was already associated with Yap Tico on or around the time that he was running the opium contract. However, the 1899 edition of the same directory also included Yap Joco but now added on a "S. de la Torre Yap Tamco" and Caosay as part of the said firm.





The 1896 Report identifies him as the Chinese Sebastian de la Torre Yap Tanco who was the same person who ran the 1890-93 contract. He was described as an *encargado* or manager of the *Real Asiento de Opio* office (Directory 1888, 602; 1894, 433; 1899, 559; NAP 1896a). While it could be suggested that running the opium farm was Yap Joco's separate investment from that of Yap Tico, it would be highly unlikely given Yap Tico's economic clout. As Yap Joco and Yap Tico were part of the company and given the capital requirements of managing a territory, it is more likely to conclude that Yap Tico's firm was somewhat involved in exercising control of the farms throughout the 1890's.


We do have an idea of how substantial was the Iloilo-Antique farm concession. In April 1901, Juan De Leon, a judge of the court of first instance in Iloilo, reported before the visiting Philippine Commission about the sourcing of Iloilo's revenues. He reported that in the past, the Iloilo franchise generated 30,000 pesos (presumably annually) and compared with the four other tax streams (cedula, forestry, urbana and forestry), comprised around 4.2 percent of revenue collections. From 1890 to 1893, Sebastian Yap Tanco's concession was valued at 96,716.70 pesos. At the conclusion of this tenure, there was a very significant jump of more than 20 percent in the contract's value as Yap Joco only managed to snag the contract now valued at 117,025 as against a rival bidder. He only won not because he offered the higher amount but that the rival made a clerical error in stating the bid properly. When Ong Caosay obtained the contract in July 1896 from Yap Joco (who was timely in his payments), the value of the three-year contract only very slightly increased at 117,325 pesos, suggesting that there was still money to be made within the territory of opium concession (NAP 1893; NAP 1896c; US War Department. 1901, 131). In contrast, the Cagayan-Isabela contract for 1892 to 1895 was worth 81,200 pesos (Wickberg 1965, 116). When the American government took over the Philippines and briefly liberalized the entry of opium imports to the Philippines, 7,700 pounds or 3.5 percent of it went to Iloilo in 1900 and jumped to 20,013 pounds or 5.4 percent the year after. Although the opium would have been distributed in areas outside Iloilo, this nonetheless indicates the presence of a substantial market in the region (US War Department 1905, 165-167).



The Iloilo-Antique monopoly, as reported by Yap Joco at the conclusion of his contract in April 1896, had 100 licensed opium dens. Of these, 98 were in Iloilo Province while only the towns of Antique and Tibiao had one each. (see Table 1.) In Iloilo, the highest concentration was in Iloilo town

Table 1. Towns in Iloilo and Antique with opium consumers, 1896 and 1903

ILOILO				ANTIQUE			
Town	Number of <i>fumaderos</i> April 1896	Number of documented users 1903		Town	Number of <i>fumaderos</i> April 1896	Number of documented users 1903	
		Filipino	Chinese			Filipino	Chinese
Ajuy	4	2	3	Antique	1	1	1
Balasan	1			Barbaza		1	1
Banate			3	Bugason		16	10
Barotac Nuevo	1		1	Culasi		2	12
Cabatuan	1		2	Guintas			1
Dumangas	2	3	3	Guisijan		3	2
Estancia		3	5	Laua-an		2	4
Guimbal		3	3	Pandan		4	4
Iloilo*	56	110	527	Patnogon		9	3
Janiuay	3		3	San Jose		3	23
Jaro	13	8	24	San Pedro		4	1
Jordan			4	Sebaste		1	
La Paz		4	11	Sibalon		6	3
Leon			2	Tibiao	1	24	8
Maasin			1	Valderrama		1	1
Mandurriao			3	Sources: NAP (1896b); US War Dept. 1905, 150, 156.			
Miagao	1		3				
Molo	9	35	28				
Oton	1		20				
Pototan	4	3	5				
Santa Barbara		2	2				
Sara	2	6	6				
Tigbauan	1						
Zarraga		1	2				



Map 1. Iloilo and Antique Fumaderos, 1896

Towns with Fumaderos under the Yap Joco opium concession:

- | | | |
|------------------|----------------|-------------|
| A. Balasan | G. Iloilo City | M. Tigbauan |
| B. Sara | H. Jaro | N. Miagao |
| C. Ajuy | I. Janiuay | O. Hamtic |
| D. Pototan | J. Cabatuan | P. Tibiao |
| E. Barotac Nuevo | K. Molo | |
| F. Dumangas | L. Oton | |

Source: NAP 1896b • Template courtesy of ESRI ArcGIS

(56), followed by Jaro (13) and Molo (9). In Iloilo town proper, around half or 26 of them were located along Real Street, now J.M. Basa Street, where Chinatown is located (NAP 1896b; McCoy 1982, 310). Although the actual number of opium users in the Iloilo-Antique concession in 1896 could not be established, a 1903 report gives us some indication of the extent of consumption. Of the 1,896 Chinese living in the province,⁶ more than one-third or 658 were opium consumers mostly based in the same three towns. The report also claimed that 170 Filipinos- 93 males and 77 females were also using opium, or one percent of the 14,000 residents of the town in 1903 (US War Dept 1905, 129, 157). When one juxtaposes the lists from 1896 and 1903 in Table 1, some level of corroboration is established as the towns with high Chinese use were also the areas identified with high numbers of *fumaderos* in 1896.





The *Dramatis Personae* of the Iloilo Inspection Reports

Let us now turn to the contents of the report. The dossier is composed of inspection reports conducted by two groups of Intendencia investigators. There were two visits. The first one was done by Julio Martinez de Velasco from May 9–19, 1896. The second was conducted by Amaro Lopez from 27–28 August 1896 (NAP 1896a). Aside from Yap Joco and the two inspectors, there were other persons who formed the *dramatis personae* of the reports.

Julio Martinez de Velasco was with the Inspection and Investigation Section of the Intendencia. His rank was *Auxiliar Oficial Tercero clase de Administracion*. (Guia 1895, 450–451) He may have been the same ‘J.Martinez’ listed as *Auxiliar* and the Secretary of the Junta de Sanidad of Iloilo province (Directory 1894, 429).

Amaro Lopez y Perez was an *Oficial Segunda Grado de Administracion* connected with the *Ordenacion de Pagos* or Disbursement/authorization office. (Guia 1895, 452) At the time of the 1896 Report, he was the *Secretario de la Inspeccion* of Iloilo province. (NAP 1896a)

Martinez and Lopez were accompanied by their respective clerks, Numeriano Alejo and Gavino Sepulveda, respectively. Alejo was already the Senior Inspector *primera clase* at the time of the 1896 Report (NAP 1896a). Sepulveda was an *Aspirante Tercera clase* (Guia 1895, 453). It is not clear whether he was the same Gavino Sepulveda (1869–1939), the Cebuano revolutionary (Bersales 2013).

Benito Perdiguero was an *Oficial Cuarto Grado de Administracion* (Administrative Officer IV) connected with the *Ordenacion de Pagos* or Disbursement/authorization office of the *Intendencia*. He was also a voting board member (*Vocal de Eleccion*) of the Casa de Moneda as the *Jefe del Negociado del Aduanas*. A librarian and bookseller, he worked as the archivist-librarian of the *Museo-Biblioteca de Filipinas* from 1890 to 1895, the forerunner of today’s Philippine National Library. He returned to Spain in 1898 (Guia 1895, 452, 464; Hernandez 1996, 340, 345–346).

Venancio Concepcion, the lawyer representing Yap Joco, was later appointed as a representative for Iloilo in the Malolos Congress and Councilor for Capiz in the Federal State of the Visayas. He later became a





Venancio Concepcion was the representative of the outgoing Iloilo-Antique opium concessionaire Jose E. Yap Joco who claimed that private opium licenses were only being handed out to persons trusted by his superior. (NAP 1896a; "Diary," n.d.)

Figure 3. Photo of Venancio Concepcion.

general and fought in the Philippine-American War. During the American period, he was appointed President of the Philippine National Bank but was tried and convicted over a controversial loan (RP Supreme Court 1922; "About Venancio"; see Figure 3).





The Reports

The Reports do not explain the reason why the inspection was undertaken but in the standard opium contracts, the contractor was required to provide a list of licensed *fumadero* operators and their addresses (Clause 14) and that government agents were empowered to undertake such inspections (Clause 18). Clause 19 required signs in both Spanish and Chinese languages designating the *fumaderos* to be displayed conspicuously (NAP 1869). What follows is the account of the inspection of the licensed *fumaderos* of the supposedly outgoing contractor Jose Enrique Yap Joco that comprises the file under the Inspection and Investigation Section of the Intendant General of the Treasury. It is classified under *Anfion: Iloilo*, Book 1, Exp.8 which includes only 24 pages of documents (NAP 1896a).

The first round of inspections commenced on May 9, 1896. It was led by Velasco and accompanied by Sepulveda as the secretary. The investigation was suspended on May 20th on what appeared to be Velasco proceeding to Manila. The second round was continued by Lopez and accompanied by Alejo from 24 to 31 August 1896, whence afterwards Lopez was relieved of his duties and consequently, the Inspection ended on 03 September 1896.

In the first inspection, Velasco and Sepulveda formally commenced their investigation at the offices of the *Real Asiento de Opio* accompanied by an official (*teniente mayor*) of the Chinese community (*Gremio de Chinos*). The stated objective was to determine whether the *fumaderos* were compliant of the contract terms. They first requested the manager of the place, Sebastian de la Torre Yap Tamco to produce identification. However, Yap Tamco claimed that his tax certificate (*cedula de capitacion*) was still with the government, which the *teniente mayor* vouched for. In addition, he also claimed that being only the office manager of the *Asiento* premises, he was not empowered to speak on matters pertaining to the contract. At this point, Don Venancio Concepcion (who was Yap Joco's attorney) intervened and claimed authority to discuss matters and then accompanied the inspectors. The party then visited one of the *fumaderos* in Calle Real under a certain Uy Quienguy. The inspectors noted the absence of the required signage. Concepcion explained that ever since the opium





franchise was set up, it was an 'observed custom' not to put up a lot of conspicuous signs where opium is sold, a practice he claimed was followed in Manila and other provinces. However, in compliance with the terms, Chinese characters were painted onto the outer wall of the *fumadero*, primarily indicating the location of the smoking area since that was what the clients were really interested in.

There was a gap of the Velasco-Sepulveda inspection for it took more than a week before the record of the visit commenced. On 19 May 1896, the party (this time without Concepcion or any *Asiento* representative) proceeded to visit the *fumadero* marked number 82 registered under the name of Po-Pangco. The group found that the room was located at the backroom of a hardware store (*quinalla*). The Chinese manager was not Po-Pangco which was confirmed by the *gremio* official. They then went to a textile shop along Real Street owned by a certain P. Valeriano Lim Junco, of which the smoking room was located at the back room of the shop's interior. When requested for proof, the owner showed a certificate marked 'Fumadero No. 14' registered under a certain Uy Limco, who was currently in Manila. However, the inspectors noted that 'Fumadero No. 14' was registered under a Yap Diengco who was supposedly a licensee located in the town of Ajuy, Iloilo. They visited another *fumadero* at 29 Real Street registered as 'Fumadero No. 19' under a certain Co Chuypitco which was likewise located at the backroom of a textile shop owned by the Chinese J. Marcelino Tan Dico. The information was consistent with the list.

The initial findings must have been communicated in Manila but did not prevent the adjudication of the contract in favor of Ong Caosay that July (NAP 1896c). As the Philippine Revolution was underway in Manila towards the end of August, the Lopez-Alejo team departed for Iloilo and commenced the formal rounds on 27 August, 1896. Like the previous team, Lopez and Alejo met at the *Asiento* office with Venancio Concepcion along with Yu Duna, an official representing the Chinese *gremio*. The party first proceeded to a huge *fumadero* along Rojas Street that was approximately 7 to 8 *brazas* (48 feet) long and 4 *brazas* (24 feet) wide. The inspector then noted the absence of the prescribed signage. The manager named Lim Quejin (Lim Quesin) explained that the doors of the premises did indicate such although only in Chinese characters. When asked why Quejin's license (Number 34) did not match the record ('Number 3'), Concepcion explained





that there was a mix-up in the sequencing of the said list provided to the inspectors.⁷

They then visited a *fumadero* located at No. 25 Real Street which was located at a *quincailleria* managed by Francisco Chua Teco. The manager presented the license for 'Fumadero no. 16' owned by a certain Go Tiengco who was unavailable during the visit but owned the house. The smoking room was located on top of the store that was 4 by 3 *brazas* (20 by 15 feet) and another room where the paraphernalia was stored. When asked for a reason why this did not have the required public den signage, Chua Teco replied that this was only for the private use of certain persons of the shop. It should be noted, however, that the said *fumadero* was registered under a Lim Siapco of Molo (NAP 1896b) yet this observation seemed to have escaped the inspectors.

With this revelation, the group returned to one of the sites along Real Street previously visited in May (the Po-Pangco *quincailleria*) to confirm with the manager whether the *fumadero* was for public or private use. He replied that it was for the exclusive use of the persons in the shop. He was then asked the amount paid to the contractor for the permit to smoke in private, the manager replied that there was no extra fee, the amount paid was only for the cost of opium consumed. They also revisited the textile shop of Marcelino Tan Dico and interviewed a certain Antonio Enriquez Tan Joco to verify whether this was a public or private *fumadero* and whether there was a fee for its exclusive use. The reply was while it was a private one, the consumers only paid for the opium smoked.

The party then proceeded to a grocery store (*almacen de comestibles*) owned by Yap Sequien located at No. 33 Real Street. When asked whether he was operating a *fumadero*, the manager Fernando Ah Leong confirmed by presenting License No. 80. As the small *fumadero* was at the end of the back room, the manager claimed it was for exclusive use and did not pay the contractor for any additional fee to smoke privately except the amount of opium consumed. It is interesting to note that he was the listed proprietor of the Yap Joco list (NAP 1896b). The group then moved next door at No. 32 Real Street to the textile shop of Placido Valenciano Lim Junco where the manager Tan Bun Liang presented License No. 14 and claimed that Lim Junco was in Manila. When asked about the absence of





the required signage, Bun Liang replied that the small smoking area located at the shop's back room was only for the exclusive use of its employees. Concepcion then explained to the commission that these concessions to smoke at home (or privately) were granted only to people of good conduct and whom the contractor trusted.

Concepcion then confirmed to the inspectors of the granting of more smoke-in-private concessions at the start of the contract. He claimed that this practice was prevalent in Manila and other provinces. This was limited to the more well-to-do Chinese who did not wish to mingle with their lower-class and laborer compatriots in the public *fumaderos* (See Tables 2 and 3).

Lopez and Alejo commenced their visit on 28 August without Concepcion, accompanied only by Yu Duna. They proceeded to 'Fumadero No.5' located at Real Street managed by a certain Uy Chinco, which was located at the upper floor of a house consisting of two rooms: one a few *varas* long and ten *varas* (26 feet) wide and the other five by six *varas* (13 by 16 feet). On both beds were found smoking paraphernalia. Outside of the rooms were signs indicating that this was a public *fumadero*.⁸

In all, the inspection and Concepcion's acknowledgment revealed that the distribution of the total number of private *fumaderos* were 49 in Iloilo City proper (if one includes the Ajuy license), 2 in Jaro, 3 in Molo. One of each den in Pototan and Janiuay were also private (See Table 3).

The summative report to the Intendant General dated 15 December 1896 presented the following findings:

1. There were discrepancies between the list of *fumaderos* provided by the contractor and the premises visited by the inspectors. In all cases, neither the names nor the numbers of the individuals tallied.
2. There were deficiencies regarding the proper identification of the *fumadero* with the mandatory bilingual signage in both Chinese and Spanish as required in Clause 19 of the contract; and
3. The contractor granted numerous permits to individuals that enabled them to smoke privately or at home whereas no such right was granted in the contract.



Table 2. Privately-Licensed *Fumaderos* in Iloilo Province under the Yap Joco Opium Concession, April 1896

ILOILO CITY			ILOILO CITY		
Proprietor	Street	Fumadero no.	Proprietor	Street	Fumadero no.
Uy Puatco	-	2	Po Pangco/Po-tien*	Real	82
Lim Mauco	-	4	Yap Boncuan	-	83
Lim Quiengco	-	17	Tan Ganco	Rojas	84
Co Chuypit*	29 Real	19	Y Tiao Quin	Marina	85
Uy Pangco	-	20	Ong Jaco	Rojas	86
Go Tianquin	-	21	Sy Quisin	Mercado	87
Yap Piengco	Real	22	Te Juico	Real	88
Lim Siengco	Arsenal	23	Chua Queco	Iznart	92
Dy Yengco	-	24	Sia Asin	Real	96
Cheng Chuylin	-	25	Chua Junchian	Sta. Rosa	97
Go Guioclian	Real	32	JARO		
Yap Buaco	-	33	Tan Bucu	-	30
Te Uco	-	38	Yap Quico	-	48
Ang Tecsin	Real	42	MOLO		
Lim Ponso	Real	46	Ti Niongchuan	-	9
Queng Lingco	-	52	Lim Siapco/ Go Tiengco?	-	16
Sia Guingco	-	53	Tan Caco	-	31
Yap Pangco	-	54	AJUY		
Yu Yamco	Real	55	Yap Diengco/Uy Limco?*	-	14
Que Caco	-	59	JANIUAY		
Tan Tiongco	Arsenal	64	Que Checo	-	51
Pua Cueco	Arsenal	65	POTOTAN		
M. Pe Changco	Real	66	Sia Chingco	-	57
Joaquin Chay Fong	Real	67	<p>Source: NAP 1896b.</p> <p>NOTE: Names with single asterisks (*) pertain to the inspected <i>fumaderos</i> by the inspectors. The double asterisk (**) indicated a non-matching license. In this case, the license was issued to a Yap Diengco of Ajuy. In August 1896, the license was located at a shop in 32 Real Street owned by Lim Junco.</p>		
Pua Chuquing	Arsenal	68			
Ong Caoco	Real	69			
Ty Ganco	Rojas	70			
Yap Tocsing	Real	71			
Jao Suyco	Real	72			
Sia Gico	Real	73			
Tiu Tiangco	Mercado	74			
Lu Upan	Arsenal	75			
Tan Tiengco	Rojas	76			
Ty Jocco	Mercado	77			
J. Quieng Chionglico	Rojas	78			
Y Apo	Real	79			
Fernando Ah Leong*	33 Real	80			
Chua Biacco	Rojas	81			

Table 3. Publicly-Licensed *Fumaderos* under the Yap Joco Iloilo-Antique Opium Concession, April 1896

ANTIQUÉ PROVINCE			ILOILO PROVINCE		
ANTIQUÉ (HAMTIK?)			JARO		
Proprietor	Street	Fumadero no.	Proprietor	Street	Fumadero no.
Pe Cauco	-	15	Que Tiaoca	Real	8
TIBIAO			Tan Yuchi	Ylaya	18
V.G. Pe Doingco	-	61	Uy Chiaoco	-	27
ILOILO PROVINCE			Lim Sayco	-	29
AJUY			Sin Chuysian	Real	34
Yap Jaco	-	37	Uy Tienchuy	-	35
Yap Dueco	-	39	Tan Guieco	-	36
V. Yap Lliangco	-	62	Yap Dianco	Real	41
BALASAN			Po Jayco	-	49
Co Banco	Real	44	Tan Yamco	-	58
BAROTAC NUEVO			Lim Pangco	Real	93
Lo Ciatco	Real	45	MIAGAO		
CABATUAN			Uy Pungco	Estanquillo	99
Ti Chongbieng	Real	40	MOLO		
DUMANGAS			Uy Oqui	-	10
Yap Cinco	-	13	Sy Uanco	Real	28
Yu Piatco	Estanquillo	100	Tan Jocco	Real	90
ILOILO CITY			Qui lngti	Real	91
Chiat Quiat	Rojas	1	M. Tan Chuyquan	Ylaud	94
Lim Quesin*	Rojas	3	Uy Bingchong	Real	95
Uy Quianco/Chinco*	-	5	OTON		
Que Chayco	-	6	Sy Jocia	Real	89
Tan Tico	Tabucan	7	POTOTAN		
Lim Teco	Tabucan	26	Quin Juatco	-	12
Uy Quiengsuy *	Real	56	Sua Tengco	Real	47
Tan Tungco	Mercado	98	SARA		
JANIUAY			Tan Soico	Real	43
Que Ngoco	-	50	Yap Sinlan	Real	63
Lim Chuitco	-	60	TIGBAUAN		
			Sia Queco	Real	11

Source: NAP 1896b



However, the report also mentioned that while it believed the contractor Yap Joco should be held accountable for his non-compliance, the specific sanction to be imposed on these types of violation seemed to be unclear as the concession's term already ended. It expressed the opinion that this situation needed a resolution through a policy-level review rather than treating it as a purely administrative matter. The file was then forwarded to the Intendant General for consultation as it awaited the reply from the Revenue Section.

That reply came with Benito Perdiguero's memorandum dated 29 December 1896. Perdiguero argued that there was no administrative sanction that can be imposed on the erring concessionaire in this case as no such provision was included in the contract that penalized those whose violations were discovered at the conclusion of the contract.

The spirit of the Decree of 1843 establishing the opium farms was aimed at regulating the supply and use of opium in the colony. In the case of the private concessions, it cannot be argued that there was smuggling *per se* since the inspection revealed that the proprietors were duly licensed and that they only sourced their opium from Yap Joco's group. Perdiguero, however, acknowledged that tolerating the existence of the private *fumaderos* was discreetly practiced in many provinces was due to the significant contributions the opium concessions made to the colonial Treasury. Since the public *fumaderos* being frequented by the ordinary Chinese lacked the pleasurable ambience and comfort, the wealthy merchants and their employees were granted the privilege by the contractor to smoke privately which would eventually benefit government revenues. If the prohibition on private-only licenses were rigorously enforced, the affluent consumer will just simply obtain the opium from the black market. Perdiguero concluded his recommendation by stating that private opium-smoking licenses are getting to be the norm and has taken the appearance of legality. He added that it was about time for the Island's Superior authority to deliberate on this matter. He then ended the memorandum by recommending that the concession provisions be modified to reflect the reality with the view of preventing potential abuses of the private concessions and thereby safeguard the interest of the state.





Conclusions

It would seem that Perdiguero's recommendation to allow the granting of private licenses to Chinese consumers was never adopted by the regime. A sample Calamianes Contract for 1898 still included the smoke-at-home prohibition (NAP 1898b). However, that would not have mattered since Spanish rule would collapse in the next few months to have created a real impact.

Yap Joco was never sanctioned for the breaches of the contract terms. In fact, his manager Yap Tamco requested for a return of the bond that served as a guarantee of solvency of the concession. Yap Joco was cleared and the bond released in January of 1897 (NAP 1897). Yap Tico, Yap Joco, Yap Tamco and Ong Caosay would weather the disruptive events of the Philippine Revolution and the Philippine-American War that saw their consultant, Venancio Concepcion, fight in the battlefield. While the Iloilo-Antique's concession file does not reveal to us how their opium business fared after 1897, we do know that the four were still listed in the 1904 Hongkong Directory. Ong Caosay's name would no longer be in the following year's Directory and only Yap Tico remained by 1908 (Directory 1904, 780; 1905, 786; 1908, 1386; "About Venancio," n.d.).

The proliferation and concentration of *fumaderos* within the Iloilo town proper did amplify the impression that it was one of the largest opium revenue farms that operated outside of Manila in terms of the number of licenses that were issued. With most of the licenses heavily concentrated in one region and dropping drastically further out, it was bound to be noticed by the central authorities. It was through a closer inspection that revealed that quite a number serviced a private clientele, hence suggesting a more dispersed pattern of use and the relative affluence of some of these proprietors who were connected with the regional and colonial economic network.

The Iloilo Inspection reports also reflected the tenuous hold the Spanish opium regime had on the concessionaire. The regime tolerated the policy of allowing affluent Chinese persons and their employees to smoke opium privately at backrooms of shops that doubled as residences despite the fact that it was prohibited by the contract terms. A number of reasons justified this toleration. The lax policy in the enforcement of the





contract enabled affluent consumers a comfortable ambience compared to the public *fumaderos* that were frequented by laborers and lower-class Chinese. Given the high cost of opium use, some sort of accommodation had to be given to the upper-class Chinese who would be in a position to afford and consume more in private comfort. This arrangement became a *fait accompli* in Manila and the other provinces and the Iloilo-Antique concession was no exception, as claimed by Concepcion. The officials' discovery of the wide extent of the deviations from policy such as the failure to put up mandatory bilingual signage, the mix-ups in the contractor's list of licensees, the privatization of *fumaderos* and even trying to find out whether the contractor charged a fee for the concession indicated the contractor's depth and breadth of local control. In the colonial state's attempt to control the bodies of its opium consumers by requiring that *fumaderos* be made public and identifiable to the state's enforcement institutions, some proprietors justified their non-compliance by claiming that their clientele cared more about where to access the drug through the Chinese language rather than the imperial language of Spanish. One must be skeptical, however, of the claim that no such added fee was granted towards the private concessions granted by Yap Joco as the Lopez-led inspection party was accompanied by the farmer's representative Concepcion. One possibility was that the replies by the proprietors would have been already orchestrated. At the end of the day, the Spanish regime ended up renegotiating its power and influence with the contractor when it absolved Yap Joco from accountability.

As a final note, when it was the United States' turn to formulate its own comprehensive drug policy, its newly-acquired Philippine colony became the battleground and Iloilo province weighed in its voice. Protests against the government's plan to reinstate the opium concession system led to a series of events culminating in a total ban on nonmedical opium use in 1908, which eventually became the international norm. One such event was the publication of the Philippine Opium Report in 1905 that eventually recommended gradual prohibition. Of the Filipino resource persons in the Report, the renowned former revolutionary-turned-provincial health chief, Pablo Araneta stood out because of his very detailed analysis of the opium situation in Iloilo province. By this time, as Table 1 showed, opium use had spread to other towns in the span of 7 years. Despite this, Araneta





confidently claimed that in towns where it was smoked, “99 per cent” had “a sentiment of repugnance” (US War Department 1905, 144).

However, Araneta was also realistic as he surveyed the opium situation in his province. When asked about his opinion on whether absolute prohibition of opium use for everyone was a practical solution, he and 5 other interviewees took the position that such was impractical. Several in the majority thought that such a policy “would be a violent measure for those already addicted to the vice,” however it was nevertheless “practicable and expedient.” A schoolteacher even stated that “It matters not that a few hundred may be killed as a result, for in return we shall overcome an evil that threatens to destroy the majority of the Filipino people” (US War Department 1905, 146). Araneta believed, however, that while its general use among Filipinos ought to be absolutely prohibited, the Chinese and Filipinos already “enslaved to the habit” should be allowed to continue provided that the government charged a high premium for the privilege with the Filipinos paying a higher fee (US War Department 1905, 146, 147, 157). Eventually did this not happen as the American government eventually phased out opium use and prohibited it in 1908.

This essay attempted to explore one instance where these contestations of power played out throughout the life of the opium revenue farm in the Philippines. The 1896 Iloilo Inspection Reports reflected a mechanism whereby the colonial government adopted a *modus vivendi* attitude in delegating its local regulatory functions to the private concessionaire since it lacked the necessary means to enforce a strict regime. The illegal practice of granting *fumadero* licenses to private individuals or spaces was already noted in the late 1860’s, not to mention the numerous cases of opium smuggling that were being dealt with. Nonetheless, it was tolerated in practice because in the light of the mandatory restrictions on opium use against non-Chinese, it was a way of increasing the concessionaire’s profit margin which would eventually benefit the colonial state’s coffers in the form of increased contract value at the next triennial auction. This *imperium in imperio* policy of accommodation with the private entrepreneurs continued to prevail for as long as the colonial bureaucracy saw the direct benefits of outsourcing such specialized services. When colonial officials, however, tried to reassert state control over the opium consumer through the public *fumadero*, it found it difficult to enforce





such a scheme without pushing the contractor and their affluent clientele to resort to non-legal means of peddling and consuming an addictive substance.

Notes

1. This practice was also observed among the Taosug aristocracy of the Sulu Sultanate as they discussed trade and politics (Warren 2007, 20–21, 99).
2. 8 *reales* made up one peso while a *tahil* was the equivalent of 1.3 ounces or 36.85 grams (Trocki 1999, 185; Permanyer-Ugartemendia 2013, x)
3. The year as to when the policy review and the issuance of the decision occurred is in dispute. The claim of September 1864 was from the book written by the German observer Fedor Jagor who mentions the year twice and appears in both the original German (1873) and its Spanish translation (1875) with the extant portions of the decree copied. The Spanish writer Rafael Comenge claims in his book published in 1894 and accepted by scholars such as Wickberg and Gamella and Martin a year of 1849. However, he identically reproduces the same extant portions of the decision that appeared in Jagor without introducing new ones, suggesting Comenge copied off Jagor's account and committed a typographical error. From the internal evidence, it seems that Jagor was more consistent in his references to works of De Mas and Pedro Mata whose works were already known and published before 1864. Comenge, on the other hand, interspersed comments that seemed anachronistic. For example, he cites a De Mas book that would not be published until 1861 but which Jagor footnoted! The extant text of the document does refer to ongoing treaty negotiations with China. It would not be signed until October 1864. The English translation of Jagor's work omits the appendices including the opium article. (Mas 1861, 377; Jagor 1873, 309-310; Jagor 1875a; Jagor 1875b, 325-326; Comenge 1894, 161–162; Wickberg 1965, 114–115; Gamella and Martin 1992, 67; Martinez Robles 2015, 721).
4. To a certain extent, British Burma paralleled the Philippine model. The British Chief Commissioner of Burma Charles Aitchison recommended in 1881 to formally allow Chinese and Indian persons to consume opium but banned it for the ethnic Burmans. This policy was adopted for the whole of Burma by 1893, and excluded some ethnic groups. In Assam province, the regime also auctioned off licenses to entrepreneurs on condition that the number of





opium shops was to be limited per district. Lastly, the legal restrictions placed on opium use limited the opportunity for revenue extraction. British Burma's opium revenue in 1885 was 10.3 percent (Wright, 58–59, 82–83, 158).

5. A half-peseta was equivalent to two *reales* (Potet 2016, 99).
6. The report could have been restating the figure given in *Guia Oficial de Filipinas of 1895* and therefore treated with caution. There were around 300,000 inhabitants of the province at the time (Guia 1895, 730).
7. A *braza* was roughly 6 feet (Moreno 1972, 113).
8. A *vara* is equivalent to 81 centimeters (Potet 2016, 138).

Bibliography

- “About Venancio Concepcion.” n.d. *The Philippine Diary Project*. <https://goo.gl/QNzXgh>. Accessed 14 August 2016.
- Alejandro, Jose. 1949. *The Price of Freedom*. Translated by Jose M. Alejandro. Mandaluyong: Solar Books, 1987.
- Alvarez, Jose Antonio Canton. 2015. “Opio, Comercio y Colonialismo: El Opio en la Penetracion Colonial Europea en Asia y China.” Dissertation, University of Granada.
- Archivo Historico Nacional. 1844. “Sobre Estancamiento del Opio en Filipinas sin Aprobacion Real Previa.” *Ultramar* 430/30, 1. August 22.
- Balanza Mercantil del Comercio de las Islas Filipinas*. 1855. N.p. Manila.
- . 1858. N.p. Manila.
- Bamero, Alma M. 2006. “Opium: The Evolution of Polices, the Tolerance of the Vice, and the Proliferation of Contraband Trade in the Philippines, 1843-1908.” *Social Science Diliman* 3, 49–83.
- Berriz, Miguel Rodriguez. 1888. *Diccionario de la Administracion de Filipinas, Anuario de 1888*, Book 1. Manila: M. Perez (Hijo).
- Bersales, Jobers. 2013. “How About Our Local Heroes?” *Philippine Daily Inquirer*. 5 December. Accessed 21 July 2016.
- Brook, Timothy and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, eds. 2000. *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839–1952*. Berkeley: University of California Press.





- Brown, Ian. 1993. "The End of the Opium Farm in Siam, 1905-7." In *The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming: Business Elites and the Emergence of the Modern State in Southeast Asia*. Edited by John Butcher and Howard Dick, 233-245. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Butcher, John. 1993. "Revenue Farming and the Changing State in Southeast Asia." In *The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming: Business Elites and the Emergence of the Modern State in Southeast Asia*. Edited by John Butcher and Howard Dick, 19-44. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Buzeta, Manuel at Felipe Bravo. 1851. *Diccionario Geografico-Estadistico-Historico de las Islas Filipinas*. Volume 2. Madrid: Imprenta de D. Jose C. de la Peña.
- Camba, Andres Garcia. 1839. *Los Diez y Seis Meses de Mando Superior de Filipinas*. Cadiz: Imprenta de D. Domingo Feros.
- The Chronicle and Directory for China, Japan, and the Philippines for the Year 1877*. Hongkong: Daily Press.
- Chu, Richard T. 2012. *Chinese and Chinese Mestizos of Manila: Family, Identity and Culture, 1860s-1930s*. Manila: Anvil.
- Chu, Richard T. and Teresita Ang See. 2016. "Toward a History of Chinese Burial Grounds in Manila during the Spanish Colonial Period." *Archipel* 92: 63-90.
- Comenge, Rafael. 1894. *Cuestiones Filipinas, Una Parte: Los Chinos*. Maynila: Chofre y Compania.
- Corpuz, Onofre. *Roots of the Filipino Nation*. 1989. Quezon City: Aklahi, 2 vols.
- Crafts, Wilbur, Mary Leitch and Margaret Leitch. 1905. *Intoxicants and Opium in All Lands and Times*. Washington D.C.: The International Reform Bureau.
- Derks, Hans. *History of the Opium Problem: The Assault on the East, ca. 1600-1950*. Leiden: Brill, 2012.
- "Diary of Venancio Concepcion." Undated photo. *The Philippine Diary Project: Diary Entries from Philippine History*. <https://goo.gl/QNzXgh>.





- Diaz-Arenas, Rafael. 1850. *Memorias Historicas y Estadisticas de Filipinas y Particularmente de la Grande Isla de Luzon*, Book 8. Imprenta del Diario de Manila.
- Diehl, F.W. 1993. "Revenue Farming and Colonial Finances in the Netherlands East Indies, 1816–1925." In *The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming: Business Elites and the Emergence of the Modern State in Southeast Asia*. Edited by John Butcher at Howard Dick, 196–232. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Dick, Howard. 1993. "A Fresh Approach to Southeast Asian History. In *The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming: Business Elites and the Emergence of the Modern State in Southeast Asia*." Edited by John Butcher and Howard Dick, 3-8. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Dikotter, Frank, Lars Laamann and Zhou Xun. 2004. *Narcotic Culture: A History of Drugs in China*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- The Directory and Chronicle for China, Japan, Corea, Indo-China, Straits Settlements, Malay States, Siam, Netherlands India, Borneo and the Philippines*. 1888. Hongkong: Daily Press.
- . 1894. Hongkong: Daily Press.
- . 1899. Hongkong: Daily Press.
- . 1904. Hongkong: Daily Press.
- . 1905. Hongkong: Daily Press.
- . 1908. Hongkong: Daily Press.
- Doeppers, Daniel F. 2016. *Feeding Manila in Peace and War, 1850–1945*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Fay, Peter Ward. 1975. *The Opium War, 1840–1842: Barbarians in the Celestial Empire in the Early Part of the Nineteenth Century and the War by which they Forced Her Gates*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 1999.
- Gamella, Juan and Elisa Martin 1992. "Las Rentas de Anfon: El Monopolio Español del Opio en Filipinas (1844–1898) y su Rechazo por la Administracion Norteamericana." *Revista de Indias* 194, 61–106.





- Guia Oficial de las Islas Filipinas para 1895*. Manila: Chofre y Compania.
- Hernandez, Vicente S. 1996. "The Spanish Colonial Library Institutions." *Philippine Studies* 44 (3): 321–348.
- Jagor, Fedor. 1873. *Reisen in den Philippinen*. Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung.
- . 1875a. *Travels in the Philippines*. London: Chapman and Hall.
- . 1875b. *Viajes por Filipinas*. Translated by S. Vidal y Soler, Madrid: Aribau y Co.
- M.G.H. 1900. "American Rule in [the] Philippines." *New York Times*. August 5, 10.
- Martinez-Robles, David. 2015. "Constructing Sovereignty in Nineteenth-Century China: The Negotiation of Reciprocity in the Sino-Spanish Treaty Of 1864." *International History Review* 38 (4): 719–740.
- Mas, Sinibaldo de. 1853. *Articulo Sobre las Rentas de Filipinas, copiado del Boletin Oficial de Ministerio de Hacienda, num. 174*. Madrid: Imp. Y Est. de M. Rivadeneyra.
- McCoy, Alfred W. 1982. "A Queen Dies Slowly: The Rise and Decline of Iloilo City." In *Philippine Social History: Global Trade and Local Transformations*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1981. 297–358.
- McMahon, Keith. 2002. *The Fall of the God of Money: Opium Smoking in Nineteenth Century China*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Moreno, Federico. 1972. *Philippine Law Dictionary*. Third Edition. Quezon City: Rex Bookstore.
- Montero y Vidal, Jose. 1876. *Cuentos Filipinos*. Translated by Renan S. Prado, et al., Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. 2004.
- Nankoe, Hakiem, Jean-Claude Gerlus and Martin J. Murray. 1993. "The Origins of the Opium Trade and the Opium Regie in Colonial Indochina." In *The Rise and Fall of Revenue Farming: Business Elites and the Emergence of the Modern State in Southeast Asia*. Edited by John Butcher and Howard Dick, 182–194. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- National Archives of the Philippines (NAP). 1851. "Expediente promovido por D. Ciriaco Bautista, asentista de los fumaderos del opio





- manifestando los diferentes modos con que se hace el contrabando de dicha droga y los medios para remediar dicho mal." *Anfion: Varias Provincias, 1835-1898*, Book 1, no. 25: 2.
- . 1851–1853. "Peticones varias de asentista de opio relativas a la espedicion de nombramiento para su comisonados o titulos respectivas." *Ramos de Anfion*.
- . 1857. "Pliego de Condiciones." *Anfion: Binondo, 1849–1869*, Book 1, Exp. 5.
- . 1868. "Certifico que Tan Toco ha comprador para el Surtido de los Fumaderos de Binondo." *Anfion: Manila, 1837-1898*, Book 2, Exp. 20.
- . 1869a. "Pliego de Condiciones." *Anfion: Manila*, Book 6, Exp. 46.
- . 1869b. "Expediente del Sr. Administrador del Alcalde Mayor de Cebu referente a una carta de pago y otros documentos a D. Ygnacio Rocha, como contratista de los fumaderos de opio de esa provincia." *Anfion: Varias Provincias, 1869–1896*, Exp.1.
- . 1870. "Relacion de los Fumaderos de Anfion Establecidos en esta Provincia." *Anfion: Zamboanga*, Book 2, Exp. 6.
- . 1874. "Relacion de los Fumaderos Publicos de Anfion que Establecer el Contratista de los Mismos." *Anfion: Ambos Ilocos, 1868–1886*, Book 1, Exp. 5.
- . 1882. [List of Fumaderos in Nueva Ecija]. *Anfion: Varias Provincias, 1880–1894*, Book 1, Exp. 3.
- . 1884a. "Relacion de los fumaderos de Anfion en los pueblos de esta provincia." *Anfion: Albay*, Book 2.
- . 1884b. "Incidente interior del promovido por el Chino Tan Janco, pidiendo el bastantes del poder otorgado por el mismo a favor de sus paisanos Saturnino Tan Tiatco y Federico Uy Choco para que lerepresenten en la contrata de anfion de Iloilo y Antique." *Anfion: Iloilo*, Book 1, Exp.2.
- . 1886. "Estado comprensivo del opio importado por el contratista de los fumaderos de anfion de la provincial de la Pampanganga a partir desde el 1 de Febrero hasta el 31 de Octubre del corriente año." *Anfion: Varias Provincias, 1880-1894*, Book 7, 1–14b.





- . 1887. [Letters of Ramon Aenlle to the Intendant General]. *Anfion: Varias Provincias, 1880–1894*, Book 7, 18–36.
- . 1888. “La relacion detallada sobre la cantidad de opio introducido en esta provincia.” *Anfion: Varias Provincias, 1880–1894*, Book 2, 1–42.
- . 1892. [Case Number 7499 vs. Eulalio Guidote Co Bun-U]. *Anfion: Binondo*.
- . 1893. “Carpeta del expediente interior, referente al arriendo por un trienio de los fumaderos de anfion de las provincias de Iloilo y Antique.” *Anfion: Iloilo*, Book 1, Exp.6.
- . 1896a. “Por disposicion del Sr. Inspector lo se hizo la visita de Inspeccion los fumaderos de tenia establecidos en toda la localidad de Iloilo el contratista del anfion el chino Jose Enrique Yap Joco.” *Anfion: Iloilo*, Book 1, Exp.8.
- . 1896b. “Fumadores [*sic*] de esta provincia de Iloilo y Antique.” *Anfion: Iloilo*, Book 1, Exp.9.
- . 1896c. “Decreto de Adjudicacion definitiva del servicio de arriendo de los fumaderos de anfion de las provincia de Iloilo y Antique a favor del Chino Ong Caosay.” *Anfion: Iloilo*, Book 1, Exp.7.
- . 1897. [Request by Sebastian Yap Tamco to cancel the bond for the 1893-1896 opium contract]. In *Anfion: Iloilo*, Book 1, Exp.6: 24–26.
- . 1898b. “Pliego de Condiciones.” *Anfion: Palawan*, Book 1: 43–44.
- Omohundro, John T. 1981. *Chinese Merchant Families in Iloilo: Commerce and Kin in a Central Philippine City*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press.
- Permanyer-Ugartemendia, Ander. 2013. “La Participacion Española en la Economia del Opio en Asia Oriental tras el Fin del Galeon.” Ph.D. Dissertation. Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Potet, Jean-Paul. 2016. *Numbers and Units in Old Tagalog*. Raleigh: Lulu Press.
- Philippine Revolutionary Papers. 1898. Letter of Carlos Palanca to Emilio Aguinaldo. Document 222.10. September 6.
- Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court. 1904. “McCullough, E.C. vs. R. Aenlle & Co.” *Government Reports*. G.R. No. 1300. 3 February.





- . 1922. "People of the Philippine Islands vs. Venancio Concepcion." *Government Reports*. G.R. No. L-18535. 15 August.
- Rizal, Jose. 1890. Rizal's Letter to Dr. Adolf Bernhard Meyer. In *Jose Rizal: Pakikipagsulatan sa Iba't Ibang Tao*. Manila: National Historical Commission of the Philippines.
- . 1891. *El Filibusterismo*. Translated by Ma. Soledad Lacson-Locsin. Makati: Bookmark, 2008.
- Rush, James R. 1990. *Opium to Java: Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia, 1860-1910*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Schumacher, John and Cushner, Nicholas P. 1969. "Documents Relating to Father Jose Burgos and the Cavite Mutiny of 1872." *Philippine Studies* vol. 17 (3): 457–529.
- Souza, George Bryan. 2009. "Opium and the Company: Maritime Trade and Imperial Finances on Java, 1684–1796." *Modern Asian Studies* 43 (1): 113–133.
- Taylor, Arnold H. 1967. "American Confrontation with Opium Traffic in the Philippines." *Pacific Historical Review* 36: 307–324.
- Trocki, Carl A. 1990. *Opium and Empire: Chinese Society in Colonial Singapore, 1800–1910*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- . 1999. *Opium, Empire and the Global Political Economy: A Study of the Asian Opium Trade, 1750–1950*. London: Routledge.
- . 2000. "Drugs, Taxes, and Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia." In *Opium Regimes: China, Britain, and Japan, 1839–1952*. Timothy Brook and Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, eds. Berkeley: University of California Press, 79–104.
- United States Library of Congress. 1924. "Opium Den on Malinta Street, Manila, Philippine Islands." cph 3c03376 //hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/cph.3c03376. Accessed March 9, 2013.
- United States War Department. 1901. *Report of the United States Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War for the Period from December 1, 1900 to October 15, 1901*. Part 2. Washington: Government Printing Office.





- . 1905. *Report of the Committee Appointed by the Philippine Commission to Investigate the Use of Opium and the Traffic Therein and the Rules, Ordinances and Laws Regulating Such Use and Traffic in Japan, Formosa, Shanghai, Hongkong, Saigon, Singapore, Burmah, Java and the Philippine Islands*. Washington, DC: Bureau of Insular Affairs.
- Viana, Lorelei D.C. de. 2001. *Three Centuries of Binondo Architecture, 1594–1898: A Socio-Historical Perspective*. Manila: UST Press.
- Victoria, Ferdinand Philip. 2015. “The Most Humane of Any that Could be Adopted: The Philippine Opium Committee Report and the Imagining of the Opium Consumer’s World in the Colonial Philippines, 1903–1905.” In *Towards a Filipino History: A Festschrift for Zeus A. Salazar*. Edited by Portia Reyes. Quezon City: BAKAS, 88–156.
- . 2018. “*El Monstruo de Vicio*: Isang Pagbasa at Pagtalakay sa Apyan/Opyo sa Pilipinas at mga Kaugnayan Nito sa *Noli* at *Fili* ni Jose Rizal.” *Saliksik* 7 (1): 133–191.
- Warren, James Francis. 2003. *Rickshaw Coolie: A People’s History of Singapore, 1880–1940*, Second Edition. Singapore: National University of Singapore. 1986.
- . 2007. *The Sulu Zone, 1768–1898: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State*, Second Edition. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 1981.
- Wertz, Daniel J.P. 2013. “Idealism, Imperialism, and Internationalism: Opium Politics in the Colonial Philippines, 1898–1925.” *Modern Asian Studies* 47 (2): 467–499.
- Wickberg, Edgar. 1965. *The Chinese in Philippine Life: 1850–1898*. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press. 2000.
- Wilson, Andrew R. 2004. *Ambition and Identity: Chinese Merchant Elites in Colonial Manila, 1880–1916*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- Wright, Ashley. 2014. *Opium and Empire in Southeast Asia: Regulating Consumption in British Burma*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Zheng, Yangwen. 2005. *The Social Life of Opium in China*. Cambridge University Press.

